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Abstract 
The bulk of British army officers during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were 
junior officers, namely officers who held the rank of captain, or lower. Scholarship revealing the 
intellectual and cultural life of the British army during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
is expanding; however, junior officers have received little specific scholarly attention. This 
thesis is the first full-length study of junior army officers, and has ‘identity and experience’ as its 
central themes. A combination of military and cultural history, this thesis examines British 
junior officers as products of the military and of Georgian society, and draws on histories of 
masculinity, family life, and national and political identities to interpret their experiences.  This 
thesis focuses on the lived experiences of junior officers, and interrogates three main types of 
personal accounts, namely letters, diaries and journals, and memoirs. This group of officers 
developed a set of sensibilities and perspectives that were bound to their middling status within 
the army’s hierarchy.  Junior officers were imbued with significant authority over the rank and 
file, yet were subjected to the authority of superior officers. As some of the youngest members 
of the officer corps, junior officers straddled the lines between the civilian and military spheres, 
and between youth and adulthood.  
This thesis argues that the tensions inherent in such a position saw junior officers develop an 
identity as junior officers, which shaped other aspects of their identity. Junior officers fashioned 
identities as ‘polite gentlemen’, with the regimental mess inculcating a sense of gentlemanly 
value. Junior officers displayed careerist and professional ambitions, and hoped for promotion 
to deliver them from their subordinate position. While the honour culture of the officer corps 
could conflict with some new officers’ sense of masculinity, junior officers found themselves 
embroiled in a performative culture of honour, which included fighting duels. Although military 
service entailed separation from family and friends, junior officers were adept at staying in 
touch with family members, with some officers contriving to bring their families into the field. 
These family bonds proved strong enough to outweigh comparatively fluid regimental loyalties. 
Drawing on their social standing and the language of sensibility, junior officers styled 
themselves as brave patriarchs, leading from the front and caring for their men. Serving within a 
truly ‘British’ army, junior officers’ service had the effect of dissolving national differences, 
while their conceptions of patriotism broadened as the Revolutionary War gave way to war 
with Napoleon. 
1 
Introduction 
George Wood, the son of an army officer, was commissioned as an ensign in the 82nd Foot in 
August 1806 and was initially enamoured with his career choice. Wood recalled in his memoir 
that he was: ‘much struck with the new mode of life I was about to lead, from its apparent 
splendour.’1 Wounded in the Peninsula at the 1813 Battle of Vitoria, Wood was promoted to 
captain in 1814, before retiring to half-pay in 1816, meaning that he would never attain field 
rank, despite his decade of military service. Wood’s conception of himself as a soldier was 
inherently bound to his middling status within the military hierarchy, which at once invested 
him with considerable moral and personal authority over the rank and file, yet condemned him 
to subordination at the hands of superior officers. His 1825 memoir, The Subaltern Officer, had 
the stated aim of drawing attention to the experiences of subalterns during the Napoleonic 
Wars, with Wood claiming: ‘The Journals and Memoirs of Private Soldiers have been frequently 
published; but not those of Subaltern Officers, on whom so much depends, and whose duties are 
of a different nature, and far more arduous than those imposed upon individuals in the ranks.’2 
In addition to fatiguing responsibilities, Wood was galled at his subservience to superior 
authority, and was overjoyed at becoming his ‘own master’ upon retirement, ‘not subject to 
orders, reprimands, or martial law, I found myself as light as a bird that has had the door of its 
cage thrown open and been set at liberty.’3 Evidently, Wood believed that subalterns were a 
feature of the army in their own right, at once distinct from the rankers they commanded, and 
the superior officers who commanded them.  
George Wood was one member of a group which expanded considerably in size during the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Two decades of nearly constant warfare with 
France saw the British regular army expand from a size of 50, 000 men in 1793, to a peak of 
250, 000 in 1813.4 This expansion was accompanied by an increase in the number of officers in 
the army: on the eve of war with Revolutionary France, there were 3, 107 officers on full-pay. In 
1814, there were 10, 590 full-pay officers in the British service.5 The bulk of officers in the 
British army were the junior level officers below field rank, namely ensigns, cornets, second-
lieutenants, lieutenants, second-captains and captains. While some junior officers of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars would have long and illustrious military careers that would 
1 George Wood, The Subaltern Officer: A Narrative (London, 1825), p. 2.  
2 Wood, The Subaltern, pp. vi-vii. 
3 Wood, The Subaltern, p. 247.  
4 David Gates, ‘The Transformation of the Army, 1783-1815’, in The Oxford History of the British Army, ed. Ian 
Beckett and David G. Chandler (Oxford, 1994), p. 132. 
5 Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army in the Peninsula, 1808-1814 (Newton Abbot, 1977), p. 36. These figures 
refer to officers of the infantry, cavalry, and technical branches. They exclude garrison and veteran battalions. 
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extend long into the mid-Victorian era, far more would end their careers as junior officers, 
either being reduced to half-pay in the years following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, or 
retiring after finding promotion rates too sluggish at the war’s end.  
Inevitably, such a large cohort of officers included individuals of diverse social and national 
backgrounds, outlooks, and experiences. At one end of the scale, there were blue-blooded 
aristocrats, who rubbed shoulders with other well-heeled officers in prestigious Guards and 
cavalry regiments, while at the other end there were officers who managed to hurdle the social 
divide and were commissioned from the ranks into less celebrated line infantry regiments. In 
between, there were officers from a variety of land-owning and professional backgrounds. One 
point of commonality within this diverse group was their middling status within the British 
military machine. Complicating their position further was the gentlemanly culture of the officer 
corps, which encouraged junior officers to consider themselves worthy of interacting with even 
the most senior officers as ‘polite gentlemen’. The tensions inherent in such a position provided 
junior officers with a shared set of sensibilities, aspirations, and complaints, albeit ones that 
were coloured by differences between individual officers. Virtually every junior officer, 
regardless of social and regimental background, yearned for promotion and recognition, 
complained of the strictures of the military hierarchy, and was conscious of their relatively 
limited perspective on the war. Although these characteristics could be more pronounced 
amongst subaltern officers, these sentiments did not dissipate if officers were promoted to a 
captaincy, suggesting that there was considerable continuity between the experiences of 
subalterns and captains.  
A combination of military and cultural history, this thesis is a study of officers at these junior 
ranks, whose particular place within the army and Georgian society has been the subject of 
limited historical inquiry. This thesis examines only British and Irish officers serving in the 
British army, and does not explore the experiences of foreign officers in the British service. 
Foreign officers in the British army were likely to have interpreted their experiences through a 
different cultural framework to their British comrades, which would almost certainly have 
produced a different set of responses and identities which are deserving of their own study. 
Revolving around the central themes of experience and identity, this thesis explores how junior 
officers’ cultural backgrounds and military experiences shaped their concepts of themselves as 
soldiers, gentlemen, family members, friends, leaders, and Britons. Drawing on personal 
testimonies from seventy-seven British officers who served as junior officers in the infantry, 
cavalry, and technical branches of the army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars, this thesis is a study of junior officers in all their guises, and how they thought and wrote 
about their own place within the British army and society during the period 1793-1815. 
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British Junior Officers in History 
Befitting the length and scale of the wars, the historiography of Britain’s role in the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is vast. Military historians have covered substantial 
historical ground to provide a rich overview of the conflicts. There are several wide-ranging 
narratives of the conflicts, in addition to which, there are also more focused campaign and battle 
studies, such as Charles Esdaile’s consummate survey of the Peninsular War.6 In addition to 
these campaign narratives, historians have also explored how the British army was 
administered and reformed during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.7 J.A. Houlding’s 
study of the training of the eighteenth-century British army up to the beginning of war with 
Revolutionary France provides important context for the army in the period 1793-1815.8 The 
methodological approach of the ‘new military history’ has seen an increased focus on the 
relationship between warfare and eighteenth-century British society and culture. Warfare has 
been recognised as having a pivotal role in shaping British society during the eighteenth 
century. In Britons, Linda Colley argued that war with France was crucial in the formation of a 
‘British’ national identity, while John Brewer, Stephen Conway, Anthony Page, and Kathleen 
Wilson have all explored how the demands of warfare affected the British state and politics.9 
There are several studies into the impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on Britain 
and Britain’s response to the wars, such as Clive Emsley’s history of British society during the 
wars, and John Cookson’s study of the volunteer movement.10 The focus on the organisation of 
the British army, and the effect of war on British society, however, has ensured that the 
character of the army has been understudied, as historians have traditionally treated the army 
                                                          
6 Narratives of the conflict can be found in: Jeremy Black, Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815 (London, 
1999), pp. 193-220; Anthony Page, Britain and the Seventy Years War, 1744-1815: Enlightenment, Revolution, 
and Empire (Basingstoke, 2015), pp. 42-59; Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 (New 
Haven, CT, 1996). More focused studies include: Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (London, 
2003); Rory Muir, Salamanca, 1812 (New Haven, CT, 2001). 
7  Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 1963); Alan 
J. Guy, ed., The Road to Waterloo: The British Army and the Struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France (London, 1990); Glover, Wellington’s Army. 
8 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1795-1815 (Oxford, 1981).  
9 Linda Colley, Britons; Forging the Nation: 1707-1837, revised ed. (New Haven, CT, 2014), pp. 17-8; John 
Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (London, 1989); Stephen Conway, 
War, State, and Society in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 2006); Page, Britain and the 
Seventy Years War; Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 
1715-1785 (Cambridge, 1995). 
10 Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815 (London, 1979); John Cookson, The British 
Armed Nation, 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1997). Other studies include: Roger Knight, Britain against Napoleon: The 
Organisation of Victory, 1793-1815 (London, 2014); Emma Vincent Macleod, A War of Ideas: British Attitudes 
to the Wars against Revolutionary France, 1792-1802 (Aldershot, 1998); Mark Philip, ed., Resisting Napoleon: 
The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot, 2006). 
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as an institution that existed separate to the rest of Georgian Britain.11 Stephen Brumwell, Sylvia 
Frey, and Roger Norman Buckley have all produced important social histories of the army 
during the mid-late eighteenth century, while Edward J. Coss has examined the social 
backgrounds and campaign experiences of British rankers during the Peninsular War.12 These 
studies, however, have been the exception rather than the rule. This stands in contrast to 
France, where considerable scholarship has examined the relationship between the French 
army and French society during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.13  
Recently, historians have begun to fill this gap in scholarship by more thoroughly exploring the 
character of the Georgian army, and its relationship to eighteenth-century British society and 
culture.14 Crucially, this expanded scope has resulted in a greater consideration of the 
combatants who made up the Georgian army, with the aim of understanding how soldiers’ 
cultural backgrounds shaped their interpretations of the military experience.15 This approach 
has seen gender, identity, and religion become important areas of research with regards to the 
Georgian army.16 Two recent studies of British combatants during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars exemplify this approach. Catriona Kennedy surveyed the experiences of 
soldiers on and off the battlefield in her study of how individuals narrated their experiences of 
                                                          
11 Kevin Linch, Britain and Wellington’s Army: Recruitment, Society and Tradition, 1807-15 (Basingstoke, 2011), 
p. 3; William P. Tatum, ‘Challenging the New Military History: The Case of the Eighteenth-Century British Army 
Studies’, History Compass, 5 (2007), pp. 72-84.  
12 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge, 2002); 
Roger Norman Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age 
(Gainesville, FL, 1998);  Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the 
Revolutionary Period (Austin TX, 1981); Edward J. Coss, All for the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier under 
Wellington, 1808-1814 (Norman, OK, 2010). 
13 For example, see John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of 
Revolutionary France, 1791-94 (Boulder, CO, 1996); Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution: 
From Citizen Soldiers to Instruments of Power (Princeton, NJ, 1988); Alan Forrest, The Soldiers of the French 
Revolution and Empire (London, 2002); David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of 
Warfare as We Know It (Boston, 2007); Michael J. Hughes, Forging Napoleon’s Grand Armée: Motivation, 
Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808 (New York, NY, 2012). 
14 For a review of recent literature, see Charles Esdaile, ‘The British Army in the Napoleonic Wars: Approaches 
Old and New’, English Historical Review, 130 (2015), pp. 123-37. 
15 For an overview of this approach, see Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, ‘Defining Soldiers: Britain’s 
Military, 1740-1815’, War in History, 20 (2013), pp. 144-59; Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, 
‘Wellington’s Men: The British Soldier of the Napoleonic Wars’, History Compass, 13 (2015), pp. 288-96. 
16 John Cookson, ‘Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the Experience of British Soldiers during the Napoleonic 
Wars’, in Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars, 1790-1820, ed. Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 23-42; Karen 
Hagemann, Gisela Mettele, & Jane Rendall, eds., Gender, War, and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-
1830 (Basingstoke, 2010); Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack, eds., Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 
1750-1850: Men of Arms (Basingstoke, 2012). Studies over a longer period include: Jennine Hurl-Eamonn, 
Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century: ‘The Girl I Left Behind Me’ (Oxford, 2014); 
Michael Snape, The Redcoat and Religion: The Forgotten History of the British Soldier from the Age of 
Marlborough to the Eve of the First World War (London, 2005); Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, eds., 
Britain’s Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society, 1715-1815 (Liverpool, 2014). 
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war throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.17 Delving into British soldiers’ 
identities as travellers and ethnographers, Gavin Daly has explored the attitudes of British 
soldiers towards their Portuguese and Spanish allies during the Peninsular War, and revealed 
how cross-cultural contact informed soldiers’ conceptions of British national identity.18 Central 
to these histories was a consideration of British soldiers’ lives away from the battlefield, with 
soldiers’ time spent sightseeing or dancing integrated into the military experience. What has 
emerged from this scholarship is a better-rounded image of Georgian soldiers and officers; 
however, there is still considerable scope for exploring the cultural dimensions of the army 
during this period. 
This thesis sits within the latter wave of historiography. Even within this expanding field, junior 
officers have been afforded little specific space. Owing to the work of Michael Glover on the 
system of commissions and promotions, the social background of new officers and the basic 
features of the lives of junior officers during the Napoleonic Wars are well-established.19 
Similarly, Alan J. Guy produced a study of the financial lives of eighteenth-century officers, the 
patterns of which are relevant to the study of junior officers during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, while Rory Muir has explored the functional role of junior officers in battle.20 
It is only recently that the cultural lives of junior officers have begun to be specifically explored. 
Neil Ramsey examined the authorial style of subaltern memoirists; however, it is only the recent 
work of Catriona Kennedy that has seen junior officers studied as an historical group in their 
own right.21 Kennedy examined the implications of military service on subalterns’ sense of 
masculinity, and also revealed how new subalterns negotiated the passage between the civilian 
and military worlds.22 This lack of scholarship devoted specifically to junior officers may be a 
result of the tendency to see officers as a homogenous block, owing to the social distinction 
between officers and the ranks. In his study of the British ranker in the Peninsula, for example, 
Coss viewed the officer corps as united by their wealth, which prevented officers from forming 
and understanding of rankers’ experiences and motivations.23 While it is true that junior 
                                                          
17 Catriona Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and Civilian Experience in 
Britain and Ireland (Basingstoke, 2013), especially chapters 2 and 3. 
18 Gavin Daly, The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814 
(Basingstoke, 2013). 
19 Michael Glover, ‘The Purchase of Commissions: A Reappraisal’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 58 (1980), pp.223-35; Wellington’s Army, pp. 36-44, 76-89. 
20 Alan J. Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-1763 
(Manchester, 1985); Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (New Haven, CT, 
1998), chapters 9 and 10. 
21 Neil Ramsey, The Military Memoir and Romantic Literary Culture, 1780-1835 (Farnham, 2011), pp. 137-65. 
22Catriona Kennedy, ‘John Bull into Battle: Military Masculinity and the British Army Officer during the 
Napoleonic Wars’, in Gender, War, and Politics, pp. 127-46; Kennedy, Narratives, pp. 41-8. 
23 Coss, All for the King’s Shilling, pp. 123-5. 
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officers’ sensibilities had more in common with their superiors than their subordinates, viewing 
the officer corps as a whole overlooks important nuances in the experiences of officers. 
Furthermore, junior officers’ relative obscurity and inability to influence the direction of the 
war effort does not lend their stories to the grand histories or biographies. This stands in 
contrast to the numerous histories of celebrated commanders, most notably the Duke of 
Wellington.24  
Owing to the wealth of primary source material authored by junior officers, their accounts have 
been regularly included in wider studies; however, this has normally been as an adornment to 
the narrative, rather than the focus of historical enquiry.  This thesis, therefore, is the first full-
length study to focus specifically on the experiences of junior officers during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. As a combination of cultural and military history, it is not a 
history of junior officers’ function in battle, or an assessment of the role they played in the 
eventual defeat of the French armies.25 This thesis is a study of the cultural and intellectual life 
of British junior officers, and explores how junior officers’ status as products of Georgian society 
informed their interpretation of the military experience and, subsequently, shaped their 
military identities.   
 
Soldiers and Authors 
Identities are personal, and although they are shaped by external factors, personal testimonies 
are revealing as to how people form individual or collective modes of belonging.26 As noted by 
Alan Forrest, Étienne François, and Karen Hagemann, memory is communicated by numerous 
mediums, all of which have the common characteristic of providing a record of what was 
important to individuals at certain points in time, ‘beyond periods of collective and cultural 
oblivion.’27 This thinking is useful when applied to studies of identity. Personal accounts not 
only reveal what events individuals considered important, but are also suggestive as to the 
individual and collective perspectives the author considered as worthy of recording, and to the 
image of the self that the author chose to project to their audience. As prolific letter, journal, and 
memoir writers, junior officers are particularly open to this type of historical analysis. As all 
officers were required to be literate, it stands to reason that officers would produce more 
                                                          
24 Michael Glover, Wellington as Military Commander (London, 1968); Huw J. Davies, Wellington’s Wars: The 
Making of a Military Genius (New Haven, CT, 2012); Rory Muir, Wellington, 2 Vols. (New Haven, CT, 2013). 
25 For an assessment of the competency of the British officer corps, see Bruce Collins, ‘Effectiveness and the 
British Officer Corps, 1793-1815’, in Britain’s Soldiers, pp. 57-76. 
26 Kennedy, Narratives, pp. 7-8. 
27 Alan Forrest, Étienne François, and Karen Hagemann, ‘Introduction: Memories of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture’, War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 
Modern European Culture, ed. Alan Forrest, Étienne François, and Karen Hagemann (Basingstoke, 2012), p. 21. 
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accounts than the rank and file, who had much lower rates of literacy. In addition to higher 
literacy rates, British combatants of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were writing at a 
time when the stories of rankers and low-ranking officers gained broad appeal. Before the late-
eighteenth century, personal accounts of war had been the preserve of high-ranking and 
celebrated officers. As demonstrated by Yuval Noah Harari, the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries were a watershed period for soldiers’ writings in Europe, as the 
recognition of individual soldiers as thinking and autonomous beings legitimised the stories of 
low-ranking officers and soldiers.28 The output of soldier authors from this period is borne out 
by the quantity of accounts identified by historians: Robert Burnham has identified over 300 
published accounts of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.29  
This thesis draws on eighty-seven personal accounts written by junior officers that fall into 
three broad categories: letters, diaries and journals, and memoirs, with each category 
comprising roughly one-third of each of the sources used. In addition to these sources, there is 
also one poem written by an anonymous subaltern, and two political tracts. While several of 
these accounts exist only in manuscript form, drawn from archives across the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, the majority have been published, either by the authors themselves, or by later 
editors, such as the corpus of archival sources that have been edited and published by the 
prolific Gareth Glover.30 The sources under consideration are also weighted heavily towards 
officers who served during the Napoleonic period, and especially officers who fought during the 
Peninsular War and at Waterloo. In part, this is a result of the size of the army during different 
periods of the conflict. As highlighted previously, the officer corps was nearly five times larger 
during the last years of the Peninsular War than it was in 1792, which undoubtedly resulted in 
fewer letters, journals, and memoirs being produced regarding the earlier stages of the war. 
Additionally, officers who served during the Revolutionary Wars, or at least before the Egyptian 
Campaign of 1801, may not have felt that their stories provided sufficient fodder for memoirs. 
The British army’s campaigns during the 1790s were expeditions to the continent that ended in 
defeat, or took place in the West Indies, where disease ravaged the army. In contrast, officers 
who fought in the Peninsula or at Waterloo could point to their place within a narrative that 
ended with the defeat of one of the great leaders of the age. Furthermore, as shown by Neil 
                                                          
28 Yuval Noah Harari, The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 
1450-2000 (Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 127-96. 
29 Robert Burnham, ‘Appendix: British Memoirs of the Napoleonic Wars’, in Inside Wellington’s Peninsular 
Army, 1808-1814, ed. Robert Burnham, Ron McGuigan, Howie Muir & Rory Muir (Barnsley, 2006). 
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Ramsey, public interest in the Peninsular War was high, generating demand for memoirs of the 
conflict.31  
In his overview of combatants’ narratives of modern conflict, Samuel Hynes viewed soldiers’ 
writings as belonging to a singular, overarching ‘tale’.32 Viewing soldiers’ accounts in this 
manner effectively divorces soldiers’ writings from the literary context in which they were 
produced. It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a full analysis of the influences that 
shaped junior officers’ writings; however, a consideration of these factors is necessary to outline 
the advantages and potential difficulties of the sources used for this thesis. Written soon after 
the events officers were describing, letters, diaries, and journals are the most immediate 
sources produced by junior officers. Proximity to the events they were describing does not 
ensure that officers’ letters, in particular, were verbatim descriptions of all that had occurred 
since the author’s last letter, or were entirely consistent in their style. Junior officers often 
remarked of the lack of interesting events they had to describe, resulting in a short letter which 
contained minimal detail. Other letters were fired off in the immediate aftermath of a battle, 
with a more detailed and reflective account being written in the days that followed. Some letters 
were constructed over a period of days, as officers found they had time while in camp to provide 
a lengthy description of recent events. In each of these types of letters, junior officers were 
engaged in a process of selection with regards to which events and thoughts they deemed 
worthy of conveying to their recipient, and were contributing to the collective memory of the 
wars by highlighting the author’s place within important events.33 
Furthermore, letters were written within a set of literary conventions. As revealed by Kennedy 
in her study of narrative during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, British officers’ style of 
letter writing was stylised. Officers’ letters were shaped by late-eighteenth century literary 
culture, with officers drawing on the languages of sensibility, Gothicism, and the sublime to 
describe their emotions and the events they witnessed.34 Letter writing was central to maintain 
bonds of family and friendship over distance during the eighteenth century, as highlighted by 
junior officers’ correspondence.35 While some well-connected officers corresponded with 
government figures, the bulk of letters were written to close family members and friends. The 
content of letters varied, depending on the recipient. Letters written to mothers or siblings 
tended to include more emotional detail, while letters to fathers were more likely to have a 
                                                          
31 Ramsey, The Military Memoir, pp. 33-6. 
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focus on military events, promotion, and expenditure. Not all letters were private texts, 
intended for one recipient. Some letters were written with the intention that they would be read 
aloud or shared amongst a circle of family and friends, while others were published in the 
British press.36 In itself, the literary style of officers’ letters speaks to an important aspect of 
their identity, as it highlights junior officers’ status as part of a wider reading culture, and of 
their aspirations to ‘polite gentlemanliness’.37 In addition to writing letters, many junior officers 
kept a diary or journal to record events as they occurred. Journal writing was also important in 
the styling of a polite identity, as the introspective practice of writing was believed to nurture 
self-improvement.38 Lieutenant George Woodberry of the 18th Hussars kept a journal 
throughout 1813, and even named his journal his ‘Idle Companion’. Self-reflection was at the 
forefront of Woodberry’s mind when he wrote, ‘I don’t know how to employ myself except with 
this, my idle companion. I have used myself so regularly to write in it daily that it is become a 
part of my daily duty & in fact don’t feel comfortable till I have discharged it.’39  
Memoirs present a slightly different set of challenges as sources. As published and public texts, 
memoirs are the most literary sources provided by officers. The early-mid nineteenth century 
was a boon period for military memoirs of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, as the 
British reading public became eager for tales from the recently completed wars. 40 In his literary 
study of British Romantic military memoirs, Neil Ramsey revealed how memoirs influenced 
Romantic visions of war, as they depicted war as a picturesque and heroic experience.41 The 
literary composition of memoirs has been noted as an obstacle to their use by historians of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: in her study of wartime narratives, Kennedy chose to 
favour contemporary accounts and to use memoirs sparingly, owing to the different cultural 
climate in which memoirs were written.42 Written after the events they recounted, the detail 
included in memoirs could be affected by the passage of time, and were written to reflect 
romantic literary tastes and styles. With judicious use, however, memoirs are valuable sources 
for the study of identity. There are numerous thematic similarities between contemporary 
sources and memoirs. Memoirs also reveal general impressions and generalisations, that speak 
to the author’s aspirations, sensibilities, and expectations, and which are also suggestive as to 
the influences which held sway during formative experiences.  
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As noted previously, a feature of Romantic military memoirs was their celebration of the 
experiences of commons soldiers and low-ranking officers. The very titles of junior officers’ 
memoirs reflect this. As highlighted at the start of this introduction, George Wood chose to name 
his memoir The Subaltern Officer, and was also a feature of George Gleig’s 1826 memoir, The 
Subaltern.43As this thesis focuses on the experiences of junior officers, memoirs written by 
officers who attained field or general rank during their career present another challenge. 
Theoretically, memoirs written by high-ranking officers could suffer from a shifting perspective, 
and provide a ‘top-down’ view of officers’ military careers. As nineteenth-century memoirs were 
liable to celebrate the experiences of low-ranking soldiers and officers, and viewed the entire 
military experience as one of self-discovery and formation, even memoirs written by general 
officers regularly described and reflected on their experiences as junior officers.44 George Bell, 
for example, retired in the mid-nineteenth century as a major-general, and published his 
memoir in 1867. For all of his achievements, Bell chose to dedicate his memoir to subalterns, 
and began his account with a description of his leaving home to join his regiment as a new 
ensign.45 With careful reading, therefore, even the memoirs of senior officers can shed light on 
the experiences of junior officers.  
 
Culture, Experience, and Identity 
‘Identity’ has become an important topic for historians of eighteenth-century Britain, and has 
been used to explore a range of topics, such as nationalism, gender, politics, and class.46 This 
thesis uses the term ‘identity’ to describe a range of individual and collective modes of 
belonging. Junior officers’ identities were formed internally and externally, as they found points 
of similarity and difference with a wide range of groups and individuals. Junior officers’ 
allegiances were complex and multi-faceted, with significant overlap between identities. Dror 
Wahrman has argued that the late-eighteenth century saw the ‘self’ become prominent in the 
fashioning of identities, as opposed to the collective identities of the seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries.47 There are some features of junior officers’ identities that reflect the 
growth of the cult of the self. Junior officers’ yearning for promotion and their complaints about 
submission to the military hierarchy suggest that junior officers had a streak of individualism. 
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These individualistic aspects of junior officers’ identities, however, were refracted through a 
broader set of collective identities. As noted by Kathleen Wilson, identities in eighteenth-
century Britain were inherently bound to social orders and the practices of daily life.48 To 
properly examine junior officers’ identities, therefore, it is not only essential to explore how 
junior officers wrote about their own experiences, but to interpret their accounts through the 
lens of eighteenth-century British society and culture.  Traditionally, cultural historians have 
focused on the representation of nationhood, gender, or class.49 This thesis, however, is 
grounded in the lived experiences of junior officers, and explores how junior officers’ daily 
practices and identities were shaped by the ideals of British culture.  
This thesis draws on cultural histories of eighteenth-century Britain to interpret the 
experiences of junior officers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Ranking highly 
among these is the history of masculinity. As noted by Matthew McCormack, military historians 
have been reluctant to study masculinity within the military, owing to the assumption of 
‘masculine’ attributes within the army, such as bravery and physical strength, while historians 
of masculinity have only recently begun to apply their methodologies to the military.50 The 
history of masculinity is especially pertinent to the British officer corps, as different models of 
manhood allow us to interpret how junior officers related to each other, their superiors and 
inferiors, and to establish where military practice diverted from civilian mores. The eighteenth-
century British officer corps was viewed by some contemporaries as adhering to a roguish and 
libertine masculinity, obsessed with womanising, drinking, and gambling, a view that has been 
adopted by some historians of the army.51 British officers were prone to these behaviours; 
however, this was only one aspect of their character. With its emphasis on ‘gentlemanliness’ as a 
qualifying attribute, the British officer corps was deeply influenced by the values of ‘politeness’, 
the dominant measure of eighteenth-century British gentlemanliness. Recent scholarship has 
revealed that the sensibilities of Georgian officers reflected those of the ‘polite gentleman’, as 
officers took an interest in reading, travel, and dancing, amongst other cultural pursuits which 
were seen to compliment an officer’s military character.52 Displaying the manners and outlook 
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of a ‘polite gentleman’ was essential for ingratiating junior officers to their comrades; however, 
there were additional characteristics officers displayed. Georgian society made a virtue of 
‘independence’ as a masculine trait, which conflicted with the strictures of the military 
hierarchy.53 A culture of honour pervaded the officer corps. Honour is a nebulous concept which 
operated on several levels for British officers. Honour bound junior officers to their regiments 
and to nation. The honour code also informed how officers related to each other. Personal 
honour demanded that officers be tenacious of their gentlemanly reputation, sometimes to the 
point of fighting a duel with a comrade to prove their character. Junior officers also drew on the 
language of sensibility to describe the close bonds they formed with regimental comrades, those 
they maintained with family members at home, and their attitudes to the rank and file. These 
differing models of masculinity existed alongside and interacted with each other, with each 
shaping junior officers’ identities in different contexts. 
Junior officers joined the army with a range of existing values and expectations, which fused 
with more thoroughly military values, such as pan-European military professionalism and a 
belief in the honourable conduct of war. As a relatively contained institution, the army could be 
reasonably expected to have reduced the influence of civilian values over time, and shaped 
individuals’ identities according to values found only within the army. Junior officers, however, 
did not abandon the values of Georgian society once they joined their regiments. Avid readers of 
newspapers and periodicals from Britain, and eager for news from home in letters, junior 
officers remained well-connected to the civilian world, ensuring that the influences of Georgian 
society remained throughout their service. These values were intrinsic to their military 
identities, as they provided a lens for officers to view their military experiences through, 
ensuring British junior officers were not solely products of the army. Junior officers, therefore, 
lived not only as soldiers, but as members of families, nations, and political communities. 
Through letters and by serving alongside family members, for example, junior officers 
attempted to maintain close family relationships, while they also looked to the family as a model 
for the ideal regiment.54 As the army was ‘British’ in name and composition, with officers and 
soldiers drawn from across Britain and Ireland, the army provided a context for officers to 
reflect on the nature of the British nation and appropriate expressions of patriotism.  Class is an 
especially important consideration with regards to British officers during this period. As officers 
were at once ‘officers and gentlemen’, a sharp social distinction existed between officers and the 
ranks. There were also distinctions between individual officers, who were drawn from across 
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the landed and professional classes of Georgian Britain. In addition to these individual 
differences, the regimental system also encouraged a degree of social stratification. Entry into 
the elite Foot Guards or cavalry was more expensive than the line, and these regiments 
attracted wealthy or aristocratic officers. Furthermore, these officers were often well-
connected, and used these connections in attempts to gain promotion or staff appointments. 
Often possessed of additional income from a family member, the experiences of these officers 
were materially different from officers of the line. For their part, line officers could develop 
resentment towards these regiments and their officers, and viewed their wealth and 
monopolisation of patronage through the prism of eighteenth-century classical republican 
discourses, which attacked elites for their corruption and lack of virtue.55  
 
Men in the Middle 
In addition to the values officers brought from civilian society, junior officers’ identities were 
deeply influenced by their middling status within the military hierarchy. The hierarchy of the 
Georgian army has been most thoroughly explored with regards to the rank and file. 
Traditionally, studies of the relationship between the officer corps and common soldiers have 
argued for the powerlessness of rankers in the face of coercive military justice and capital 
punishment.56 A recent study by William P. Tatum, however, has significantly revised this view, 
and revealed the varying forms of protest open to British soldiers during the eighteenth-
century, which included the potential for a reciprocal relationship of ‘negotiated authority’ 
between rankers and officers.57 Given the social distinction that existed between officers and 
rankers, the focus on the experiences of rankers within the military hierarchy is somewhat 
understandable. This thesis aims to complement existing knowledge of the British military 
hierarchy by providing a view from the middle of the British army.  
The British officer corps was socially diverse, especially at the junior levels, and drew in men 
from across the aristocracy, landed gentry, and professional classes.58 With the exception of 
officers who had been promoted from the ranks, junior officers were still socially remote from 
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the rank and file, who were drawn largely from labouring classes.59 Furthermore, officers of all 
ranks shared the sensibilities and tastes of ‘polite gentlemen’, providing the officer corps with a 
cultural unity and another point of differentiation from the ranks. Buttressed by the authority of 
class distinction, British junior officers were endowed with significant direct and moral 
authority over the rank and file. The Regimental Companion, a military guidebook outlining the 
duties of army officers, stressed the importance of subalterns to the functioning of a regiment, 
‘The conduct of every subaltern officer in a regiment is of the last importance to service. The 
interior oeconomy of a corps rests almost wholly upon his attention, zeal, and vigilance.’60 
Influenced by Enlightenment ideals, the eighteenth-century British military was obsessed with 
the cleanliness and order of its soldiers and sailors, as a part of what Erica Charters has 
described as the ‘caring fiscal-military state.’61 Subalterns’ duties reflected these values: they 
were responsible for inspecting the cleanliness of soldiers’ barracks, bedding, kitchens, and 
cooking utensils; for ensuring that all men were in bed at lights out; and for reporting illnesses 
and irregularities within the ranks.62  
There was, however, another side to the position of junior officers. As occupants of the lowest 
ranks of the officer corps, junior officers were themselves subject to the strictures of military 
authority. The hierarchy of a regiment could be calculated down to the day. The Army List was 
an annually published list of every officer in the regular army that contained the date on which 
an officer obtained his present rank within the army, as well as the date from which he had 
served with the regiment.63 With the majority of promotions awarded via seniority, with all 
officers moving one step higher each time a vacancy occurred higher up the chain, status within 
the hierarchy had important ramifications for an officer’s career.64 Despite retaining more 
individual licence than the rank and file, there was still much in a junior officers’ life he could 
not control: uniforms were set, while daily routines were subsumed by the needs of the 
regiment. In terms of campaign experience, junior officers could share more in common with 
the rank and file than superior officers. This is especially true of line regiments, where officers 
tended to be of lesser means and social standing. To push the idea of the ‘middle’ further, new 
subalterns also occupied the middle space between civilian and military society, and the fault 
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line between youth and adulthood. As some of the youngest and newest members of the officer 
corps, the experiences of these officers highlight the intersection between the civilian and 
military world, and reveal the tensions between the practices in both spheres. The junior ranks 
of the officer corps had a youthful complexion, with the officers in this study having an average 
age of nineteen years when they were commissioned. Therefore, newly commissioned officers 
were not only making the transition from ‘civilian’ to ‘soldier’, but also from youth to manhood. 
Taken together, these factors combined to ensure that junior officers developed an identity as 
junior officers. This identity stemmed more directly from the subordination junior officers 
experienced, than the authority they wielded. Across the social, national, and regimental 
spectrum, junior officers shared much in terms of their outlook on the military and their place 
within it. This is not to suggest that this was junior officers’ primary identity, or that they 
routinely identified with each other on the basis of their common experiences. Other modes of 
belonging, such as class, regiment, or family provided strong points of reference for junior 
officers. Identifying as a junior officer; however, shaped how officers interpreted their 
experiences in the army, as their middling status provided a swathe of competing demands, and 
conflicts of identity. These identities were not fixed, or mutually exclusive, as junior officers 
variously identified with a range of individuals and collectives. This thesis explores these 
tensions across a range of contexts, which highlight the complexity of junior officers’ worldview.  
Chapter One is a sociological overview of the officers included in this thesis, and provides 
contextual information for the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two centres on politeness, and 
highlights how identifying as a ‘polite gentleman’ was essential for integrating into the army, 
and also identifies some of the limitations of using politeness as a model for understanding 
junior officers’ conduct. Chapter Three examines the idea of ‘professional identity’, by exploring 
junior officers’ professional aspirations and how they believed these were best fulfilled. Chapter 
Four explores collective belonging and the intersection between the civilian and military 
worlds, by focusing on the bonds within regiments, families, and friendship groups. Chapter 
Five focuses on honour culture in the officer corps, and how and why junior officers fought 
duels with their comrades. Chapter Six is a survey of how junior officers thought about their role 
as leaders, and of their relationship with the rank and file. The final chapter, Chapter Seven, 
looks at the relationship between military service and national identity, and considers how 
junior officers’ patriotic identities evolved over the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
period. The tensions that existed within junior officers’ identities suggests that theirs was a 
unique place within the British army of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and 
highlights how the hierarchy of the British army was more complex than the often highlighted 
social divide between officers and the common soldier.
16 
 
Chapter One: Sociological Analysis 
The period between 1793 and 1815 saw Britain almost continually at war with France, the final 
chapter in what has been considered the ‘Second Hundred Years War’ and, more recently, the 
‘Seventy Years War’ by Anthony Page.1 This sustained period of warfare saw the regular British 
army, traditionally small by European standards, grow to a record size as it was deployed in a 
range of theatres to combat the armies of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. A relatively 
modest 42, 000 strong in 1793, the British army grew to a size of 250, 000 men at its peak in 
1812, with an average of three to four per cent of the British population serving in the regular 
army during the wars.2 This degree of mobilisation necessitated an increase in the size of the 
officer corps, which swelled from 3, 107 officers in 1792, to a high point of just under 11, 000 
effective officers in 1812.3 While these rates of mobilisation still paled in comparison to 
continental nations – in early-1793 alone the French republic added 300, 000 troops to the 
Revolutionary army – expanding the army to such a size was unparalleled in British history.4  
The increased size of the army and the experience of war impacted the administration of the 
army and officer corps, while also altering the officer corps’ social and cultural fabric. When 
compared to the drastic reorganisation of the French army and officer corps occasioned by the 
Revolution, the rate and scale of change within the British officer corps was less dramatic. As 
shown by John A. Lynn, the French abolition of aristocratic privilege and the political demands 
of the Revolutionary government transformed the French officer corps, with promotion from 
the ranks becoming commonplace.5 
In contrast, the British officer corps during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars retained 
many of its eighteenth-century characteristics. Various studies have explored the 
administration and composition of the eighteenth-century British officer corps and how the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars impacted this institution. In a study of the training of the 
eighteenth-century British army, J.A. Houlding examined the social composition of the officer 
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corps up until 1795.6 Similarly, P.E. Razzell compared the social origins of officers of the Indian 
and British home army between 1758 and 1962, and revealed that warfare had the long-term 
effect of diluting the social standing of army officers.7 With regards to the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, scholarly attention has been focused on administrative reforms, the social 
make-up of the Peninsular officer corps, and how officers acquired their commissions. Richard 
Glover surveyed the reformation of the British army following the failed 1793-1795 campaign in 
the Low Countries, an integral component of which was an overhaul of the system of 
commissions and promotions.8 Our understanding of the officer corps during the period of the 
Peninsular War is extensive, largely owing to Michael Glover’s studies of officers’ commissions 
and promotions during this period, as well as their social origins.9 The findings of this chapter 
are not intended as a definitive survey of the junior ranks of the British officer corps; a task 
which could constitute a separate study. While the detail of this chapter contributes to our 
knowledge of the late-Georgian officer corps, it would be misleading to suggest that this chapter 
is wholly representative of the social make-up and career progression of junior officers. This 
chapter, rather, is a sociological analysis of the seventy-seven officers whose testimonies have 
been drawn on for this thesis, and contextualises this cohort of officers within the broader 
sociological studies of the army. It aims to explain, therefore, who the officers included in this 
study were, and how their wartime careers compared with our established knowledge of the 
British officer corps during the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. 
 
Social and National Backgrounds 
The eighteenth-century British officer corps was a socially and nationally diverse institution, 
despite the presence and cultural strength of officers from the aristocracy and landed gentry. 
This diversity is reflected in the social backgrounds of the seventy-seven officers included in 
this study. As highlighted by Roger Norman Buckley and John Cookson, the eighteenth-century 
officer corps reflected the values of the land-owning classes.10 Unlike some continental 
eighteenth-century armies, however, the British army did not place social restrictions on the 
officer corps, ensuring that the aristocratic domination seen in some continental armies was 
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unlikely to be replicated in Britain.11 The purchase system did not preclude officers from 
outside the aristocracy or wealthy gentry from becoming officers, but it reduced their chances 
of achieving field or general rank. The nobility and landed gentry comprised over half of all 
general officers and full colonels during the eighteenth century.12 The social pool was wider at 
the regimental level. In his study of the eighteenth-century army, J.A. Houlding described the 
British officer corps as a ‘social mélange’, and placed regimental officers into four main social 
categories. Houlding calculated that the vast majority of regimental officers came from small 
gentry, professional, and farming families; one-quarter from the sons of aristocratic or upper 
gentry families; a small proportion of men from professional ‘army families’, including 
foreigners; and men promoted from the ranks. This last group, argued Houlding, was larger than 
normally supposed.13 What unified these men from disparate social backgrounds, with the 
exception of men promoted from the ranks, was a social outlook and educational grounding 
which defined them as gentlemen.14  
The manpower demands created by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars broadened the 
social base of the officer corps. The officer corps grew from 3, 107 officers in 1792, to just under 
11, 000 on full pay in 1812, with an annual demand for 1, 000 new officers during the 
Peninsular War.15 Indicative of how these pressures drew men from outside the aristocracy and 
landed gentry into the army is that this increase was not accompanied by an increase in the 
number of officers from noble families. As revealed by Robert Burnham and Ron McGuigan, the 
number of officers of noble birth remained relatively stable between 1805 and 1815, with 198 
nobles or sons of nobles serving in 1805, 227 in 1812, and 206 in 1815.16 The stability in 
numbers of elite officers suggests that the families of the 450 British and Irish peers could only 
contribute so many men to the army, and ensured that the proportion of officers from titled 
backgrounds could only decline as the officer corps expanded, a known long-term effect of 
warfare on the British officer corps. 17 Furthermore, warfare reduced the proportion of first 
commissions and promotions which were had by purchase, particularly in line regiments, 
opening up opportunities to officers of lesser means.18 By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, 
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therefore, the officer corps as a whole was a social patchwork: aristocrats and the landed gentry 
served in the same institution as men from the lesser gentry, the sons of professional men, and 
men from the ranks, who comprised five per cent of all officers.19  
Figure 1.1 Social Backgrounds 
 Number % 
Aristocracy 4 5.2 
Gentry 18 23.4 
Professional 23 29.9 
From Ranks 3 3.9 
Unknown 29 37.8 
Data compiled from personal accounts, editor’s notes, and secondary biographical sources. 
Identifying the social background of the seventy-seven officers considered by this thesis is 
difficult owing to the limited available biographical information regarding several of the officers, 
with the only available evidence of their social background being their personal accounts. These 
are often fragmentary or lacking in biographical detail. This is especially true of officers whose 
accounts exist only in manuscript form. It is evident from the available data regarding forty-
eight officers included in this study, however, that this cohort reflects the social diversity of the 
officer corps during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Figure 1.1 highlights the social 
breakdown of these forty-eight officers, which included men from the peerage; large and small 
gentry families; professional families; and men from the ranks. The easiest group to identify 
within this cohort are officers of aristocratic background. Four officers in this study were from 
aristocratic families, comprising five per cent of the total. Even within this small sample there 
were differing backgrounds. Edward Charles Cocks of the 16th Light Dragoons served as a 
member of the House of Commons between 1807 and 1809, while Alexander Gordon of the 15th 
Hussars was the illegitimate child of the 3rd Earl of Aberdeen.20 Below these illustrious officers 
were officers who came from land-owning families. The landed gentry had traditional ties to the 
military, and had provided one-quarter of all army officers during the eighteenth century.21 
Eighteen, or just over twenty-three per cent, of the officers in this study came from land-owning 
backgrounds. The amount of land owned by these families, and the wealth at their disposal, is 
likely to have varied. John Mills, the son of an MP, and John Aitchison and Charles Kinloch, both 
the sons of Scottish lairds, could call on their families to supplement their income with 
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allowances of over £100 per year.22 In contrast, John Blakiston appears to have come from a 
small land-owning family, as his family purchased his commission for him, but offered little 
support thereafter, while Peter Bowlby was sent into the army after his father sold the family 
estate.23 This group includes two officers from the Irish Protestant gentry, Robert Blakeney and 
George Bell.24 
The largest group of officers in this study with identifiable social backgrounds are officers from 
what can be termed ‘professional’ backgrounds. There are twenty-three officers from this group 
in this thesis, comprising just over one-quarter of the total officers. The families that these 
officers came from varied markedly in terms of wealth and stature. At one end, there were 
officers from relatively wealthy families. John Lucie Blackman, for example, was the son of a 
governor of the Bank of England, who could afford to send Blackman into the Coldstream 
Guards, while providing an additional income.25 Similarly, John Fremantle, also of the 
Coldstream Guards, came from a family of merchants, and was the son of a successful army 
officer and member of the Irish parliament.26 Others came from respectable, if less salubrious 
origins. Harry Smith of the 95th Rifles was the son of a surgeon, while George Simmons, also of 
the 95th, was a surgeon by trade before obtaining his commission.27 William Thornton Keep was 
the son of a War Officer bureaucrat, while Thomas Henry Browne and George Hennell the sons 
of manufacturers.28 This group also includes officers from military families. George Wood, 
Thomas Staunton St. Clair, and John Le Couteur, were all the sons of army officers, while 
Thomas Phipps Howard initially entered the British army as a mercenary with the largely 
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foreign-raised York Hussars, suggesting that he was a career officer.29 Similarly, Peter Jennings, 
the sole Irish Catholic officer in this thesis, came from a family of military professionals who 
served the French monarchy before the Revolution, a tradition which Jennings was a part of.30  
There are three officers in this study who were promoted from the ranks. Only one of these 
officers, William Surtees, provided information about his social and educational background in 
his account. Surtees stated that his parents: ‘may be said to have been among the middle classes, 
my father being a tradesman. They gave me such an education as was customary with people of 
their station in life; viz. reading, writing and arithmetic.’31 Surtees, therefore, was of slightly 
higher social standing than other rankers. As highlighted by Arthur Gilbert and Edward Coss, 
the majority of the rank and file in the eighteenth-century and Peninsular armies were drawn 
from labouring classes. 32 Given the requirement that non-commissioned officers be literate, it is 
possible that the two other officers in this study who were promoted from the ranks, William 
Gavin and David Wainwright, came from a similar background to Surtees, or at least had a 
rudimentary education. Finally, there are the twenty-nine officers in this study whose social 
backgrounds cannot be determined with certainty. The fragmentary biographical detail 
available for these officers suggests that this group were drawn from a variety of backgrounds.  
Lieutenant George James Sullivan of the 1st Life Guards, for example, left little information about 
his family background in his unpublished memoir; however, he managed to purchase a 
commission and subsequent promotions in some of the army’s most expensive regiments, 
suggesting that he was from a family of some means. Others, such as Edward Teasdale, cited 
their need to economise in their letters, suggesting they were of more straitened means.  
While the officers in this study were drawn from diverse social backgrounds, this picture of 
social mixing is diminished by the social distinctions which existed between regiments. 
Regiments synonymous with social standing and wealth, such as the three regiments of Foot 
Guards and the twenty-seven of cavalry, were favoured by elite officers: of the 140 aristocratic 
regimental officers serving in 1809, seventy-nine held commissions in these regiments, with the 
                                                          
29 George Wood, The Subaltern Officer: A Narrative (London, 1825), p. 2; Thomas Staunton St. Clair, A Soldier’s 
Recollections of the West Indies and America: With a Narrative of the Expedition to the Island of Walcheren, 
Vol. I (London, 1834), pp. 1-2; Donl E. Graves ed., Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal of 
Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot (Ottawa, 1993), p. 6; Roger Norman Buckley ed., The Haitian Journal of 
Lieutenant Howard, York Hussars, 1796-1798 (Knoxville, TN, 1985), pp. xxxix, xlix-l. 
30 NAM 1983-01-102 Peter R. Jennings, ‘Diary of Peter R. Jennings’. 
31 William Surtees, Twenty-Five Years in the Rifle Brigade (London, 1833), p. 1.  
32 For the social composition of the rank and file during the eighteenth-century and during the Napoleonic 
period, see Arthur Gilbert, ‘An Analysis of some Eighteenth-Century Army Recruiting Records’, Journal of Army 
Historical Research, 54 (1976), pp. 38-47; Edward J. Coss, All for the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier under 
Wellington, 1808-1814 (Norman, OK, 2010), pp. 67-72. 
22 
 
remainder scattered between various line regiments.33 Nearly half of all first commissions in the 
Guards and cavalry were purchased, to a cost of as much as £900 in the Foot Guards, and £1600 
in the Life Guards cavalry regiment.34 The four aristocratic officers in this study served with 
these prestigious regiments: two with the Foot Guards, and two with the cavalry. Similarly, 
wealthy members of the landed gentry or professional classes flocked to these regiments. 
Aitchison, Bragge, and Mills all served with the Guards or cavalry. Officers from wealthy 
professional families could also find their way into these regiments, highlighting how money 
could facilitate social blending. As noted previously, Blackman and Fremantle, who were both 
from professional backgrounds, served with the Coldstream Guards. Other officers from 
professional backgrounds could serve with the aristocratically inclined Guards and Cavalry. 
William Warre, the son of a British wine merchant based in Portugal, found his way into the 
cavalry and onto the staff.35  
It was in line regiments where the officers from the lesser gentry and professional families 
included in this study proliferated. There were fewer social barriers to entering line regiments. 
Only seventeen per cent of commissions in the line were had by purchase, while the cost of a 
commission was cheaper at £400.36 Of the forty-eight line officers included in this study, none 
were from the aristocracy. The sons of wealthy land-owners could be found in in line regiments; 
yet only one line officer in this study, Kinloch, who served with the fashionable 52nd Light 
Infantry, was identifiably from a wealthy gentry family. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
degree of social mixing in line regiments was higher than in the Guards or cavalry. In a letter to 
his mother, Ensign William Thornton Keep described the diverse backgrounds of his comrades 
in the 77th Foot, who ranged from the son of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Isle of Man, to the 
son of a naval captain; another was  a Quaker of a ‘violent and gay disposition’ who bordered on 
a fop; another an impoverished, thirty-five  year-old Scottish ensign, and Bradshaw: ‘a very 
accomplished scholar and of a literary turn, and is well connected and rich, but derives his 
parentage I suspect on the maternal side from a Hindoo.’37 Further highlighting the social mix 
within line regiments is the presence of officers who had been commissioned from the ranks. All 
three of the officers in this study who were commissioned from the ranks went into the line. 
This was consistent with the pattern of commissions for rankers identified by Glover, who 
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found no examples of rankers being commissioned to regiments other than the line in a sample 
of commissions from the Peninsular War period.38  
Several officers in this study had connections to the military through traditions of family 
military service, through a military education, or through service with Britain’s auxiliary forces. 
Six officers in this study definitively had fathers who were, or had been, regular army officers; 
one was the son of a naval officer; and two who were the nephews of lieutenant-colonels. Three 
officers, Orlando Bridgeman, the son of the Earl of Bradford, Fremantle, and Le Couteur, passed 
through the Royal Military College (RMC), which was established at Great Marlow in 1802.39 The 
low numbers of officers who received training at the RMC is reflective of the overall low number 
of officers who attended the college. With no formal training required of officers before they 
joined their regiments, only four per cent of all army officers in the Peninsular had attended the 
RMC.40 The RMC was structured so as to prefer young men with familial or social connections to 
the military. Select sons of officers who had died or been disabled during military service could 
attend the college for free, with the sons of serving officers paying annual fees of £40, compared 
with the standard fee of £90 per year.41 This preference for sons from military families is 
reflected in the officers in this study who attended the RMC: Le Couteur was the son of a serving 
lieutenant general during the Napoleonic Wars, while Fremantle was the son of a deceased 
colonel. Eight officers in this study joined the technical branches of the army, and served with 
the Royal Artillery or Royal Engineers. These officers were of mixed social standing. Charles 
Dansey was from a relatively wealthy gentry family, while William Webber was from a 
respectable, if not wealthy, land-owning background. Since the 1741 establishment of the 
military academy at Woolwich, artillery and engineering officers had been required to undergo 
training before being appointed to a commission.42  
Finally, there were officers who had served with Britain’s auxiliary forces. By the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic period, Britain had established the practice of recruiting part-time forces for 
home defence, a practice described by Ian Beckett in The Amateur Military Tradition.43 As a 
response to the threat of France, Britain called up the militia in 1792, while local volunteer 
forces were raised from 1794.44 These forces were numerous. Cookson calculated that at any 
given point there could be 129 regiments of regular militia, 199 of local militia, along with a 
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peak of 2, 000 volunteer corps in 1804.45 The line between these auxiliary forces and the regular 
army blurred, as the government used the militia as a recruiting ground for the regulars, by 
drafting rank and file from the militia into the regulars and by allowing militia officers to obtain 
a commission in the regulars by recruiting forty rankers from their militia regiments.46 Ten 
officers in this study, all from line regiments, held commissions in the militia prior to joining the 
regulars, with four of these ‘recruiting for rank’. Two officers served with fencible units, one 
with a volunteer regiment, and one with a yeomanry regiment of cavalry.  
While social backgrounds can be difficult to discern, national backgrounds are easier to glean 
from officer accounts. The army which fought during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
was a truly ‘British’ institution. The demands of warfare during the eighteenth century saw men 
from all parts of Britain and Ireland incorporated into the ranks and officer corps, to the point 
that fewer than one-quarter of officers who served in America during the Seven Years’ War 
were English.47 In particular, Scots came to be over-represented in the officer corps: during the 
American War of Independence, twenty-seven per cent of all officers were Scottish, despite 
Scots only comprising twelve per cent of the British population.48 The proportion of Scottish 
officers remained steady into the Napoleonic Wars, where one-quarter of all officers were 
Scottish.49 The officers in this study came from all across Britain and Ireland. As shown in Figure 
1.2, English officers made up the bulk of officers in this study, with thirty-nine, or just over half, 
being English. The next largest national group are the Scottish, with eleven Scots comprising 
just over fourteen per cent of the officers in this study, including one officer from a Highland 
family. There are five Protestant Irish officers in this study, who comprise over six per cent of 
the whole, two Welsh officers, one Irish Catholic officer, and eight whose nationality cannot be 
determined. While Irish soldiers, Protestant and Catholic, comprised one-third of the army in 
1813, Irish Catholic officers were rare, as they were prevented from holding commissions 
outside of Ireland before 1817.50 In terms of nationality, then, the officers in this study do not 
reflect the national breakdown of the overall British officer corps during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. There is enough diversity within the selected officers, however, to ensure that 
the views of different nationalities are considered throughout this thesis. 
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Figure 1.2 National Backgrounds 
 Number  % 
English 39 50.6 
Scottish 11 14.3 
Welsh 2 2.6 
Irish Protestant 5 6.5 
Irish Catholic 1 1.3 
Unknown 8 10.4 
Data compiled from personal accounts, editors’ notes, and secondary biographical sources. 
Similar to officers’ social backgrounds, calculating the age of officers when they were 
commissioned is reliant on fragmentary evidence. Overall, the British officer corps of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had a youthful complexion. Before 1803, twenty per cent of 
new officers were under fifteen years of age, and after 1803, half were under eighteen, with 
sixteen being the most common age.51 There is data available for the ages of forty of the officers 
included in this thesis. As shown in Figure 1.3, the officers in this study were overwhelmingly 
young when commissioned. The average age of officers in this study at the time of their 
commission was nineteen years old. Seventeen years was the most common age of officers in 
this study, with eleven officers that age at their commission. The bulk of officers in this study, 
nearly forty per cent, fell into the age range of between sixteen and twenty-five years old at 
their commission. Regulations stipulated that all new officers must be at least sixteen years 
before being commissioned; however, the flurry of commissions that were sold during the 
earliest years of the Revolutionary Wars were sold to men well under the regulation age.52 One 
of these was John Blakiston, the youngest officer in this study at his commission, who became a 
‘schoolboy in uniform’ in 1794 at only nine years of age, before being placed on half-pay as a 
consequence of the Duke of York’s reforms targeting abuses of the purchase system.53 The 
regulations appear to have been loosely followed with regards to the officers in this study, with 
another four officers commissioned at fifteen years old. The oldest officer in this study was 
William Gavin, who was commissioned from the ranks at the age of thirty-six, and is one of three 
officers commissioned in their thirties. Officers commissioned from the ranks tended to be older 
than their comrades when commissioned. In addition to Gavin, William Surtees was aged 
twenty-six when he was promoted to quartermaster of the 95th Rifles. Older officers are likely to 
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have been conspicuous when commissioned. Robert Bakewell, for example, was thirty-four 
years old when his father purchased him a commission in the 27th Foot.  If the most senior 
ensign in the 27th when Bakewell joined, Michael White, was nineteen when he was 
commissioned in 1807, then there would still have been an age difference of at least eleven 
years between the two when Bakewell joined.  
 Figure 1.3 Ages at Commission 
Age Range Number % 
6-15 5 6.5 
16-25 30 39 
26-35 4 5.2 
36+ 1 1.3 
Unknown 37 48 
Data compiled from personal accounts, editors’ notes, and secondary biographical sources. 
 
Commissions 
The first officer in this study to be commissioned was William Harness, who joined the 65th Foot 
in February 1780. The last to be commissioned was John W. Dunbar-Moodie, who joined the 21st 
Foot in February 1813. Generally, the officers in this study may be said to have joined the army 
as a response to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, with only four officers holding 
their commissions prior to the break-out of war with Revolutionary France in 1793. As Figure 
1.4 demonstrates, the officers in this study entered the army spasmodically between 1788 and 
1802, before a period of relatively consistent enlistment between 1803 and 1813. This pattern 
follows the expansion and contraction of the army during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. In 1792, there were 3, 107 officers on full pay, a number which swelled as new regiments 
were created on the outbreak of war in 1793.54 This growth is reflected in the small spike in 
commissions obtained in the years 1794 and 1795. The low number of commissions per year 
until 1803 reflects the low overall intake into the army between 1796 and 1803, as recruitment 
efforts stalled and the government focused attention on auxiliary forces for home defence.55 As 
the 1802 Peace of Amiens gave way to renewed war in May 1803, the army ballooned in size 
again, growing from 52, 000 in March 1803, to 94, 000 strong in January 1804.56 From this 
period until 1813, the army and officer corps grew in size: in 1807, there were 8, 600 officers on 
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full-pay, excluding the artillery and engineers, before the officer corps peaked at 10, 590 officers 
in 1814.57 The largest intake of officers in this study occurred in 1809, when ten officers were 
commissioned. This occurred as the Peninsular War began to demand more manpower for the 
British army. As well as creating the demand for new officers to lead an expanding army, the 
Peninsular War also brought about a heavy loss of officers, with approximately 1, 000 new 
officers required each year.58 This period of consistent enlistment was brought to a halt in 1814, 
the first year since 1798 when no officers in this study were commissioned; as Napoleon’s first 
exile saw the British reduce the size of their army, diminishing the demand for new officers. 
As shown in Figure 1.5, these men were commissioned into the four main branches of the 
regular British army. Of the seventy-seven officers whose accounts have been used in this study, 
forty-seven joined line infantry regiments, thirteen joined cavalry regiments, nine joined the 
Foot Guards, and eight went into the technical branches as artillery or engineering officers. 
While officers could, and occasionally did, switch between regiments, the officers in this study 
generally finished their careers in the same branch in which they started. The three exceptions 
to this rule are Lieutenant George Woodberry of the 18th Hussars, who purchased his way into 
this cavalry regiment from the 10th Foot, Captain William Warre, who served with dragoon 
regiments and on the staff in the Peninsula, and Captain Charles Pasley, who transferred to the 
Royal Engineers from the Royal Artillery in 1799. The number of line infantry officers in the 
army dwarfed the number of officers from the Foot Guards and the cavalry. For the duration of 
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the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, there were only three Foot Guards regiments, while 
the number of cavalry regiments remained stable at twenty-seven between 1805 and June 
1815.59 In contrast, in 1805 there were 100 line regiments, not including colonial units, such as 
the West India Regiments or New South Wales Corps.60 As this study examines differences 
between officers from all branches of the army and attempts to establish the differences and 
similarities in cultures between these branches, it is inevitable that officers from the Guards and 
cavalry will be over-represented when compared to their numbers within the army.  
Commission data compiled from TNA WO 65/29-162,  A List of all the Officers of the Army. 
When it came to obtaining a commission and achieving promotion for the eighteenth-century 
British army officer, opportunity was not equal. Patronage and wealth could count for much, 
values which were enshrined in the methods used for obtaining commissions. A degree of 
patronage was required before an officer could gain a commission, with a personal 
recommendation from an officer of field rank or higher the only requirement for a prospective 
officer, apart from literacy and age requirements.61 The importance of wealth to the system of 
commissions and promotions was highlighted by the legitimate practice of buying and selling 
commissions and promotions, a system which was not abolished in the British army until 1871. 
As revealed by Anthony Bruce, the practice of purchasing military positions had roots in the 
medieval period, before being consolidated after the establishment of a standing British army in 
1660, and brought under closer government control during the early-mid-eighteenth century.62 
Aside from acting as a social filter, the purchase system had several practical and theoretical 
benefits. As a saleable piece of property, the sale of commissions allowed the government to 
avoid the expense of providing pensions for all of their former officers, while the possibility of 
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Figure 1.5 Commissions by Branch 
Branch Number % 
Guards 9 11.7 
Cavalry 13 16.9 
Line 47 61 
Artillery/Engineers 8 10.4 
Total 77 - 
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obtaining and selling more valuable commissions allowed officers the chance to turn a profit.63 
Additionally, purchase had perceived ideological benefits. The purchase system was theorised 
as drawing men of property who were personally invested in the defence of Britain’s interests 
into the officer corps, while a commission’s status as personal property was seen to act as a 
safeguard against monarchical control of the army, as a monarch stripping an officer’s 
commission would be considered an act of robbery.64 The process of purchasing a commission 
during the eighteenth century, as described by J.A. Houlding and Richard Glover, was relatively 
straightforward. A prospective officer purchased an ensigncy, second lieutenancy, or cornetcy 
from the government by lodging money with a regimental agent when a vacancy opened, who 
then passed the money on to the seller.65 While prices were officially fixed, the cost of 
commissions reflected the esteem and exclusivity of a regiment. During the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, a commission in a line regiment cost £400, rising to £735 in the dragoons or 
dragoon guards, £900 in the Foot Guards, £1050 in the Royal Horse Guards, and £1600 in the 
prestigious Life Guards.66  
The purchase system was an accepted facet of military life by the time of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. It had helped shape the social make-up and ideological outlook of the officer 
corps; however, the proportion of officers who purchased their commissions can be overstated.  
Stephen Brumwell and Houlding both suggested that purchase accounted for two-thirds of new 
commissions during the eighteenth century.67 As the army expanded during the period 1793-4, 
this rate looked set to continue, as the War Office expanded the army by creating new units with 
commissions available for purchase, allowing the War Office to collect revenue from each 
commission sold. 68 By the time of the Peninsular War, however, the proportion of first 
commissions obtained by purchase had dropped to nineteen-and-a-half per cent, discounting 
the artillery and engineers, where commissions could not be purchased.69 Michael Glover 
attributed this decline to the policy of augmenting existing units by adding additional battalions 
to their strength, rather than creating new regiments.70 Commissions and subsequent 
promotions created by augmentation could only be given freely, a policy which Glover 
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calculated saw the number of commissions increase to 10, 590 in 1814, of which only 2, 000 
were had by purchase.71  
The data for commissions and promotions in this study has been compiled from a variety of 
sources. In the first instance, the Army Lists for the period 1779-1878 have been consulted to 
ascertain the date of officers’ first commissions and subsequent promotions.72 Published 
annually, the Army List listed every officer on full or half-pay, and included the dates at which 
each officer attained their current rank within the regiment and the army. As the Army List does 
not detail the means by which an officer obtained their commission, information about how 
officers got their commissions has been obtained primarily from the London Gazette, the 
government periodical which published details of commissions and promotions. This same 
method was applied by Michael Glover in three studies into commissions and promotions at the 
time of the Peninsular War.73 Where possible, the Gazette publications have been cross-checked 
against other sources, such as personal testimonies, and an 1828 government circular sent to 
retired officers on half-pay, which recorded biographical details of each officer.74 Even with 
reference to several sources, there are still seven instances where the circumstances of an 
officer’s first commission cannot be conclusively ascertained. Where there is a discrepancy 
between the dates of a commission as published in the Gazette and as it appears in the Army 
List, the date from the Army List has been used, as this was the date routinely consulted by 
officers when examining seniority within their regiment and the army.  
As demonstrated in Figure 1.6, the proportion of purchased commissions for officers in this 
study is higher than the nineteen-and-a-half per cent found at the time of the Peninsular War; 
yet lower than the two-thirds figure suggested by Brumwell and Houlding for the eighteenth 
century.  Of seventy-eight commissions in this study, forty-six, or fifty-nine per cent, were 
obtained freely; twenty-five, or just over thirty-two per cent were purchased; with the 
remaining seven, or nine per cent, unknown. When the six commissions awarded to artillery 
and engineer officers, who could not purchase their commissions, are discounted, the purchased 
proportion expands to nearly thirty-six per cent. In part, the relatively high representation of 
officers who purchased their commissions can be attributed to the prominence of Guards and 
cavalry officers in this study, branches of the military which had higher rates of purchase than 
the line. During the Peninsular War, forty-seven per cent of newly commissioned cavalry 
officers in the wider army purchased their commissions; while forty-four per cent of Guards 
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officers purchased their ensigncies.75 For the same period, Glover found that only seventeen per 
cent of line officers purchased their ensigncies or second-lieutenancies.76 The Guards and 
cavalry officers included in this study were considerably more likely to have purchased their 
commissions than their comrades: over sixty-one per cent of cavalry officers bought their way 
into the army, while nearly sixty-seven per cent of Guards officers did the same. The proportion 
of officers who purchased commissions in the line is also higher than the figure identified by 
Glover: just under one-quarter of commissions in the line were purchased. Contributing to this 
inflated number of purchased commissions is the odd occurrence of one officer who purchased 
two commissions during his career. Bakewell of the 27th Foot purchased an ensigncy in 1810 
and was promoted to lieutenant without purchase in 1812. Bakewell sold his lieutenancy in 
1813 due to ill-health, before re-purchasing an ensigncy in the 27th in early - 1815.77  
Figure 1.6 Rates of Purchased Commissions  
Branch Free % Purchase % Unknown % 
Guards 3 33.3 6 66.7 - - 
Cavalry 4 30.8 8 61.5 1 7.7 
Line 31 64.4 11 23.9 6 12.5 
Artillery/Engineers 8 100 - - - - 
Total 46 59 25 32.1 7 9 
Commission data compiled from official notices in the London Gazette, personal accounts, and TNA WO 25/744-779, 
Returns of Officers’ Services. 
As suggested by the fact that the majority of commissions in this study and the wider army were 
given freely, lacking the money to purchase a commission was not an impediment to becoming 
an officer. For officers without the money or need to purchase their commissions, there were 
several ways to obtain a free commission. A prospective officer could submit an application for a 
commission, accompanied by a recommendation, to the commander in chief in the hope of being 
appointed to a vacant ensigncy or cornetcy.78 Other, less direct, pathways to a commission were 
also available. As an aid to recruitment, from 1808 militia officers who could persuade forty 
rank and file from their militia regiment to transfer to a line regiment would receive a 
recommendation to a vacant commission in that regiment.79 The practice of ‘recruiting for rank’ 
proved popular; Glover calculated that one in five new officers during the Peninsular War joined 
                                                          
75 Glover, Wellington’s Army, p. 44. 
76 Glover, ‘Purchase, Patronage, and Promotion’, p. 212.  
77 National Army Museum, London (hereafter NAM) 1975-09-75, Robert Bakewell, ‘Diary of Lieutenant Robert 
Bakewell’, Vol. II, pp. 22-5. 
78 James, The Regimental Companion, Vol. I, p. 28.  
79 Linch, Britain and Wellington’s Army, pp. 77-8. 
32 
 
the army in this way.80 Four officers in this study obtained commissions in this way. Two of 
these officers, John Kincaid and George Simmons, both recruited to obtain commissions in the 
95th Rifles, an unsurprising occurrence when the popularity of the 95th is taken into account. A 
light infantry regiment as opposed to a stock line regiment, the 95th was renowned for intrepid 
tactics and its distinctive dark green uniform. The 95th proved so popular for volunteers from 
the militia that the regiment formed a third battalion in 1809.81  
Two final paths to a commission, promotion from the ranks, and serving as a ‘gentleman 
volunteer’, were also used by officers in this study. As will be explored further in Chapter Two, 
officers in these categories complicated the relationship between holding a commission and 
gentility through their association with common soldiering. Officers elevated from the ranks 
were traditionally in the minority of officers, and comprised just over five per cent of new 
officers during the Peninsular War.82 Officers promoted from the ranks were generally non-
commissioned officers who received a commission as recognition of long service, or who were 
recognised as being of sufficient character so to hold a commission.83 Exceptional individual or 
regimental conduct could also result in a commission, as was the case with one officer in this 
study, William Gavin, who received an ensigncy as a result of the 71st Highland Regiment’s 
bravery at Fuentes d’Onoro in 1811.84 Gentleman volunteers were a category of officers who 
had no official status within the army. With the permission of a regiment’s commander, a 
volunteer served with a regiment’s rank and file, until a free commission became available for 
them.85 Three officers in this study were volunteers, and are slightly represented when 
compared to the Peninsular army, where volunteers comprised four-and-a-half per cent of new 
officers.86  
 
Promotions 
Promotions, just like commissions, could be purchased. Each rank was valued higher than the 
one previous. A purchased lieutenancy in the line cost £550 and a captaincy £1, 500.87 Ranks in 
the Guards and cavalry were more expensive than in line regiments. A purchased lieutenancy in 
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the Guards cost £1, 500, and a captaincy £3, 500.88 The same ranks in the dragoons cost £997 
and £2, 782 respectively.89 Officers who had purchased rank previously did not need to pay the 
full cost of the next rank, but only the price difference between the two ranks.90 When an officer 
who had purchased rank intended to sell-out from the service, the first option on the vacant 
commission was given to the most senior officer of the next rank down, and then to each 
subsequent officer in seniority if that officer could not afford the purchase price.91 How far 
purchase influenced promotion during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period has been the 
subject of much scholarly interest. Charles Oman emphasised the importance of purchase and 
patronage, arguing that these factors were ruthlessly employed by wealthy officers to achieve 
promotion, while poorer officers waited ‘vainly’ for a free promotion.92 During periods of peace, 
certainly, the ability to purchase promotions was essential to advancing in rank.93 A lack of 
appropriate governance of the purchase system in the period 1793-5 also allowed officers of 
junior years to rapidly purchase rank. Blakiston, an ensign at age nine, was a lieutenant by 
purchase less than two months later, while Richard Glover noted instances of an eleven year-old 
becoming a captain, and a seventeen year-old commanding a regiment in Flanders.94  
Following the disastrous 1793-5 Low Countries campaign, however, regulations surrounding 
commissions were tightened. A minimum age requirement of sixteen was more rigidly enforced, 
as were minimum service requirements, with an officer needing to have served at least two 
years as a subaltern before they could become a captain, and at least seven years total before 
becoming a major.95 Coupled with the overall reduction in purchasable commissions owing to 
the policy of augmentation and non-purchasable vacancies created by death, these reforms 
curbed the overall influence of purchase on promotion. In contrast to Oman’s assertion, only 
twenty per cent of promotions during the Peninsular War were purchased, with the majority, 
seventy per cent, decided by seniority.96 Rates of purchase were higher in the Guards and 
cavalry, with fifty per cent purchased and forty-five per cent given freely, than in the line, where 
fewer than eighteen per cent of promotions were purchased.97 Up to and including the rank of 
major, the officers in this study purchased their promotions more regularly than their comrades 
in the wider army. Excluding three promotions of unknown method and promotions in the 
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artillery and engineers, there were a total of 119 promotions amongst this set of officers, fifty-
three per cent of which were had freely, and forty-seven per cent purchased. Cavalry officers 
had the highest rate of purchase, at ninety-two per cent, followed by the Foot Guards, who split 
evenly between purchase and non-purchase, and then the line, where thirty-two per cent of 
promotions were purchased.  
The higher than average rates of purchased commissions and promotions in this cohort 
suggests that the officers in this study were more likely to possess the means to purchase rank 
than their comrades. On average, the officers in this study could expect to serve two years 
before advancing one step in rank, nine years before their second step, and an average of 
nineteen years before being promoted to field rank. For officers in the artillery and engineers, 
where rank could not be purchased, there was little to do but wait for promotion. The eight 
artillery and engineering officers in this study served an average of one-and-a-half years for 
their 1st Lieutenancy, and ten-and-a-half years for their 2nd Captaincy. In the line, purchase 
allowed officers to advance slightly faster than their comrades. Line officers who did not 
purchase could expect to become lieutenants after nearly two years, while those who purchased 
waited a little over a year. Furthermore, officers who purchased their captaincy became 
captains after an average of six years’ service, compared with eleven years for those who waited 
for a free company. In the Foot Guards, promotion could be tortuously slow, irrespective of 
purchase. As an added advantage, however, a lieutenant in the Guards held the army rank of 
captain, and a captain the army rank of lieutenant-colonel, tempering a lack of regimental 
advancement. As calculated by Glover, of the seventy-five ensigns spread across the three 
Guards regiments in 1809, only eighteen became lieutenants within five years.98 The Guards 
officers in this study who purchased their lieutenancy waited five years for their lieutenancy, 
compared with three-and-a-half years for those who received free promotions, suggesting that 
circumstance was more important than money for securing these officers’ promotions. The four 
Guards officers in this study who joined from 1810 onwards advanced more rapidly than those 
who joined before. Of the five who joined before 1810, only one became a lieutenant before 
serving five years, despite three purchasing their lieutenancy. The four officers who joined from 
1810 on, when the Guards were in near constant service in the Peninsula, Holland, and at 
Waterloo, all became lieutenants within four years, all receiving their promotions freely.   
The small sample size and the domination of cavalry officers who purchased their ranks limit 
the comparisons that can be made between those who purchased, and those who did not; 
however, the regularity of purchase by cavalry officers suggests that purchase was something of 
a necessity in certain cavalry regiments. Cavalry officers below the rank of major had the 
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highest rates of purchase in the army during the Peninsular War, with nearly forty-three per 
cent purchasing their lieutenancies, while sixty per cent purchased their captaincies.99 Eighty 
per cent of the cavalry officers in this study purchased their lieutenancies, after a wait of one-
and-a-half years. Of the eleven cavalry officers who became captains, ten purchased their troop, 
with one acquired in an unknown way.   
It would appear for officers in this study that the effects of war on overall promotion trends 
were of greater importance for achieving relatively quick promotion than the capacity to 
purchase rank, particularly in the Guards and cavalry. In this respect, the officers in this study 
followed an established eighteenth-century pattern of slow promotion during peace time, 
punctuated by relatively quick promotion during war. In 1740, an ensign of a foot regiment 
could expect to serve an average of eleven and a-half years before becoming a lieutenant and 
nineteen years before becoming a captain.100  During the American War of Independence, an 
ensign of foot likely spent only two years on average in the service before being promoted to 
lieutenant, and only seven years on average before becoming a captain.101 For lieutenants in this 
study who avoided being placed on half-pay in the post-1815 army reductions, the wait for a 
captaincy was long. On average, a captain of the line who became captain after 1815 had served 
a little over fifteen  
years, compared with eight and-a-half years during the period 1808-15, and five years in the 
period 1793-1808. The longest serving of these was John Malcolm, who was into his nineteenth 
year of service with the 42nd Foot before he became a captain. George Bowles of the Coldstream 
Guards had been a subaltern for even longer, becoming a captain during his twenty-first year of 
service.  
 
Personal Economy 
While overseeing the training of Britain’s Light Infantry regiments at Shorncliffe as colonel of 
the 52nd Foot in January 1804, Sir John Moore advised the parents of a prospective officer: 
It is difficult in these times for a Subaltern to live upon his pay. There are some few 
who do it, but it requires a degree of economy and attention which few young men, 
at starting, are equal to. I should recommend an allowance of not less than £50, nor 
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above £100. This will put him on a par with most of his comrades, and still oblige 
him to pay attention to economy.102 
Moore’s assessment of the financial situation of his subalterns highlights the competing aims of 
maintaining the lifestyle requisite of an officer and a gentleman, particularly in fashionable 
regiments such as the 52nd, and the need to avoid the pitfall of falling into poverty or debt. As 
shown by Alan Guy, this pattern of financial difficulty had been established during the 
eighteenth century. Meagre pay ensured that routine expenses of food and equipment could 
place an officer into arrears, particularly in regiments where an officer was expected to 
maintain the social standards of the regiment.103 This section explores the financial lives of 
junior officers firstly by examining the standard pay rates and daily deductions shared by all 
officers. 
 
Figure 1.7 outlines the 1810 daily and annual pay of junior officers in the line infantry, the Foot 
Guards, and the cavalry, excluding the Household Cavalry.104 Ensigns in the line were the lowest 
paid of all officers, and received 5s 3d per day in pay. A lieutenant in the line was paid 6s 6d per 
day, with an extra shilling per day paid to lieutenants who had served for seven or more years, 
and a captain 10s 6d per day. Pay rates were higher in the Foot Guards. For ensigns and 
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Figure 1.7 Daily and Annual Pay of Junior Officers, 1810 
Foot Guards Daily Pay £ s d Yearly Pay £ s d 
Ensign 0 5 10 106 9 2 
Lieutenant 0 7 10  142 19 2 
Captain 0 16 6 301 2 6 
Cavalry   
Cornet 0 8 0  146 0 0 
Lieutenant 0 9 0  164 5 0 
Captain 0 14 7 266 2 11 
Line Infantry   
Ensign or 2nd Lieutenant 0 5 3 95 16 3 
Lieutenant 0 6 6  119 2 6 
Lieutenant of 7+Years’ Service 0 7 6 136 17 6 
Captain 0 10 6 191 12 6 
Figures taken from Burnham and McGuigan, The British Army, pp. 143-5. 
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lieutenants, this difference was marginal: only 7d more daily for an ensign, and 1s 10d for a 
lieutenant. Captains in Guards regiments were paid markedly more than their counterparts in 
the line, receiving 6s more per day than a captain of the line. Cavalry officers were paid the 
highest of any subalterns, with cornets and lieutenants receiving 8s and 9s respectively as daily 
pay. Captains of cavalry were paid around 4s more a day than line captains, but still 2s less than 
Guards captains.  
Living off this pay was a task fraught with difficulty.  As highlighted in Figure 1.8, junior officers 
were subject to daily wage deductions, which reduced their pay significantly. The biggest 
deduction from an officer’s pay was the daily deduction for rations, with upwards of three-
quarters of daily pay being spent on food. The method and rate of payment for rations varied 
between regiments. Some regiments deducted pay; others issued separate mess bills to 
individual officers.105 While daily subsistence was nominally more expensive for Guards officers, 
the percentage of pay devoted to food in the Guards was slightly less than in the line. An ensign 
of the line, for example, devoted eighty-one per cent of his pay to rations, compared to seventy-
seven per cent for a Guards ensign. In addition to deductions made for rations there were a 
number of other stoppages made, amounting to between fifteen and twenty per cent of annual 
pay.106 All officers contributed one day’s pay to the upkeep of the Chelsea Pensioner’s Hospital, 
an ‘agency’ fee paid to cover the regiment’s running costs, usually five per cent of annual pay, 
and income tax of five per cent for officers earning less than £150 and ten per cent for those 
earning more this figure.107 An additional fee of five per cent of annual pay for ‘poundage’, a fee 
paid to a regiment’s agent, was paid by all officers before 1797, and only by officers who were 
ranked captain or higher thereafter.108 The effect of these deductions was to leave junior officers 
with precious little actual pay: after all daily and annual deductions were taken into account, an 
ensign in the line could be expected to have a daily net pay of 5d, and an ensign in the Guards 
marginally more at 7d.109 Out of this pay, officers also had to cover extra costs such as laundry 
fees and paying servants: while an ensign stationed in Ireland, John Patterson of the 50th Foot 
calculated that these additional costs reduced his daily pay to zero.110  
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Figures taken from Burnham and McGuigan, The British Army, pp. 143-5. 
The straitened nature of an officer’s pay situation shifted the onus of economy onto individual 
officers. Sir John Moore’s observation about the necessity of subalterns having an annual 
allowance suggests an underlying relationship between private means and the officer corps, a 
relationship also reflected in the belief that the purchase system would bring gentlemen of some 
degree of wealth into the army.111 Patterson noted how the ability to draw additional money 
represented the difference between security and poverty and recalled, ‘The poor fellow who 
couldn’t occasionally bleed his friends, or draw on the purse of some old “nuncle”, was reduced 
to a sad dilemma; his countenance looked particularly blue the expiration of the month, and was 
fully as long as the bills that lay upon his table.’112  With the exception of officers commissioned 
from the ranks, who received a £50 payment for their equipment and uniform, the initial cost of 
equipping an officer during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period fell on the new officer.  An 
average uniform, including sword, cost £9 13s; however, officers joining fashionable regiments 
could pay more for their full equipment: an officer joining the 52nd Foot spent £57 18s 6d, while 
an enquiry into the expenditure of the 15th Light Dragoons stated that a new cornet needed to 
spend £458 1s 6d.113 Once in the army, preparations for campaign were partially covered, with 
officers travelling to the Peninsula allowed to draw two months’ pay in advance, and the West 
Indies and America, three months’ pay, as well as an embarkation allowance of £20 to pay for 
supplies for the voyage.114  
For officers in the Foot Guards and the cavalry, having additional income was imperative, as a 
heightened sense of gentlemanliness and refinement permeated the cultures of these regiments, 
with officers conscious to maintain this standard of living. The financial dealings of John Lucie 
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Figure 1.8 Daily Pay Deductions for Rations 
Foot Guards Daily Deduction £ s d Net Daily Pay after Deduction £ s d 
Ensign 0 4 6 0 1 4 
Lieutenant 0 6 0  0 1 10 
Captain 0 12 6 0 4 0 
Line Infantry   
Ensign or 2nd Lieutenant 0 4 3 0 1 0 
Lieutenant 0 5 0  0 1 6 
Captain 0 8 0  0 2 6 
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Blackman, the son of a director of the Bank of England and a subaltern in the Coldstream Guards 
from 1812 until his death at Waterloo, reveal the financial demands placed on officers in this 
regiment. With an annual allowance of £150 from his father, Blackman was certainly from a 
family of means; however, he was unprepared for just how much money he would have to 
outlay on campaign. By May 1812, Blackman had spent all £150 of his allowance after arriving 
in the Peninsula, Blackman spent £51 15s on mules to carry his baggage, before having to spend 
another £45 as one mule was stolen, and its replacement proved to be inadequate.115 Blackman 
was not alone in spending large amounts on animals. John Rous, an aristocratic subaltern also in 
the Coldstream, spent £118 13s on a horse, two mules and a pony when he arrived in Lisbon in 
1812.116 The outlay on mules for baggage was necessary owing to the large amount of 
equipment Blackman carried: a letter from an outfitter in Lisbon to Blackman’s father revealed 
Blackman spent £84 6s 7d in November 1812 on a tent with a marquee; a bed and bedding; 
candlesticks and candles; silver tablespoons, tea spoons, mugs, six pairs of knives and forks; as 
well as a larder full of food, including: hams, cheese, tea, sugar, and chocolate.117  
 
Theatres of War 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars defined the careers of the officers in this study. Of the 
seventy-seven officers included, only four held their commissions before the outbreak of war. 
By 1830, however, only eighteen remained in the service. Seven officers died on active service, 
with the remaining fifty-two having retired from the army, sold their commissions, or been 
reduced to half-pay in post-war demobilisations. Figure 1.9 provides the average service length 
of officers in this study by period. Not including periods spent on half-pay, or the service of the 
seven officers in this study who died on active duty, the officers in this study served an average 
of twenty years. The scale and duration of war with France allowed the time for officers who 
were commissioned before 1803 to carve out a lengthy career by war’s end. Charles Steevens of 
the 20th Foot, for example, was commissioned in 1795, and retired in 1818 as a lieutenant-
colonel. The average length of service for those who were commissioned before 1803 was 
twenty years; however, only two officers commissioned during this period remained in the 
army beyond 1830. For officers commissioned during the period 1803-15, the average service 
length was also twenty years, suggesting a broad trend of long service. Both of these figures are 
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inflated by a handful of general officers of very long service, such as John Aitchison, who died 
during what was technically his sixty-sixth year of service. As noted by McGuffie, however, the 
presence of general officers on the Army List can be misleading, as, unless a general officer was 
employed on a specific service, they were unpaid, rendering their rank largely titular.118 
Perhaps a greater indicator of officers’ careerist tendencies is their reluctance to leave the army 
during conflict. As shown in Figure 1.10, there were only thirteen retirements or reductions to 
half-pay between 1793 and 1813, with four officers forcibly placed on half-pay in the reductions 
of 1814. Surviving the reductions of the army in the post-war period was essential for officers 
with career aspirations which extended beyond the Napoleonic Wars. Twenty-three officers 
retired or were reduced in the period 1815-21; just under a third of the surviving officers in this 
study. Further indication of the careerism of these officers is their average length of service of 
twelve-and-half years, excluding time spent on half-pay, up to 1820. 
 
                                                          
118 McGuffie, ‘The Significance of Military Rank’, pp. 217-8. 
Figure 1.9 Average Number of Years Served by Period 
Commissioned Pre-1803 20 
Commissioned 1803-15 20 
Service up to 1820 12.5 
Overall 20 
Service length data compiled from TNA WO 65/29-162,  A List of all the Officers of the Army. 
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Generally long-serving and careerist in outlook, the officers included in this study served in a 
wide range of theatres and often left accounts that related to more than one campaign. The 
accounts drawn on for this thesis, therefore, reflect the depth and breadth of the military 
experiences of the British army during this conflict. Five officers in this study left detailed 
accounts about home service, providing an insight into the lives of regular soldiers while in 
Britain. Four of the officers drawn on for this study wrote accounts of the Low Countries 
campaign of 1793-5, two left accounts of the 1799 Low Countries expedition, and one of 
garrison duty on Minorca in 1800. Three officers served in the West Indies between 1793 and 
1802, in the campaigns against the French Revolutionary armies and the slave insurrection on 
Saint Domingue, while another three served with the 1801 Egyptian campaign. Seven officers 
fought in the West Indies between 1803 and 1815. The majority of officers’ testimonies drawn 
on for this study come from officers who served during the period 1807-15, reflecting the size of 
the British army, which reached a record size during the Napoleonic period. While two officers 
in this study served with the ill-fated1807 South American expedition, and five served in North 
America against America in the War of 1812 or on garrison duty, accounts left by officers 
involved in European expeditions dominate this study. Six officers served as a part of the 18, 
000 strong expedition to Copenhagen in 1807, and another four served as part of the 44, 000 
strong 1809 expedition to Walcheren in Holland, which ended in disaster as the British army 
was decimated by malaria.119 Two more officers served in the 1813-4 expedition to Holland. The 
bulk of the source material in this study relates in some way to the 1808-14 Peninsular War, 
with sixty officers spending at least some time in the Peninsula. In many ways, this dominance is 
unsurprising, with eighty-eight British regiments and some 200, 000 deployments during the 
Peninsular War.120 Fifteen officers fought in the ultimate episode of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, the 1815 Waterloo campaign.  
In some ways, the officers considered by this thesis are exceptional. The rate of purchased 
commissions and promotions within this group is somewhat higher than they were in the wider 
army.  Yet, the officers whose accounts have been drawn on for this thesis reflect the diversity of 
experience of junior British army officers during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. This diversity is reflected in this cohort’s social backgrounds, nationalities, ages, wealth, 
and the branches of the army they served with. The officers included in this study are drawn 
from across the social spectrum, ranging from socially elite and wealthy aristocrats, to men of 
                                                          
119 Jeremy Black, Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815 (London, 1999), pp. 203-4. 
120 Ron McGuigan, ‘British Regiments in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814’, The Napoleon Series (2009), 
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/Britain/Strength/c_RegimentsinPeninsula.html 
(accessed 15 Mar. 2016); Andrew Bamford, ‘A Computation of the Number of British Troops Deployed to the 
Peninsular Theatre, 1808-1814’, The Napoleon Series (2008), http://www.napoleon-
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humble origin who were commissioned from the ranks after a period of lengthy service. These 
officers were also drawn from across the nations of Britain and Ireland, including a rare Irish 
Catholic officer. The majority of the officers included in this study were young, a trend which 
reflects the overall youthfulness of the British officer corps, while there are also a handful of 
older officers whose experiences are also of valuable insight. This diversity ensures that this 
thesis provides a window into many aspects of junior officers’ experiences and identities during 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 
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Chapter Two: Polite Masculinity and the Junior Army 
Officer 
At seemingly every turn, Georgian army officers were reminded that they were expected to 
simultaneously be ‘officers and gentlemen’. The 1804 Military Mentor, a published series of 
advice letters for young officers, was written so as to comprise: ‘a course of elegant instruction, 
calculated to unite the characters and accomplishments of the gentleman and the soldier.’1 In 
eighteenth-century Britain, gentlemanliness was bound to notions of ‘politeness’ as well as to 
social standing. ‘Politeness’ encompassed many attributes: refined manners, elegance, taste, and 
sensibility are all characteristics historians have associated with the ‘polite gentleman’.2 
Accomplishment and character went hand-in-hand in Georgian polite society. Gentlemen were 
expected to display their polished character through competence at dancing, drawing, and art, 
while also displaying their sophisticated literary tastes, and their social ease in polite company.3 
As emphasised by Lawrence Klein, the ease and social amity associated with polite interaction 
was geared to bridge social divides, and to lubricate interactions between individuals of unequal 
social standing.4 Representations of polite masculinity, however, often differed from lived 
practices. Historians have recently begun to explore the divergences between the two. Philip 
Carter highlighted how polite identities were prone to collapse, with erstwhile ‘polite 
gentlemen’ engaging in distinctly ‘impolite’ conduct.5 Similarly, Kate Davison has emphasised 
how politeness was contextual, and revealed how polite men lapsed into ‘bawdy’, less 
respectable conduct when in familiar company.6 
This chapter explores junior officers’ lived experiences and identities as ‘polite gentlemen’.  
Politeness has not been universally associated with the Georgian officer. Roger Norman Buckley 
argued that the British officer corps in the West Indies exhibited the excesses of gentlemanly 
masculinity, such as indolence, drunkenness, and sexual misconduct.7 As this chapter will 
demonstrate, junior officers could fulfil this image, and worse; yet, it was politeness which 
                                                          
1 Anon., The Military Mentor: Being a Series of Letters Recently Written by a General Officer to his Son, 2nd Ed., 
Vol. I (London, 1804), p. i. 
2 Lawrence Klein ‘Politeness and the Interpretation of the British Eighteenth Century’, Historical Journal, 4 
(2002), pp. 869-98; Philip Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, 1660-1800 (Harlow, 2001). 
3 Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England, 1727-1783 (Oxford, 1989), pp. 90-102; Klein 
‘Politeness and the Interpretation of the British Eighteenth Century’, pp. 873-7. 
4 Klein ‘Politeness and the Interpretation of the British Eighteenth Century’, pp. 878-82. 
5 Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, pp. 163-201. 
6 Kate Davison, ‘Occasional Politeness and Gentlemen’s Laughter in 18th C. England’, The Historical Journal, 57 
(2014), pp. 921-45. 
7 Roger Norman Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: Society and Military in the Revolutionary Age 
(Gainesville, FL, 1998), pp. 338-49. 
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presents the best model of masculinity for understanding junior officers’ behaviour during the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. As emphasised by Matthew McCormack, Gavin 
Daly, and Catriona Kennedy, politeness had an enduring importance for British army officers 
into the early-nineteenth century, as it provided a model for male behaviour within the officer 
corps.8 Polite accomplishment and the military were seen to exist in a complimentary 
relationship. As revealed by McCormack, for example, dancing was seen to inculcate the bodily 
comportment required of a soldier.9  
The first four sections of this chapter focus on how junior officers related to other officers as 
‘polite gentlemen’. Carter has highlighted how polite identities were constructed not just in 
relation to women, but other men.10 Establishing and maintaining a reputation as a ‘polite 
gentleman’ was critical for junior officers, as it ensured that they attained and maintained the 
good graces of their comrades, and also informed junior officers’ expectations of their superiors. 
This chapter also explores some of the limitations of using politeness to understand junior 
officers’ masculine identities. Junior officers often diverted from polite norms to engage in acts 
of violence and destruction, which could result in their ostracism from the service. Furthermore, 
the internal social divide which existed between officers of the Foot Guards and cavalry, and 
officers of the line, suggests that the social bridging aimed for in polite ideals did not always 
manifest itself in social harmony. This chapter contends that it was largely in relation to other 
officers that polite conduct was considered essential. To highlight this, the final section of this 
chapter explores junior officers’ attitudes and encounters with women. Interaction with women 
was central to polite discourses. As shown by Carter, by engaging appropriately with women, 
gentlemen were seen to ‘soften’ their natural instincts and attain refinement.11 While officers 
interacted with women in ways that highlighted their identities as ‘polite gentlemen’, or ‘men of 
feeling’, there was also another dimension to officers’ gender relations. As shown by Jennine 
Hurl-Eamon, the eighteenth-century army had a masculine culture which celebrated 
womanising and sexual conquest.12 Licentious sexual conduct was in direct conflict with polite 
norms; however, it was officers who aspired to marriage who were scorned.  The lack of 
repercussion for breaching polite norms as regards to women suggests that politeness was 
                                                          
8 Matthew McCormack, Embodying the Militia in Georgian England (Oxford, 2015), p. 118; Gavin Daly, The 
British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814 (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 
27; Catriona Kennedy, ‘John Bull into Battle: Military Masculinity and the British Army Officer during the 
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Gisela Mettele, & Jane Rendall (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 137-9. 
9 Matthew McCormack, ‘Dance and Drill: Polite Accomplishment and Military Masculinities in Georgian 
Britain’, Cultural & Social History, 8 (2011), pp. 315-330. 
10 Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, pp. 9-10. 
11 Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, pp. 66-70. 
12 Jennine Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century: ‘The Girl I Left Behind 
Me’ (Oxford, 2014), pp. 95-111. 
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contextual. Expected to act in line with polite ideals with regards to other officers in the name of 
cohesion, junior officers were also liable to lapses in their polite identities. 
 
Becoming Officers, Becoming Gentlemen? 
Michael Glover noted that it is unclear as to whether gentlemen became officers, or officers 
became gentlemen.13 The relationship between officership and gentlemanliness does not appear 
to have been as straightforward as the linear relationships suggested by Glover. Officers drew 
distinctions between themselves and other officers, by either excluding others on social 
grounds, or by asserting cultural and social distinctions to create degrees of gentlemanliness. 
The late-Georgian officer corps was socially diverse; however, officers were largely drawn from 
social classes which could be broadly defined as ‘gentlemanly’. Furthermore, prospective 
officers also expressed the sentiments expected of ‘polite gentlemen’. George Hennell, then a 
volunteer with the 94th Foot who was waiting for a vacant commission, responded to the 
horrific 1812 storming of Badajoz using the language of sensibility to differentiate himself from 
the rankers he was serving alongside:  
You can have no conception of the scene I witnessed, most of the soldiers drunk, 
staggering about with their plunder … The want of reflection in numbers of the men 
surprised me. They were singing and swearing and talking of having a damned 
narrow escape while their comrades lay round them in heaps dead. It was horrible. 
It was a lesson for me that I did not let pass without taking a walk in the fields to 
reflect upon. I have an opportunity of doing this.14 
Hennell’s response mirrored that of officers who witnessed similar actions by the rank and file. 
As shown by Catriona Kennedy, by drawing on the language of sensibility and introspection, 
officers were engaged in ‘self-fashioning’ refined identities to differentiate themselves from the 
‘coarse’ soldiery.15 In relating his experience of the storming of Badajoz in this manner, 
therefore, Hennell was displaying his self-identification with polite, refined masculinity, even 
before he became a full officer. 
Acceptance and entry into an institution underpinned by an entrenched sense of 
gentlemanliness could be expected to encourage the view that one was either a gentleman 
                                                          
13 Michael Glover, ‘The Purchase of Commissions: A Reappraisal’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 58 (1980), p. 233. 
14 George Hennell, 16 Apr. 1812, in George Hennell, A Gentleman Volunteer: The Letters of George Hennell 
from the Peninsular War, 1812-1813, ed. Michael Glover (London, 1979), pp. 18-9. 
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already, or became a gentleman by becoming an officer.16 Prospective officers were certainly 
encouraged to style themselves as gentlemen from the outset of their career. The Regimental 
Companion, a guide book outlining the duties of British officers, provided the following template 
for a letter of recommendation: ‘Sir, I beg leave to recommend “A.B.” as a gentleman fully 
qualified to hold an ensigncy in his Majesty’s regiment of _____ or ____.’17 By specifically outlining 
gentlemanliness as a criterion for holding a commission, a recommendation taking this form 
appears to assume that the applicant was already, in some sense, a gentleman. A letter of 
recommendation, which applicants for a commission had to have signed by an officer who held 
the rank of major or higher, could connote gentility.18 In the context of late-Georgian Britain, 
where reputation counted for much in determining gentlemanliness, a letter of 
recommendation could be conceived of as formal recognition of an individual’s status as a 
gentleman. En route to the Low Countries in 1799, Lieutenant John Hunt of the 7th Light 
Dragoons observed how a volunteer to his regiment treasured his recommendation:  
On board … was a … North Briton, who was a volunteer in the expedition. His name 
was Cameron and he was commencing the life of a Soldier of Fortune, his wardrobe, 
which was not over large, he carried on his back, and of its contents which he valued 
most was his letter of recommendation to Sir R. Abercromby, and which I presume 
fully answered his purpose and expectation, for after the action of the 19th 
September, he was appointed to an Ensigncy.19 
Hunt’s observations highlight how a recommendation for a commission worked as an 
affirmation of personal status. Cameron’s Scottish nationality, reliance on the military as a 
‘soldier of fortune’ and his dearth of personal belongings appear to have made his claims of 
gentility dubious in Hunt’s estimation; yet Cameron’s attachment to his recommendation 
suggests that he saw his recommendation as reflecting his status as a ‘gentleman’. 
The relationship between acquiring a commission and gentlemanliness does not appear to have 
been linear, as highlighted by the experiences of two minority groups within the officer corps: 
‘gentlemen volunteers’ and officers commissioned from the ranks. ‘Gentleman volunteers’ are 
one of the curiosities of the British army during this period. This small group of officers, who 
Michael Glover calculated comprised four-and-a-half per cent of new officers in the 1809 
                                                          
16 John Cookson, ‘Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the Experience of British Soldiers during the Napoleonic 
Wars’, in Solders, Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
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17 Charles James, The Regimental Companion¸ Vol. 1 (London, 1800), p. 28. 
18 Cookson, ‘Regimental Worlds’, p. 28. 
19 National Army Museum, London (hereafter, NAM) 1968-07-55, John Hunt, ‘Journal of Lieutenant and 
Adjutant John Hunt’, pp. 3-4. 
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Peninsular army, were men who volunteered to serve with the rank and file of a regiment until a 
vacancy for a commission became available, but who messed with the regiment’s officers.20 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some volunteers could be welcomed as gentlemen by their 
new comrades, while others found acceptance by polite gentlemen difficult. Commissioned as an 
ensign in the 43rd Foot in July 1812, after serving as a volunteer with the 94th Foot, Hennell 
appeared to have suffered no loss of reputation owing to his time with the ranks, as he was 
invited to a ball by his colonel soon after being commissioned. 21 This is in line with the pattern 
of volunteering established as early as the Seven Years’ War. As highlighted by Brumwell, 
volunteers in the mid-eighteenth century army were given priority over men from the ranks on 
the broad assumption of their gentlemanly character. 22  The connections between volunteering, 
character, and gentlemanliness are further revealed in the journal of Lieutenant Charles Crowe, 
then of the 27th Foot. Crowe described a popular volunteer, Kinnion, who had initially struggled 
to ingratiate himself with the regiment’s officers, having only been addressed by the colonel. 
When Crowe and another officer approached him, however, they found Kinnion to be a: ‘really 
nice genteel young man … so amiable and unassuming th[at] he became our guest and lived as 
we did.’23 Crowe’s account suggests that volunteers were not automatically welcomed into the 
mess by their potential fellow officers, and that this was contingent upon the ascertainment of a 
volunteer’s character. This view is compounded by Crowe’s wider observations on volunteers. 
Crowe viewed Kinnion as exceptional, and believed the majority of volunteers were not worthy 
of attention: 
Many people would imagine that there was a great want of good feeling towards 
volunteers. But numerous as they were, so few had even a slight claim to notice. 
Generally speaking they were not gentlemanly in appearance, or manners. Some 
associated with the private soldiers; others, dismayed by the hardships they had to 
encounter, left in disgust. If the numbers who came out and the few who obtained 
rank were recorded, the disproportion would be very surprising.24 
Crowe’s allusion to large numbers of volunteers arriving to the army, only to be disappointed in 
their attempts at gaining a commission, suggests that a highly selective ‘weeding out’ process 
took place, in which volunteers deemed to be of inadequate character were rebuffed by their 
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potential comrades, a view reinforced by the volunteer Crowe highlighted in contrast to 
Kinnion: ‘a complete churl, better adapted to a musket than an epaulette!’25 
The ambiguous relationship between gentility and commissions is further highlighted in the 
case of officers who were promoted from the ranks. This group was a minority and comprised 
only five-and-a-half per cent of new officers in 1809, with most of these commissions awarded 
for either long service, or individual acts of merit.26 This minority status has resulted in a 
paucity of surviving sources by such officers, with such sources limited by the rudimentary 
authorial style which characterised rankers’ writings.27 One surviving source, the diary of 
Ensign David Wainwright, is a frustratingly brief record of the campaigns in which he served, 
with no personal interjections or elaborations on events, yet still offers some insight into his 
career progression.28 Enlisting in 1787, Wainwright was made sergeant major in the 2nd Foot in 
1794, and was named the regiment’s adjutant in 1797. Crucially, this was while the regiment 
was stationed in the West Indies, where high levels of sickness may have created a shortage of 
officers, allowing Wainwright to be elevated to adjutant. Commissioned as ensign without 
purchase in 1799, Wainwright was then able to purchase a lieutenancy in 1800, before retiring 
in 1802.29 The diary of William Gavin, who was promoted to ensign and quartermaster in the 
71st Foot in 1811, suffers from the same limitations. Gavin’s account describes his regiment’s 
activities in the period 1806-1815, yet does not make mention of his commission, and does not 
differentiate his experiences as an officer from those as a non-commissioned officer.30 
Wainwright’s and Gavin’s careers reflect the wider career trend of officers promoted from the 
ranks. Often ushered into the functional roles of adjutant or quarter-master, where practical 
experience as sergeants could be utilised, rankers promoted into these positions appear to have 
been broadly tolerated by their fellow subalterns, provided they exhibited proper ‘character’.31 
Describing the deaths of officers of the 50th Foot in the Pyrenees in 1813, John Patterson praised 
an ensign who had been promoted from the ranks: ‘White had been for many years our Quarter 
Master Sergeant, and in consequence of his merit; he had lately been promoted in the regiment; 
he was a man advanced in life, and an excellent worthy character, esteemed by us all.’32 
Lieutenant George Woodberry welcomed the arrival of a new adjutant to the 18th Hussars in 
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1813: ‘Mr. Duperier, our new adjutant, arrived this morning. He was originally adjutant to the 
Tenth Hussars, and was before that a Private and rose thru merit. I can only account for the 
wretched insubordinate state of the Regiment to the want of a good adjutant. Reports speak 
highly of Mr. Duperier.’33  
Concerns that men from the ranks had ‘unsuitable’ characters for holding a commission, 
however, had played no small role in excluding rankers from being promoted during the 
eighteenth century, and, as noted by Brumwell, rankers promoted to the position of quarter-
master or adjutant still struggled to be accepted as ‘real’ officers or gentlemen by their peers.34 
This continued into the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. William Grattan of the 88th Foot 
offered his opinion of the role of adjutant: ‘I always had, and have, an aversion to adjutants 
raised from the ranks. An adjutant is, properly speaking, the mouth-piece of his commanding 
officer, and should be a gentleman capable of writing a good official letter; and surely this 
cannot be expected or looked for in a man raised from the station of a private soldier.’35 A 
passing remark by William Tomkinson, then a lieutenant in the 16th Light Dragoons, suggests 
that even when former rankers were promoted to positions of relative significance, the social 
taint of having been with the ranks still remained. Describing officers in the army who actively 
sought to return home by faking illness in the wake of the failed 1812 siege of Burgos, 
Tomkinson pointedly noted that the single such officer from the 16th had once been a ranker: 
‘Captain Macintosh (raised from the ranks), went before a medical board and got sick leave to 
England. He was much better than myself after he had passed the board.’36 Tomkinson’s 
insistence on mentioning Macintosh’s low origins in the context of perceived cowardice 
suggests that Tomkinson connected the two instances, with the underlying assumption that 
Macintosh’s social inferiority resulted in a deficiency of character.  
Officers promoted from the ranks were also criticised on the grounds of brutishness. Crowe 
stated: ‘I must confess I generally found such men were the greatest tyrants in the services,’ and 
cited an anecdote of a colonel and former ranker, ‘an inhuman monster’, who punished a ranker 
for stealing a leg of mutton by imprisoning him in the ‘Black Hole’, with a leg of mutton 
suspended from a string above him.37 Undoubtedly, there was snobbishness and fear of social 
inversion inherent in the scepticism of volunteers and officers promoted from the ranks, and the 
propensity of officers to exclude individuals could only have reinforced a sense of individual 
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gentlemanliness. As will be explored more fully in Chapter Six, junior officers distinguished 
themselves from the ranks by virtue of their traditional social standing and elevated 
sensibilities. Implicit in this understanding of leadership was the belief that these were essential 
qualities, not only for having the personal ability to lead men competently, but to treat and 
direct their men in a humane manner, and emphasised the importance of affording social 
inferiors the benevolence expected from a gentleman. In the case of volunteers and men raised 
from the ranks, the association between common soldiering and brutishness could remove 
these justifications, weakening their claims to gentlemanliness and leadership. As the ambiguity, 
and even hostility, towards volunteers and rankers suggests, gentlemanliness was not inherent 
in the holding of a commission. Rather than viewing the connection between being an officer 
and gentlemanliness as a linear progression, therefore, it is more revealing to consider the 
relationship between the officer corps and gentlemanliness as one revolving around reputation. 
Maintaining the appearance and manners of a gentleman was central to fashioning a sense of 
gentlemanliness which was palatable to other officers.  
 
Learning Gentlemanliness in the Officers’ Mess 
The characteristics that could be associated with the ‘polite gentleman’ were numerous; 
however, the culture had an overriding concern for manner and comportment. The correctness 
of these attributes was believed to reflect the inner virtues and qualities developed as a result of 
the pursuit of polite accomplishment.38 As argued by Carter, the aim of politeness was not to 
construct a rigid set of manners and specific actions that would govern everyday behaviour, but 
to foster a behavioural style that favoured interpersonal qualities and promoted an ease of 
behaviour, generosity to associates, and the capacity to please others.39 Implied in the culture of 
politeness was a degree of social cohesion. As highlighted by Lawrence Klein, rather than 
creating equality between two individuals of unequal social standing, politeness aimed to 
provide a sense of openness which allowed individuals from different social backgrounds to 
communicate with ease.40 The ease of manners espoused by polite theorists, for example, 
smoothed interactions between elites and those who provided services to them.41 This 
interchange was a two-way process, with social superiors expected to display benevolence and 
‘obliging’ manners to their social inferiors, affording them the respect due to a gentleman, while 
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the inferior party was likewise expected to display manners and behaviour which marked them 
as a polite gentleman worthy of such respect.42 Such sociability was not confined to the realm of 
business. Clubs and societies with relatively open memberships allowed for social mixing 
governed by the rules of politeness.43 This culture of social ease and respect was crucial to 
fostering unity within the officer corps. In part, the importance of polite manners to the officer 
corps can be attributed to the wider culture of politeness, which encouraged interactions 
between individuals of different social standings. This, however, provides only a partial 
explanation of politeness’ importance to the army. The principles of civility and gentlemanly 
egalitarianism were not taken for granted, but were deliberately fostered by the regimental 
system, particularly through the institution of the officers’ mess.  
The focal point of regimental social life, the officers’ mess provided a convivial space for officers 
reminiscent of social clubs in Britain. The numbers attending could be large, as regiments 
welcomed officers from other regiments into their mess. Lieutenant Robert Blakeney of the 28th 
Foot described his regiment’s mess in 1812: ‘Upwards of a hundred and fifty officers dined at 
our mess daily; those of the regiment, together with those of the flank companies sent from 
Gibraltar, who were of course honorary members.’44 In theory, the atmosphere within a mess 
was convivial and free of formality. Patterson described the officers of the 85th Light Infantry at 
their mess as ‘a gay set of light bobs.’45 Alcohol was central to the conviviality of the mess. In the 
space of a week, Blakeney’s mess at Tarifa consumed 2, 000 bottles of alcohol, while at a 
Christmas mess in 1812, Second Lieutenant Howard Hough of the Royal Artillery recalled giving 
toasts to: ‘All absent friends … Church and King – Prince Regent of Portugal – England – Lord 
Wellington – Navy, and many others were well received, and we parted, at a late hour, very well 
satisfied.’46 Officers endeavoured to establish a mess under all conditions, even on campaign. 
Lieutenant Peter Hawker of the 14th Dragoons stated that his regiment: ‘contrived to establish 
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an excellent mess’ while supplies were short during the Peninsular War, owing to the 
resourcefulness of one officer, who was both an excellent scavenger and cook.47   
The officers’ mess had an important pedagogical function, and the jovial atmosphere it 
generated was seen to instil civility and respect, and build camaraderie between officers of all 
ranks. The 1813 standing orders of the 85th Light Infantry advised:  
Comfort and unanimity at meals … is the service of friendship and good 
understanding … all Officers shall belong to one Mess … any Officer withdrawing 
himself from it, indicates in him a wish not to corps with his brother officers, in 
which case, the sooner an Officer with this disposition leaves the Regiment, the 
better.48 
Recalling his time as a newly commissioned ensign in his memoir, Thomas Staunton St. Clair of 
the 1st Foot reflected on the officers’ mess, ‘A regimental mess is without doubt a most judicious 
establishment in our army; as by collecting together the whole of the officers of a corps, under 
certain wise rules and regulations, they form an agreeable society, in which, generally speaking, 
harmony and good fellowship prevail.’49  
The mess was expected to inculcate a sense of intimacy and friendship which extended further 
than the civility inherent in polite manners. The experience of newly commissioned officers 
suggests that displaying appropriate manners was initially important for integration into the 
social circle of officers, before forming more intimate friendships. Wood advised newly 
commissioned ensigns to temper their behaviour in the mess: 
where the want of politeness, good address, and propriety of speaking, on his first 
appearance, is often lastingly attended with the most unpleasant consequences. A 
deficiency in these qualifications will not fail to impress his associates with an 
unfavourable opinion of him.50 
The mess provided an opportunity for new officers to observe and learn norms in a social 
setting. On his first day with his regiment, the 4th Foot, Peter Bowlby was informed by his 
colonel to sit next to the mess vice president, so that he might have someone to advise him 
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when he had had enough wine to drink.51 Wood stated that the mess was the ideal location for 
officers: ‘to employ themselves in the study of men and manners, which they will find one of 
incalculable benefit.’52  
Furthermore, the rules which governed the mess aimed to imbue each officer with a sense of 
gentlemanly value and equality. Initially introduced to his new colonel by his father, Bowlby 
was instructed by the colonel to attend the mess ‘on your own account.’53 Rank and hierarchy 
were dispensed with in the space of the mess, encouraging officers to socialise as gentlemen and 
to consider each other as equals. St. Clair stressed this egalitarianism, ‘The commanding officer 
is as liable to the rules of the mess as the youngest subaltern … Rank is nothing, and when 
seated at table they are all upon an equality.’54 Ensign John Mills of the Coldstream Guards 
commented on the behaviour of his brother William of the 22nd Dragoons, who had gotten into a 
dispute after failing to obey orders in the mess: 
At a mess table the Commanding Officer is upon a par with the others, and any 
assumption of authority there is always looked upon with the greatest jealousy. I 
know that had the Colonel of my own regiment used the words imputed to Major 
Fraser, not an officer would have been found to sit at table with him.55  
While Mills’ status as a guardsman and his landed background likely contributed to him having 
a heightened sense of gentlemanly equality, his suggestion that even a regiment’s commanding 
officer could be ostracised if he failed to adhere to the rules of the mess speaks to how 
important the assumption of respect and equality could be within certain regiments. 
The responsibility of running the mess was shared between officers of all ranks, reminding 
officers of their responsibilities to one another. All officers dining at a mess paid for their food 
and drink, and general orders were issued to ensure that the cost did not prevent subalterns 
from joining the mess.56 Aside from financial responsibility, junior officers could be directly 
responsible for managing the mess as ‘president’, a position which was of some significance. 
Ensign Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards saw the mess presidency as indistinguishable 
from his other responsibilities, and described it as: ‘a most onerous undertaking! & a most 
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important part of an officer’s duty.’57 Interchanging between officers on a weekly basis, the 
president was responsible for procuring food and drink for the mess, monitoring each officer’s 
consumption of alcohol and issuing subsequent accounts, as well as ensuring that a convivial 
atmosphere was maintained.58 Competency in this role built respect for officers amongst their 
peers. Having acted as president of a special Christmas mess in 1812, Hough noted in his 
journal: ‘The officers called on me and voted their thanks to me for the able manner with which I 
had supported and held the chair … and expressed themselves much obliged to me for the 
trouble I had taken in procuring the dinner.’59  Drawn from a society in which a sociable persona 
was integral to polite identities, and in which social interaction was intended to bridge social 
divides, the officers’ mess could only have encouraged officers to consider themselves as 
gentlemen. By removing distinctions of rank, and by reinforcing officers’ sense of responsibility 
to each other, the mess focused officers’ attentions on the similarities between officers. The 
value of the mess, therefore, was not that it encouraged explicit equality between officers, but 
that it allowed individuals to construct a gentlemanly identity based on the values of politeness 
and civility, together with an ingrained sense of gentlemanly worth. 
 
Polite Sociability and the Officer Corps 
The interpersonal style encouraged by polite theorists and which was inculcated in the officers’ 
mess resonated widely in the officer corps. Displaying the accommodating manners and tastes 
of a ‘polite gentleman’ was central to junior officers’ relationships with regimental comrades, 
unfamiliar officers, and with civilian society. Within the officer corps, polite sociability was 
essential for facilitating interactions between officers, as recognising each other as ‘polite 
gentlemen’ allowed for the bridging of regimental and social differences. En route to the 
Peninsula in 1814, John Blakiston praised his companions on board his transport ship, only one 
of whom was known to him: ‘They were all gentlemanly men, so that a ten days’ passage was 
spent as pleasantly as sea-sickness … would allow.’60 Polite interaction could bridge social 
divides within the officer. Writing to his father, Captain William Bragge of the 3rd Dragoons 
described his companions on his transport ship home from the Peninsula:  
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I have on Board with me 3 Officers of the Guards who appear very good natured, 
Gentlemanly Men and take longer in cleaning their Teeth than I do dressing myself 
entirely; but as we are likely to agree and have made a Bargain with our Master to 
furnish a most excellent Table for 50 Dollars, I have no doubt of a very pleasant 
Voyage.61 
Despite acknowledging that his companions had different conceptions of refinement to him, 
Bragge’s account highlights how sociability focused officers’ minds on what they had in 
common, rather than their differences. Requisite manners could overcome a lack of gentlemanly 
appearances. In 1812, and also travelling to the Peninsula, Crowe of the 48th Foot and his fellow 
officers encountered a poorly dressed surgeon without provisions: ‘We agreed there was no 
alternative but to admit him to share with us. When he came on board, we were glad to find his 
address was more gentlemanly than his dress! He very handsomely apologised for not having 
any sea stock.’62 
Polite principles can be seen in junior officers’ interactions with British civilians, suggesting that 
a polite identity helped to maintain bonds between the officer corps and the civilian world. In 
her study of the army’s relationship with mid-eighteenth-century English society, Hannah Smith 
revealed that a mutual culture of politeness allowed army officers to integrate into provincial 
urban communities, a relationship which remained crucial during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars.63 Housed in Winchester Barracks, Ensign William Thornton Keep of the 77th 
Foot amused himself by attending weekly balls with the local gentry and visiting nearby 
families.64 On solitary recruiting duty in Bury in 1797, Lieutenant Charles Steevens of the 20th 
Foot found himself: ‘wandering about, without any society’ and ‘looked upon as a scamp’ owing 
to his predecessor’s poor behaviour.65 Making a favourable impression over dinner with the 
local clergyman, however, introduced Steevens to several families, and he: ‘left Bury with much 
regret, as I had met there with greatest attention.’66  
Conversely, officers who felt they lacked refinement or manners could feel isolated, while 
uncivil officers faced being shunned by their comrades. Complaining of a lack of friends, both 
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within and outside his regiment, while garrisoned in Glasgow, Captain John Sinclair of the 79th 
Foot pointed to his deficient manners as the cause in a letter to his sister: ‘I have no other 
acquaintance here, but at Sir Buchanan’s I am not a fashionable character. I have been very little 
in the higher circles of life and formality always makes me run away.’67 More common than 
personal insecurity were officers’ comments on other officers losing their comrades’ good will 
through ill-manners. Exactly how ill-manners were defined is difficult to determine, and 
standards of behaviour varied between regiments. The broad term ‘civility’, however, may be 
used to understand the limits of manners. As noted by Carter, ‘civility’, like ‘politeness’, was a 
vague term which could be applied to any number of social situations, but which was routinely 
used to describe decorum.68 In the context of the officer corps, civility appears to have been 
understood as behaviour which did not offend associates or companions, and it was this which 
formed the basis of acceptance by other officers. In his memoir, George Wood lamented his own 
behaviour as a dissolute ensign in the 82nd Foot, which he described as: ‘officious, talkative, 
presumptuous and conceited.’69 The need to avoid offence is borne out by contemporary 
accounts, which also highlight how officers had to be mindful of their extra-regimental 
reputation. Having just dined with the Duke of York while in the Low Countries in 1794, 
Lieutenant David Powell of the 14th Light Dragoons was taken aback at the disrespectful 
comments made by some officers of the Guards, who spoke: ‘pretty freely … & I if I recollect 
right, even threw imputation on the Duke, at whose table they were sitting.’70 As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, civil conduct was of sufficient importance to the officer corps’ 
cohesion that officers could be brought before a general courts martial on the charge of ‘conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman’ after insulting a comrade, or being challenged to fight a 
duel by the offended officer.  
Officers also shared in a recreational culture that revolved around polite accomplishments. To 
the eighteenth-century mind, polite accomplishments and their attendant sociability, such as 
dancing or connoisseurship of art, literature, and landscapes, was central to refining individuals 
into the ‘polite gentleman.’71 Historians have recently demonstrated the complimentary 
relationship between polite accomplishment and military identities. Gavin Daly, for example, 
has revealed how, during the Peninsular War, British officers cultivated and demonstrated their 
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identities as polite travellers, particularly when in Madrid.72 Here, officers found ample 
opportunity to demonstrate their accomplishment and taste by attending balls and dances, 
visiting museums and art galleries, or by walking the Prado or through Madrid’s public gardens 
in the company of local women.73  For junior officers, accomplishments were central to 
facilitating interaction between strangers, particularly other officers. Recalling his time in 
garrison on Gibraltar, a location not famed for its quality of society, John Patterson of the 50th 
Foot still spent his leisure time dancing or reading books from the garrison library, and noted: 
‘It is absurd to say, where so many military men congregate together, that any quarter can be 
dull. Let them but get into the remotest corner of the earth, and they will strike up something 
among themselves that will drive care away.’74 Writing to his uncle, Captain Edward Cocks of 
the 16th Dragoons believed that polite accomplishment compensated for a lack of close 
connections:  
I must highly recommend a knowledge of music, dancing and drawing, or at least 
some two of these accomplishments…When once a soldier becomes a prey to ennui 
it is all over with him, he is first sorrowful and then sick, but a man will always get 
ennui unless he has the power of amusing himself … a soldier is continually 
changing his society … Put a man among strangers and they cannot know his 
sterling virtues, they can only judge him by his manners and appearance. If he can 
sing and dance he makes nine out of ten friends.75  
Although rare, officers who felt they did not display the characteristics of polite refinement 
could experience nervousness. Attending an 1812 ball in Madrid, 2nd Captain William Webber of 
the Royal Artillery recorded his discomfort in his journal: ‘I summoned resolution enough to 
dance. Luckily there was a crowd and my awkward manner of waltzing was unperceived except 
by my partner and she thought I was careless but not incapable of dancing properly.’76 As 
highlighted by McCormack, dancing was of particular importance to eighteenth-century military 
masculinities, as dancing was seen to inculcate the manners and deportment expected of an 
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officer.77 Webber’s concern at his ‘awkward manner’, therefore, may signify wider concerns 
about his place within the army, rather than just passing embarrassment at his lack of prowess 
in the ballroom.   
Junior officers also engaged in gentlemanly pursuits that were more closely associated with the 
country squire than the sophisticated, urban ‘polite gentleman.’78 Sportsmanship was a 
prominent feature of the social life of the British officer corps during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, and officer accounts are replete with accounts of horse racing, fishing, 
shooting, and hunting.79 Officers with means could maintain extensive hunting equipment, even 
on campaign. In the Peninsula, 2nd Captain Charles Dansey of the Royal Artillery visited his 
brother and fellow army officer, and described his equipment in a letter home to their mother: 
‘Hen[ry] was in capital condition for taking the field, having one horse, 3 mules, 2 greyhounds, 2 
pointers & 2 guns besides a patent flying breakfast equipage for getting ready the breakfast 
table on horseback.’80 Officers with less money could still go hunting and fishing in their leisure 
time: Lieutenant Thomas Henry Browne of the 23rd Foot recorded one expedition in North 
America where he and a fellow subaltern shot partridge, and caught: ‘more Trout, than we could 
possibly carry.’81 These pursuits, however, had a mixed relationship with politeness. As shown 
by David Itzkowitz, mid-eighteenth-century criticisms of hunting focused on the rusticity of 
hunters themselves, by contrasting the ‘bumpkin’ hunter with the urban sophisticate.82 William 
Stafford, furthermore, has revealed that late-Georgian polite critiques of hunting could also, 
occasionally, attack the cruelty of killing for sport.83 Despite these criticisms, hunting was 
increasingly seen as a fashionable pastime by the late-eighteenth century, while the 1761 Game 
Laws provided an air of social exclusivity to the hunt.84 Being an officer provided the 
opportunity for aspirational individuals to partake in a pastime that was unavailable to them in 
Britain. Hennell wrote to his brothers from Madrid in 1812: ‘There is a great quantity of game 
within a league of this place. An officer belonging to us one day shot a deer & five braces of 
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pheasants-no game laws here.’85 Describing hunting excursions outside of Paris in 1815, 
Quartermaster William Surtees of the 95th Foot relished the opportunity, noting: ‘This would be 
looked upon almost as poaching in England, but in France it was otherwise.’86 As a model for 
day-to-day interaction between British officers, therefore, politeness was pre-eminent. Polite 
sociability gave officers a point of commonality, providing common ground and smoothing 
interaction.  
 
Subverting Politeness 
Junior officers’ behaviour was not universally ‘polite’, and there are limitations to using 
politeness as a model for understanding British officers’ behaviour. The divergences between 
polite ideals, and lived practices, have recently been the subject of historical inquiry. Carter has 
demonstrated how men who strove to match polite ideals, could consciously or unconsciously 
divert from polite practice. 87 William Stafford emphasised the plurality of gentlemanly 
masculinities during the late-Georgian period, and revealed how politeness existed alongside 
other, less-refined masculinities.88 Davison highlighted how politeness was contextual, and 
demonstrated how polite men lapsed into less respectable conduct when in familiar company.89 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, junior officers were keen to style themselves as 
‘polite gentlemen’ when interacting with each other; however, self-identifying as such did not 
necessarily limit their conduct to behaviour that could be described as ‘polite’. Junior officers 
can be found engaging in behaviours that were out of step with polite expectations, such as 
gambling, violence, and destructive conduct, while the officer corps had a well-earned 
reputation for drunkenness and licentiousness.90 These behaviours exemplify how lived 
practices were not uniformly ‘polite’, and highlight the rough underbelly of the British officer 
corps. Preparing to board his transport to the Peninsula, Blackman assured his parents that he 
would not emulate his comrades by gambling: 
I have not, I give you my word of honour, touched a card since I left you. Tho’ during 
our march down to Portsmouth and ever since, most of the officers have played 
every night, having nothing to do. I have bought Opian’s poems to amuse me when 
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on board, and when at Lymington I had books from the library, and it is my 
intention not to play at Cards at all. I know the rest of the Officers will be playing all 
the voyage.91 
Similarly, Hennell, a devout dissenting Protestant, contrasted his ‘prudence’ with the habitual 
drunkenness of his fellow officers.92 That Blackman and Hennell criticised their comrades for 
their behaviour, is suggestive as to how behaviour in the officer corps could be an affront to 
polite sensibilities.  
Junior officers were capable of more extreme behaviour, as evidenced by the findings of general 
courts martial. These records are suggestive as to the range of impolite behaviours junior 
officers could display. Furthermore, the incidents which saw officers brought to trial highlight 
the parameters of acceptable gentlemanly conduct within the officer corps.93 All of the following 
officers were tried under the charge of ‘conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman’, or a 
charge of similar phrasing. As noted by Arthur Gilbert, the vagueness of this charge made 
military law flexible and allowed for regiments to regulate their officers’ behaviour depending 
on shifting values.94 By emphasising officers’ gentlemanliness, therefore, this charge provides an 
outline of what officers expected of each other as gentlemen.95 Conversely, these records reveal 
only part of the picture, as some regiments almost certainly turned a blind eye to misbehaviour, 
or resolved crimes internally, while other transgressions may have gone unnoticed. Violence 
and destructive behaviour are a feature of general courts martial records. In April 1809, two 
lieutenants were brought to trial in Stafford for: ‘appearing in a state of intoxication, raising a 
riot and disturbance, and engaging in an affray in the public street.’96 As demonstrated 
previously, the mess was instrumental in fostering civil interaction between officers. Courts 
martial records suggest, however, that the heady atmosphere of the mess also created the 
preconditions for dissolute behaviour. In Kingston in 1806, Lieutenant Richard Gardner of the 
54th Foot was brought to trial for insulting and assaulting the paymaster of the 55th Foot in the 
officers’ mess: ‘by calling him a “Puppy”, and declaring he would pull his nose, and for 
disgracefully boxing with the said Paymaster … [by] kneeling upon and beating him, whilst on 
the floor, until forcibly separated.’97 Not content with assaulting each other, junior officers were 
also capable of acts of violence against local populations. In the Peninsula, a sense of cultural 
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superiority and anti-clericalism could manifest itself in acts of destruction, violence, and theft 
against the Portuguese and Spanish.98 In extreme cases, few things were off limits. In Portugal in 
1811, six junior officers of the 48th Foot were brought to trial and three cashiered for a range of 
offences, which included: ‘being concerned in an act of violence … on the dead body of a 
Portuguese priest … by cutting the face of the corpse, stripping it, and offering other indignities 
to it.’99 
Junior officers’ motivations in these instances are not entirely clear. It is possible that a 
combination of boredom and alcohol played a part, as officers who were fed up with military life 
acted out in frustration. It is also possible that there were officers who could not match their 
comrades at polite accomplishments, which left them as social outcasts. In a letter to his uncle, 
Cocks contrasted officers who could sing and dance with those who lacked accomplishment. 
Cocks state that accomplished officers passed: 
their evenings gaily and pleasantly … and rise in the morning with a light heart and 
a clear head ready to set to work at his duty; while his unharmonious comrade 
avoids society because he cannot excel in it, perhaps gets drunk for want of 
something to do, collects a quantity of black bile and turns out in the morning with a 
gloomy face and a grumbling air, enough to frighten the very sun behind a cloud.100 
Carter has revealed how concepts of politeness did not go unchallenged during the eighteenth 
century, and identified an important undercurrent of alternative models of masculinity, such as 
the ‘blackguards’, who rejected polite ideals and instead stressed anti-civility and violence as 
markers of manhood.101 In the case of junior army officers it is possible that being on the outer 
of polite society saw officers embrace similar types of behaviour as ‘blackguards’. In this sense, 
the impolite behaviour of some officers may have constituted a revolt against broadly accepted 
standards of politeness. 
 
Internal Social Divides 
As emphasised by Klein, the ideals of politeness stressed ease of interaction between individuals 
of disparate social standing, reducing the impact of social distinctions, without creating 
equality.102 As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the enabling capacity of politeness was 
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crucial in fostering regimental cohesion and integrating junior officers into the officer corps. 
The social divide that existed between officers in elite cavalry and Foot Guards regiments, and 
those who served in less celebrated line regiments, however, suggests that the capacity of polite 
ideals to bridge social distinctions between regiments was ultimately limited. Concepts of what 
constituted ‘polite refinement’ differed between officers of elite social backgrounds, and more 
humble officers in line regiments. As noted by several historians of eighteenth-century Britain, 
the British elite expressed their status through dominance of political patronage, a culture of 
conspicuous consumption, and through local leadership and public displays of paternalism.103 
Officers of elite background expressed their cultural and social identities in similar ways. The 
social exclusivity associated with elite cavalry and Foot Guards regiments fostered an elevated 
sense of ‘polite refinement’, intrinsic to which was the projection of personal wealth. As noted 
by Maxine Berg, consumption was central to elite and middle-class identities during the 
eighteenth century, as expenditure on fashionable items signified status, refinement, and 
taste.104 Historical accounts of eighteenth-century consumption have traditionally focused on 
women as consumers; however, as revealed by Margot Finn, men could also be active 
consumers.105  
Consumption, therefore, was a feature of all officers’ polite identities. Officers were responsible 
for purchasing their own uniform and campaign equipment, the contents of which reflected 
their status as gentlemen as much as it did military necessity. En route to Holland during the 
1809 Walcheren campaign, Keep wrote to his mother that he was relieved to own a 
portmanteau,  as it was: ‘extremely serviceable to me … I don’t know what I would do without it, 
having no other place to deposit combs, towels, brushes and all the etceteras in.’106 Lieutenant 
Charles Boothby of the Royal Engineers wrote to his sister Louisa in 1809 that he had: ‘lost one 
of my first comforts, a new blue, patent, silver-mounted, morocco writing-case; all my letter-
paper, pens, ink, letters.’107 What distinguished officers in the Guards was the amount of extra 
equipment, clothing, and food they carried with them on campaign, and the money spent to 
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acquire these goods. Judge Advocate-General Larpent criticised the amount of equipment 
carried by Guards officers in the Peninsula: ‘the present establishment of the Guards is 
absolutely ridiculous. Every subaltern has his two or three horses, and his three or four mules, 
as much as any staff-officer ought to have. He carries his bed out to the guard-house, or picket, 
and has his canteen fit to give a dinner, and every luxury &c.’108 Rees Gronow, a subaltern with 
the 1st Guards, described the replete kitchen of Ensign Dawson, an aristocratic comrade, who 
maintained a staff of cooks and servants in the Peninsula, and brought out: ‘innumerable 
hampers of wine, liquers, hams, potted meat, and other good things … no one was so hospitable 
or lived so magnificently.’109 In a letter home, Mills emphasised the importance of consumption 
to maintaining a certain standard of living on campaign: ‘The greatest luxury here is to have all 
your little comforts about you – any place becomes tolerable and you are perfectly independent 
… the advice I would give anybody coming out … would be precisely the reverse of what was 
given me – I would say bring out as many little comforts as you can.’110 
The accounts of junior officers from the Guards are replete with details of how they spent their 
money. Bridgeman wrote home from the Peninsula describing a ball his regiment hosted in the 
house of Oporto’s governor, complete with dancing, supper, toasting, and gambling.111 This ball 
was a conscious display of the wealth of Guards’ officers: Bridgeman claimed 52 subscriptions 
were raised, to a total of 2, 340 Spanish dollars.112 Nor was this an isolated incident. Mills 
recounted a ball the officers of the Coldstream gave to Spanish elites at Puebla, where the 
regiment’s officers paid for two temporary huts built for the occasion, one sixty feet by twenty 
for dancing, with additional space for the German band hired by the regiment.113 Such 
extravagant displays of wealth are exclusive to Guards officers’ accounts; however, the 
difference between Guards and line officers can also be seen in everyday expenses, such as 
clothing. While Blackman of the Coldstream Guards, the son of a governor of the Bank of 
England, wrote to his parents requesting they purchase him two pairs of blue stockings before 
he departed for the Peninsula, as: ‘whenever an Officer is invited to dinner, which of course I 
shall be at Lisbon, or whenever a General Officer invites you to his table, we always go in that 
dress’, officers of lesser means often complained of their ability to cover the costs of basic 
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uniform.114 Required to purchase a new coat, cap, epaulette, sabre, and grey overalls, Keep 
complained to his mother about his vulnerability to changes in uniform: ‘All this is a sad 
interruption to schemes of economy, and you may suppose what difficulties I shall be under for 
some time now.’115  
Junior officers in the Guards, especially, prided themselves on their refinement. Ensign John 
Rous, an aristocratic officer of the Coldstream Guards, recommended to his father that Rous’ 
brother join the Guards Brigade, citing their reputation and popularity with Wellington: ‘I have 
mentioned the advantage of the guards … Our Brigade, which is called the Brigade, is much the 
greatest favourite with the Peer.’116 Ensign John Mills, a gentry officer also of the Coldstream 
Guards, bragged in a letter home: ‘We are favourites with his Lordship; who always makes a 
point of inviting a certain number of us to dinner … of course the others are jealous of us.’117 
Crucially, this heightened sense of gentlemanliness was felt to distinguish Guards officers from 
line officers, who some elite officers saw as failing to realise polite ideals. Advising his family 
when best to sell his brother’s commission in the 58th Foot, Mills ridiculed the rustic manners of 
the Irish officers of the 58th in an 1812 letter home: ‘You have a much better chance of selling 
the commission in the 58th whilst the regiment is on service … The officers are chiefly Irish 
Gentlemen … and persons of moderate fortune who have been so elegantly educated are shy of 
associating with them.’118 Describing his regular dinners of fish and turkey while in the 
Peninsula in a letter home, Rous pointedly added: ‘This is merely to give you an idea of the living 
of the Guards when compared with that of the Line, who live on a pound of tough beef and a half 
of bread … commonly called ration, a thing not known with us when in quarters.’119  
The displays of wealth and refinement made by officers in these aristocratic regiments could be 
interpreted by junior officers in less celebrated line regiments as ostentatious haughtiness: 
Keep, the son of a war office bureaucrat, wrote to his mother that ‘aristocratically inclined’ 
officers of his regiment were keen to join the cavalry, as: ‘though expensive [it] is considered the 
most dashing service, and is generally selected by young men of good fortune and family. The 
consequence is that officers of the infantry hold themselves in very low estimation 
comparatively.’120 Describing the rustic cooking utensils he and other line officers carried in the 
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Peninsula, Lieutenant Robert Blakeney of the 28th Foot added: ‘Hussars, lancers and other 
cavalry captains would doubtless sooner starve than contaminate their aristocratic stomachs 
with viands, however exquisite, served on such plebeian utensils.’121 This sense of inferiority 
dovetailed with established anti-aristocratic discourses. During the eighteenth-century, the 
relationship between consumption and society was the matter of continued debate.122 As shown 
by J.G.A. Pocock, classical republicanism was prominent in eighteenth-century political 
discourse, which employed terms such as ‘virtue’, ‘corruption’, and luxury’ against opponents.123 
‘Excessive’ refinement, embodied by the fashion conscious figure of the fop, was portrayed as 
effeminising.124 Such criticisms were applied to the aristocracy, whose luxury and over-
refinement were alleged to have filtered down the ranks of society, sapping the military of its 
courage, valour, and strength.125 Drawing on these discourses, some officers portrayed Guards 
officers as indolent, seemingly drawing connections between their ostentatious personal habits 
and a neglect of duty. In his memoir, Blakeney savaged a ‘patrician band’ of ‘Belemites’, or 
officers who avoided combat in the Peninsula and lingered at the city of Belem. In doing so, 
Blakeney made specific reference to a classical example in: 
Some were unwillingly kept back from debility of constitution or through wounds, 
but a large majority were inflicted with a disease which, baffling the skill of learned 
doctors, call for a remedy far different from that of medical treatment … the greater 
number of its members had never seen nor heard a shot fired … far more cautious 
indeed than the smooth-faced Roman patricians who fled from the slingers at 
Pharsalia.126 
Having attempted to ascertain information about an advanced picket from a Guards’ officer, 
Crowe was surprised to find the officer ignorant about where his men were, as he slept away 
from his men on a sofa. For Crowe, this encounter: ‘fully confirmed the opinion throughout the 
army, that the Guardsmen are by their commissions, officers, they are personally brave as 
chivalrous gentlemen ought to be; but they are not soldiers!!’127  
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As argued by Kennedy, condescension on the part of elite officers suggests that the association 
between the officer corps and gentlemanliness could be tenuous, even for officers who were not 
associated with the ranks.128 As Keep’s observations suggest, line officers could certainly feel a 
diminished sense of their own gentlemanliness as a result of elite haughtiness. Rather than 
viewing the social divisions between officers as apportion or otherwise of gentlemanliness, 
these distinctions serve to highlight how there were degrees of gentlemanliness within the 
officer corps, and how politeness did not obviate social distinctions. Crowe, for example, 
considered himself a gentleman, as evidenced by his emphasis on gentlemanly language and his 
disdain for former rankers and volunteers, yet still expressed concern about the ostentatious 
display of Guards officers. The polite culture of the officer corps, reflected in the leisure pursuits 
engaged in by officers, the sociability of the regimental mess, and the exclusion of officers who 
had been associated with the ranks allowed officers to style and construct self-identities as 
polite gentlemen, yet there remained important nuances in gentlemanly identities. While 
officers from all regiments likely considered their personal tastes to reflect those of the ‘polite 
gentlemen’, the distinctions perceived by elite and non-elite officers alike suggest that there 
were differing conceptions of ‘polite refinement’ within the officer corps. Officers of elite social 
background who proliferated in the celebrated Guards and cavalry regiments appear to have 
viewed politeness as the ability to project refinement through conscious displays of wealth and 
status. For their part, officers from lesser social and regimental backgrounds appear to have 
valued restraint and taste as principles of ‘polite refinement’, as evidenced by their criticisms of 
elite officers as corrupted by their luxury. Within the officer corps, it would appear, there was 
no single concept of ‘politeness’. 
 
Knights and Rakes 
So far, this chapter has focused largely on how politeness informed relations between men, and 
highlighted how being considered a polite gentleman was key to integrating into the officer 
corps. Junior officers’ relationship with, and attitudes towards women highlight the ambiguities 
and contradictions within junior officers’ polite identities. On the one hand, officers’ dealings 
with women highlight junior officers’ polite aspirations. The capacity to mingle easily in mixed-
sex company, and the ability to please women was central to ‘polite gentlemanliness’. Polite 
theorists stressed the importance of male interaction with women to polite refinement: 
interaction between the sexes was seen to curb male behaviour, while inculcating elegance and 
a favourable deportment.129 As noted by Kennedy, the near absence of women from the army 
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presented a roadblock for officers keen to exercise this aspect of their polite identity.130 Junior 
officers were adept at making connections with local communities, allowing them to associate 
with female society. Keep attended numerous balls while stationed in Winchester, noting to his 
mother that a main attraction was that this was: ‘where the Belles of Winchester congregate.’131 
While serving in Canada during 1813, Lieutenant John Le Couteur of the 104th Foot was keen to 
display his accomplishment to local women: ‘My fair friends sent me numbers of novels … some 
of these I read aloud of an evening, to a coterie of sweet girls, three or four, whom the Lady 
permitted to listen to me.’132 Returning to the same house in the following days, Le Couteur 
noted in his journal: ‘What happy campaigning days for a young Soldier of fortune … to be in the 
cheering Society of an amiable circle of young gentlewomen, all soundly educated in the useful 
pursuits of life, all intimate by relationships, with the lively frankness of American manner, all of 
singular piety with perfect cheerfulness.’133  
Interactions with women also reveal how junior officers constructed identities as polite ‘men of 
feeling’, as they expressed sympathy for female victims of conflict. G.J Barker-Benfield and 
Stafford have demonstrated how affection and sympathy towards women were key components 
of polite sensibility.134 Sharpened by a sense of cultural similarity with the Danish people, 
British officers who visited Copenhagen after its 1807 bombardment by the British expressed 
their sympathy for the victims.135 After visiting the ruined city, Lieutenant John Christopher 
Harrison of the 23rd Foot wrote in a letter home: 
It is impossible for my feeble pen to describe the horrid and distressing scene that 
presented itself to my view when I surveyed that part of the City where the 
operations of the bombardment had been chiefly observed. The countenances of the 
inhabitants bore strong marks of their calamitous situation, and I do not blush to 
declare that I felt most poignantly their pitiable case.136 
The bombardment’s impact on women and children left a particular impact. Harrison was 
distressed when a Danish man informed him that his wife and child died during the 
bombardment, and told Harrison that the British could: ‘do me no other injury.’137 Visiting a 
Danish noble, Second Captain Charles Pasley of the Royal Engineers was appalled to learn that 
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the noble: ‘had his daughter’s leg carried off by a shell. Of three of the most beautiful young 
ladies in Copenhagen two were killed and one wounded – melancholy to think that war should 
have anything to do with women.’138 
Michèle Cohen has identified a chivalric revival during the late-eighteenth century, which 
encouraged men to combine martial ability with sympathy, by acting in the defence of women 
and winning their affections through heroic deeds.139 Such notions would have likely appealed 
to men who identified as polite ‘men of feeling’. Stafford has demonstrated how the expectation 
that Georgian gentlemen display sympathy also encouraged a sense of ‘patriarchal 
protectiveness’ towards objects of sympathy.140 In her study of British soldier-memoirists 
portrayal of Portuguese nuns, Jennine Hurl-Eamon demonstrated how officers’ sympathy for, 
affairs with, and attempts to liberate cloistered nuns during the Peninsular War reflected 
memoirists’ identities as men of polite sensibility and chivalry.141 The chivalric connection 
between love and war made the military the perfect setting for junior officers to style 
themselves as men of feeling and chivalric gentlemen. Describing a brawl between two officers 
to his mother, one hoping to keep women within the barracks, the other hoping to exile them, 
Keep made specific reference to chivalry: ‘never was an occasion more suited to chivalric deeds, 
one striving to imprison, the other to liberate the fair supplicants.’142 Departure scenes in junior 
officers’ memoirs leant themselves to chivalric imagery. Memoirists focused on female 
spectators who massed to see the army leaving Britain. Blakeney placed women at the centre of 
his description of the army departing for the 1809 Walcheren campaign, and played on the 
chivalric relationship between love, manliness, and bravery: 
Many beauteous fair, whose smiles were rendered yet more brilliant by the 
intrusive tear, waved their handkerchiefs in the breeze to the fond objects of their 
fixed regard, who responded with silent but steadfast gaze, burning with the two 
noblest passions which inspire the breast of man – love and glory.143 
 It was in the Peninsula where junior officers’ chivalric identities found their greatest 
expression. As highlighted by Daly, the late-eighteenth-century Gothic and chivalric revival in 
Britain provided a model for British views of the Portuguese and Spanish people, such as in the 
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1812 Madrid triumph.144 Accounts of the liberation focus on the affection the British received 
from the women of Madrid for liberating them from the French. Officers elevated their position 
in this triumphal procession, emphasising their place on horseback, evoking similarities with 
horse-mounted knights. Browne wrote in his journal: ‘the stirrups of the officers, as they rode 
along, were taken hold of & they were gently stopped to be saluted with every possible 
expression of good will and joy.’145 In particular, the focused attention of women inflated 
officers’ sense of exultation. Hennell wrote to his brother: ‘The inhabitants are ready to pull the 
officers off their horses with joy … The lady at the window, immediately she sees you, touches 
the one next to her to look and they are all ready the moment you make a slight inclination of 
the head & smile, to return it more cordially.’146 
As suggested by the above, attracting and seducing women were features of junior officers’ 
interactions with women. Sex and military service were inherently bound. Although the British 
army did not explicitly link martial exploits with sexual conquest in the way Napoleon’s army 
did, sex was still important to British military masculinity.147 Scott Hughes Myerly has 
highlighted how uniforms flattered the male figure, encouraging the view of military uniforms 
as sexually attractive, while Louise Carter has revealed the complex relationship between the 
military and sexual attraction in her study of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century 
phenomena of ‘scarlet fever’, which included the elevation of the soldier as an object of lust.148 
While the overlapping importance of sympathy for women in ideals of polite and chivalric 
masculinity ensures that the two were closely related, the officer corps also embraced a 
libertine masculinity which conflicted with polite ideals. As emphasised by Hurl-Eamon in her 
study of marriage in the eighteenth-century British army, the army had a culture of ‘tomcatting’, 
which celebrated sexual conquest as a defining feature of masculinity.149 While the culture of 
libertine masculinity was strong within the army, womanising was also a feature of civilian 
Georgian masculinity, even for otherwise polite men.150 As shown by Erin Mackie and M. John 
Cardwell, the rake was an enduring influence on British masculinities during the eighteenth-
century, with literary rakes portrayed in a stylish and even military light, planning their sexual 
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conquests in the way a general plans a battle.151 Especially within cavalry regiments, whose 
uniforms were amongst the most elaborate in the army, officers placed a premium on their 
ability to attract and seduce women. Cocks of the 16th Dragoons complained in a letter to his 
cousin about the frostiness of the ‘contemptible’ women at Falmouth who rejected his advances:  
If you address them in a morning they are shocked at the idea of walking at night 
and if you speak to them in the dark, Good Lord, they set up their backs like a cat 
worried by a terrier. What can be the cause of this astonishing degeneracy I am 
unable to ascertain, and I know not whether any cold-blooded Sea Monster formerly 
haunted these shores, daily demanding the sacrifice of a virgin … This fact, only, 
have I been able to ascertain for sure, that I have lived in celibacy since my arrival. 
Dreadful.152 
Woodberry of the 18th Hussars noted how Spanish nuns were attracted to the distinctive blue 
uniforms of the hussars, ‘I made them comprehend that I was an Hussar and that in England we 
are the pride of the fair sex, which they were not at all astonished at. They said, they like us 
better than those they had seen from their windows in red coats.’153 Woodberry’s emphasis on 
the sexual appeal of the Hussars is suggestive to a strong rakish culture in these regiments, 
which he attributed to their comparatively showy uniforms.  
The nomadism of campaign life appears to have encouraged officers to view themselves as freed 
of the moral constraints of polite society.154 Woodberry emphasised the temporary nature of his 
own affairs in the Peninsula, stating that passion for Spanish women: ‘only lasts while in sight of 
the object … I actively think nothing of telling a dozen females here the same tale.’155 Describing 
he and his fellow officers ‘marshalling’ Spanish women to dances in the Peninsula, Captain John 
Kincaid of the 95th Rifles reflected that he and his comrades: ‘frequently incurred the most 
indelible disgrace among the better orders of our indiscriminate collection … we were only 
birds of passage, it was a matter of perfect indifference to us what they thought.’156 In this 
regard, junior officers’ conduct reflected that of another set of young eighteenth-century 
gentlemen. The’ Grand Tour’ was seen as an important tool for rendering young British men 
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‘polite’; however, it was also a period of ‘sexual adventure’, as travellers indulged their sexual 
appetites when set at liberty.157 With close social and cultural ties to the classes who travelled 
on the ‘Grand Tour’, it is likely that junior officers were aware of the duality of character which 
travel allowed for, making for an easier reconciliation of their libertinism with their polite 
identities. 
Rakishness was in direct conflict with polite principles, which stressed decorous conduct in the 
company of women as a means of refinement, and idealised the figure of the married, 
domesticated male.158 As will be demonstrated in Chapter Four, the figure of the polite domestic 
male had a place within the army, as officers maintained relationships with wives and children, 
even on campaign. There were significant material barriers to junior officers marrying, with few 
officers possessing the means to maintain a family on campaign. Furthermore, officer corps 
could be disdainful of marriage. Marriage appears to have made an officer unpopular with his 
comrades, and there is the suggestion that being overly concerned with the domestic gave an 
officer the reputation of a killjoy. Patterson commented on an unpopular and unsociable major, 
‘Being comforted with the rather inconvenient appendage to the solder, commonly called a wife 
… he was but an honorary member of the mess.’159 Similarly, Woodberry described a married 
friend pining over his wife as: ‘the dullest young I ever knew’ and labelled such a concern: ‘a 
very frivolous one for a Hussar.’160 Woodberry’s account reveals conflicting ideas, as he 
regularly wrote longingly of a sweetheart in England, and hoped for: ‘the good fortune to have a 
wife and children’.161 Eventually deciding to retire from the army and marry, Blakiston pointed 
not just to the financial difficulties of marriage in the army, but to the wider culture of 
rakishness within the army. Blakiston suggested that officers with wives faced a ‘delicate 
situation’, forced to avoid the ‘vulgarity’ of officers, while the married couple were approached 
with trepidation by other officers, unsure of how to conduct themselves around a fellow 
officer’s wife. Compounding these problems was Blakiston’s belief that voracious officers would 
make sexual advances on a comrade’s wife: ‘There is the gallant Colonel to keep at a distance 
without giving offence, and … there are puppies of all grades to hold at arm’s length.’162 Within 
these accounts, it is officers who did not participate in rakish conduct who are portrayed as the 
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outlier. Together with a general lack of condemnation of womanising, this suggests that junior 
officers were not expected to adhere to polite norms as they related to interactions with 
women.  
Politeness, therefore, is the most important model for understanding how junior officers related 
to each other, civil society, and women, and is revealing as to what standards of behaviour 
shaped their conduct. Displaying the manners and tastes of a ‘polite gentleman’ provided the 
social capital upon which junior officers based their status as leaders, and was essential in 
maintaining respect between officers. The regimental mess was important in inculcating the 
manners and behavioural style of the ‘polite gentleman’. There were important nuances within 
the polite culture of the officer corps. Elite officers from aristocratically inclined regiments 
appear to have had a different concept of ‘politeness’ to their comrades in less celebrated line 
regiments, which could engender a degree of anti-aristocratic sentiment on the part of line 
officers. Furthermore, officers engaged in a range of behaviours which were in conflict with 
polite ideals, and could lapse into bouts of drunkenness and violence, while womanising was not 
condemned. These divergences, however, should not obscure the predominance of politeness in 
shaping the identities of British junior officers. Indeed, such was the centrality of politeness to 
junior officers’ identities that politeness would influence many aspects of their wider identities, 
as will be explored in the following chapters.  
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Chapter Three: Junior Officers and the ‘Profession of 
Arms’ 
Having served in the British army for nearly fifty years after being commissioned as an ensign in 
the 34th Regiment of Foot in March 1811, Major-General George Bell chose to dedicate his 
memoirs to: ‘The Young Officers of the British Army’. Bell advised them to: ‘Stick to your trade, 
young gentlemen. The wheel of fortune is always going round, and every spoke comes 
uppermost in its turn. I was SIXTEEN years a sub.’1 Bell’s dedication reflects both how he 
defined himself in terms of his profession as well as the acknowledgement that the time he 
spent as a subaltern was frustrating and constricting, but also necessary for him to fulfil his 
ambitions. Bell’s identification as a ‘career’ officer who felt restricted by the subaltern’s position 
in the army was not unique, and was similar to sentiments expressed by many junior officers. 
The relationship between the British officer corps and the concept of ‘professionalism’ has 
usually been viewed in terms of training and battlefield effectiveness. Various studies have 
highlighted the patchy framework of professionalism which characterised the eighteenth-
century British officer corps. Sylvia Frey argued that the purchase system, indifference to 
training and a lack of standardised training undermined the professionalism of British officers 
during the American War of Independence.2 J.A. Houlding examined the training of the British 
army during the eighteenth century and found that there was no standardised procedure for 
officer training, with most officers joining the army with only self-driven reading from 
guidebooks as their only form of training.3 Similarly, John Cookson suggested that the British 
officer corps of the Napoleonic Wars was professionalised only by dint of the army’s regular 
deployment, while Bruce Collins has demonstrated how experience, coupled with increasing 
standards of discipline and training, made British officers effective commanders.4 
This chapter, however, will explore how junior officers identified with the army as a profession 
by exploring their professional motivations and aspirations, and how they saw these as best 
being fulfilled. Junior officers’ writings suggest that there was a strong identification with the 
military as a profession; yet this appears to have rarely begun out of any great professional or 
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careerist impulse. The first section explores enlistment and highlights the multitude of reasons 
why a prospective officer might seek out a commission. Military spectacle and the army’s 
glamorous uniforms were important inducements for prospective officers. Often linking their 
commission to an idealised feeling of personal liberation, young officers often felt intoxicated by 
their newfound career. As will be explored in the second and third sections, once in the army, 
junior officers could find the suffering, subordination, and slow promotion rates within the 
army to be a source of disillusionment. This generated bitterness towards the system of 
promotion, which also became politicised as officers lacking in money or influence to gain rank 
adopted an anti-aristocratic identity which attacked wealthy and well-connected for their 
perceived corruption of the system of promotions. Despite this resentment, officers’ reliance on 
their military career and a sense of masculine honour which encouraged stoic perseverance saw 
many officers develop a strong sense of careerism. Identification with the military as a career 
does not appear to have generated a uniform concept of ‘professionalism’. The final section will 
explore the theme of professionalisation. The increasing professionalisation of the British 
officer corps throughout the eighteenth century existed in constant tension with the embedded 
British tradition of military amateurism. This tension ensured that concepts of what constituted 
‘professionalism’ within the junior ranks of the officer corps varied. While junior officers could 
embrace the learning of drill as an important part of their professional identity, junior officers 
still valued a gentlemanly comportment and polite accomplishment as professional attributes, 
with these factors also encouraging a degree of self-education.  
 
Enlistment 
There was no single motivation that spurred prospective officers into obtaining a commission. 
Some officers suggested that they were enamoured with the pomp and spectacle of military life, 
which they saw as connoting a certain liberty from the constraints of adolescent life. Catriona 
Kennedy has explored the experiences of new officers joining their regiments and revealed how 
this could be a jarring experience for young officers, as they were separated from their families 
and immersed into the alien world of the regimental barracks.5 This was certainly a feature of 
junior officers’ first steps into the army; however, there was also a celebratory dimension to 
junior officers’ descriptions of their enlistment. Particularly in memoirs, many junior officers 
suggested that entering the army was an intoxicating and exhilarating experience. Often, these 
officers suggested that the pomp and glamour of a military life seduced them into choosing the 
army for their career. The lure of military spectacle and, especially, showy military uniforms, 
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was an important motivation for enlistment. As highlighted by Scott Hughes Myerly, uniforms 
were an integral aspect of the culture of military spectacle which the army cultivated. Often 
prioritising aesthetics over practicality, uniforms were designed to flatter the male form, and to 
project an idealised form of masculinity.6 In her study of late-eighteenth century ‘scarlet fever’, 
Louise Carter highlighted how the image of military uniforms as an object of sexual attraction 
was actively promoted in Georgian society.7 Officers’ uniforms were particularly flattering, as 
they were tailored to fit, made of better material than rankers’ uniforms, and were adorned with 
lace and braid.8 Memoirists recalled wearing their uniforms for the first time with excitement, 
and cited the sexual appeal of uniforms. Recalling the first time he wore his new uniform, 
Thomas Staunton St. Clair hoped to win the affection of a girl: ‘On trying on my full-dress 
embroidered coat … I could not help thinking how killing I should look in it.’9 Similarly, John 
Kincaid evoked the links between his volunteer uniform and sexual attraction: ‘when I found 
myself on a Sunday in the front seat of the gallery of our parish church, exposed to the 
admiration of a congregation of milk-maids, my delight was without alloy.’10 For Jonathan Leach, 
his first uniform was a symbol of his liberation from school life: ‘I felt that delight which is 
experienced by most youngsters, on making an escape from school, putting on a scarlet coat, 
epaulet, cocked hat, and a tremendously long feather, to say nothing of the false queue affixed to 
a head of hair plastered with pomatum.’11 
With an average of nineteen years, and a mode age of seventeen years at their commission, the 
officers included in this study were youthful. Particularly for these young officers, being 
commissioned could be an intoxicating experience, suggesting that they saw their new 
profession as providing autonomy, and freeing them from the strictures of family life. John 
Malcolm of the 42nd Foot recalled his early infatuation with the military, and especially the 
army’s association with liberty: 
There is something in the idea of a military life particularly fascinating to youth. The 
sight of a regiment marching past, with its colours flying, and its martial music, 
awakens a slumbering instinct in the soul … There is a charm in the gorgeous array, 
the nodding plume, and the martial air of the soldier – in the unrestrained freedom 
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which is supposed to belong to a military life – in its promise of honour and glory – 
of love and war, and strange adventures in foreign lands. Against temptations like 
these, the voice of caution speaks in vain.12 
Similarly, George Wood of the 82nd Foot had an initial love for the: ‘gaiety, freedom and ease’ of 
military life.13  Informed of his commission in the 34th Foot on 11 March 1811, George Bell 
instantly saw his new military career as liberating him from his ‘thraldom’ at a public school: 
‘Six days after the 11th of March, I was just seventeen years of age, an independent military 
gentleman, let loose upon the world with the liberal pay of 5s. 3d.’14  
Linked to the idea of liberty was the opportunity for travel that the army presented. As noted by 
Gavin Daly, as the Napoleonic wars blocked British travel to the continent, many soldiers 
availed themselves of the opportunity to interpret their military experiences as travellers.15 
Malcolm hoped to travel in the Romantic climes of the Peninsula: ‘the war in the Peninsula was 
at the hottest; and from the time I had a prospect of joining the army, all the romance of my 
nature was called forth, by the hope of visiting that interesting country. My very dreams were of 
orange groves and evening serenades, and latticed windows and dark-eyed beauties.’16 Malcolm 
was not alone in associating his military career with travel. Describing his voyage to the 
Peninsula on board the Samaritan, William Grattan of the 88th Foot recalled: ‘On board … were 
ten or a dozen officers, who, like myself had seen little of the world.’17 While Malcolm’s romantic 
evocation of the orange groves, evening serenades and latticed windows of Spain suggests that 
wanderlust played a role in him joining the army, his association of travel with ‘love and war’ 
and the sexual attraction of ‘dark-eyed beauties’ hints at a broader significance of travel to 
Malcolm. Officers lived and wrote in a context in which travel and the tradition of the ‘Grand 
Tour’ were felt to have far-reaching implications for manhood, masculinity and the self. During 
the eighteenth century, the ‘Grand Tour’ was seen as an important formative experience for 
young gentlemen, as travels around Europe were believed to foster the qualities essential 
around which a polite, gentlemanly adult identity centred: self-sufficiency, freedom of thought 
and refined manners.18 As highlighted by Casey Blanton, this was reinforced by eighteenth-
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century travel literature, which cast travel as an experience of self-reflection and 
development.19 Napoleon’s blockade of Europe, however, severely limited the opportunities for 
young men to complete this aspect of their gentlemanly education. Travel through military 
service, therefore, could act as a substitute for the formative experience of the Grand Tour, and 
provided a contributing motivation for young men to join the army. 
There were also officers who were channelled into the military through family traditions. This is 
especially true for officers from families with traditional ties to the military, such as those from 
the aristocracy or the sons of officers. The aristocracy had long standing ties with the army, 
which was seen as a viable career for younger sons who could not expect to inherit land, while 
the sons of army officers made up a significant portion of British officers during the eighteenth 
century.20 As highlighted in Chapter One, several officers in this study were the sons, or close 
relatives, of former army officers. St. Clair was the son of a former colonel, the brother to two 
army officers, and was born amongst the garrison on Gibraltar. Having stated his desire for a 
commission, St. Clair received his father’s blessing to  join the army, ‘not having forgotten his 
own military ardour.’21 Not all officers went willingly into the army. Unable to inherit land as his 
father sold the family estate, Peter Bowlby’s dream of joining the navy was countermanded by 
his father: ‘When my school days were ended my wish was to enter the Navy. My father 
remarked that I had two brothers already in the Navy, and but one in the Army, so it was 
decided that I should enter the Army.’22 For wealthy or aristocratic families, notions of family 
honour and prestige appear to have been paramount in sending sons into the military. The 
importance which families could place on military commissions as a symbol of family status and 
prestige is borne out in the anecdotal evidence in officers’ letters. Letters from parents could be 
used to ensure that sons were active in pursuing promotion. Having seen another officer 
promoted ahead of him, Ensign John Rous of the Coldstream Guards was forced to defend 
himself to his father:  
it gives me the greatest uneasiness to find, that you regret having allowed 
Anstruther to have gone over my head …as the army will be in England in a few 
months it will make no actual difference to me…I can only add that it will be doing 
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me the greatest kindness to think no more of having allowed an officer to go over 
my head.23 
Similarly, Ensign John Aitchison of the 3rd Foot Guards experienced an indirect attack on his 
masculinity from his father after seeing a less senior officer promoted ahead of him: ‘I regret to 
see you accuse me with having permitted a junior officer to have been put over me – rest 
assured, no person is more zealous for my interest than myself.’24  
Patriotism played an important role in getting officers into the army, although not necessarily 
directly into the regulars. This is especially true of officers who joined the army during the first 
five years of the nineteenth century, when fears of French invasion and the threat of Napoleonic 
tyranny were at their peak.25 The threat of invasion during this period saw the phenomenon of 
volunteering to serve with Britain’s auxiliary forces, the volunteers and the militia, also reach its 
peak. As examples of ‘citizens in arms’, these institutions were more closely associated with 
patriotism than the regular army.26 For some officers, the volunteers and militia units formed 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars appear to have been an initial outlet for 
patriotism and military ardour. Facing the threat of French invasion, Harry Smith chose to join a 
local yeomanry unit, and recalled in his memoir: ‘In 1804 the whole country was en masse 
collected in arms as volunteers from the expected invasion of the French, and being now sixteen 
years of age, I was received into the Whittlesea troop of Yeomanry Cavalry, commanded by 
Captain Johnson.’27 During the summer of 1803, Robert Bakewell joined the 5th Loyal London 
regiment of volunteers, noting that: ‘The citizens about this period appear’d to be attack’d with 
a military phrenzy.’28 Kincaid was similarly swept up: ‘I had left school as a school-boy, 
unconscious of a feeling beyond the passing moment. But the period at length arrived when 
Buonaparte’s threatened invasion fired every loyal pair of shoulders with a scarlet coat.’29 The 
motives of patriotism as an attraction to the military should not be viewed as exclusive to 
Britain’s auxiliary forces. Service with auxiliary forces overlapped with regular service in 
several ways. Increased state control of volunteer units saw them more closely reflect the 
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military experience, as units received pay for service and began to wear uniforms.30 Local 
considerations and influences provided militia and volunteer members with the opportunity to 
perform many of the same roles which the regular army offered, without attracting the same 
stigma as regulars.31 The militia, especially, blurred the line between service with Britain’s 
auxiliary forces and the regular army. As a fertile recruiting ground of rankers and officers for 
the regular army, it is possible that some men joined the militia with the intention of using it as 
a stepping-stone to the army proper, suggesting a potential overlap in motivations.   
Lastly, there were officers who joined the army with the intention of making the army their 
career. George Simmons, a surgeon by trade, joined the 95th Rifle via a militia transfer in the 
hope of obtaining patronage and promotion that would allow him to provide for his parents and 
siblings, as he wrote home shortly after gaining his commission:  
 I am confident there would have been little chance of promoting the interests of my 
family as I was situated; and as a soldier, with perseverance, I must in time have 
promotion, which will enable me to be of use to my family; and at all times it will be 
my greatest pleasure and pride to take care that the boys go regularly to a good 
school, and I have no doubt of seeing them one day men of some experience through 
my interposition.32 
While Simmons was an officer with a clear intention behind his getting a commission, there is 
the sense that other officers resorted to the army out of necessity, having failed at other careers. 
Having briefly flirted with the military with an ensigncy in the 29th Foot, George James Sullivan 
joined the 1st Life Guards after having struggled to establish himself as a lawyer:  
determining  once more to enter the Army, being the only station or sphere in life 
that my humble abilities could in any way be turned to a good account. An idle life, I 
mean one without a Profession, I detested, for there is something so disreputable in 
a young man when he is asked what Profession he is following, to say “none at all.” 
This idea was most repugnant to me & induced me to re-enter His Majesty’s service 
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& with my small pittance & my pay as Cornet or Lieut. I thought I could manage to 
get on, & I hoped ultimately to be a credit to my friends.33 
Robert Bakewell and John Harley, two officers in this study who were in their thirties when 
commissioned, provide examples of how older individuals effectively used the army as a last 
resort.  Bakewell, an officer from a reasonably well-off farming family, was frozen out of the 
family business and failed to establish himself in a profession despite several attempts in his 
twenties. Returning to his family’s estate from London, Bakewell was ushered into the army 
aged thrity-four by his father, having spent several idle years at home: ‘and very little if anything 
to do … a Mr. William Fallows … told me that he had seen my name gazetted for an Ensigncy 
commission in the 27th Regiment, and when I mention’d that circumstance to my father, he told 
me that he had paid four hundred pounds [for the commission].’34 
While Harley asserted at the start of his memoir that he had a deep-seated predilection for the 
military, suggesting a rudimentary appeal to the army, he appears to have only turned to the 
military after finding civilian opportunities limited.35 The son of a wealthy Roman Catholic 
father, Harley was swindled out of his family property and fortune after his father, being legally 
barred from owning property, placed it in the hands of a Protestant trust holder.36 After 
struggling to establish himself in a mercantile profession, Harley was commissioned to the 54th 
Regiment of Foot from an Irish fencible unit in June 1800, at the age of 31.37 Reduced to half-pay 
following the Peace of Amiens in 1802, Harley variously attempted to begin a professional 
career in London, purchase shares, and also bought land in Ireland, but: ‘Finding a difficulty in 
procuring a situation to my wishes … effected an exchange into the 47th.’38 Harley’s military 
career highlights the reliance which some officers placed on the army for their profession. While 
many officers cited the more romantic notions of military glamour and patriotism as attracting 
them to the army, others appeared to join the army out of practicality. The multitude of 
potential motivations for junior officers to join the army suggests that a variety of factors 
encouraged prospective officers to seek out a commission.  
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Suffering and Subordination  
The factors which motivated junior officers to obtain a commission could, to a degree, be 
undermined by their military experiences. As noted by Kennedy in her study of subaltern 
officers and military masculinities, the hardships of campaigning, and the subordinate position 
of subalterns damaged the image of military glamour and conflicted with subalterns’ sense of 
‘manly independence’.39  The figure of the ‘suffering subaltern’ is important here. Suffering was 
central to junior officers’ accounts, especially those of subalterns. Being attuned to suffering was 
a feature of discourses of sensibility and sentimentalism which were current in late-eighteenth 
century British literature and society.40 As highlighted by Neil Ramsey, suffering formed an 
important part of romantic military memoirs, as soldier memoirists appealed to their readers’ 
sympathies by highlighting their suffering on campaign.41 By emphasising their suffering, 
authors highlighted the soldier’s self-sacrifice for the nation, thereby reinforcing the author’s 
distinct status as a soldier.42 Captain John Kincaid of the 95th Rifles claimed: ‘our very privations 
were a source of pride to us’.43 Similarly, Lieutenant John Cooke of the 43rd Foot looked upon the 
tattered uniforms of his comrades as badges of honour: ‘Seven regiments of light infantry and 
riflemen defiled before us, with wide and patched trousers of various colours, and threadbare 
jackets … with infinite admiration did I regard the purple jackets battered epaulettes of my 
companions.’44 
Contemporary accounts suggest that the suffering and hardship experienced by subalterns, 
especially, could undermine the allure of a military career. By then a veteran of the disastrous 
Walcheren campaign, Ensign William Thornton Keep wrote to his brother: ‘You must remember 
it is not all gold that glitters, and the road to distinction is a hazardous one. In the pursuit of 
happiness surely one chief essential is security for life and property, yet both are risked in the 
military profession.’45 As demonstrated by Gavin Daly, the extreme weather conditions and 
routine hardships experienced by soldiers during the Peninsular War encouraged British 
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officers to accentuate their ‘romantic suffering’ in their accounts.46 It is in accounts of Peninsular 
War service that junior officers’ suffering was most pronounced. The hardship that attended 
long marches, food shortages, sickness, the extremities of hot and cold weather, and the 
backward living conditions of the Spanish and Portuguese were all recurrent features of 
accounts describing the Peninsular War. In a letter to his brothers, Ensign George Hennell of the 
43rd Foot noted how privation sharpened the enjoyment of basic meals: ‘This has been rather a 
fatiguing retreat to our animals … If we are well and get a comfortable meal we are repaid for 
our disagreeables. You in England have no idea of the enjoyment of a cup of good tea with a 
chop or steak in our fingers sitting on the ground on a fine morning after a rainy night.’47 
Convalescing in London after a bout of malaria he received in the Peninsula, Lieutenant John 
Aitchison of the 3rd Guards wrote in his journal that any glory he had achieved was: ‘dearly 
purchased! – at two and twenty I find myself unequal to extraordinary exertion … and I am left 
in doubt whether I shall ever be restored to my former health.’48 
Moreover, subalterns saw this suffering as the product of their low rank. This sense cut across 
regimental and social lines, suggesting that the suffering subalterns associated with their rank 
was important in the formation of a collective identity as subalterns that provided a point of 
commonality between junior officers of different regiments. George Wood, a middle-class officer 
who served in the Peninsular War as a subaltern in the 82nd Foot, recalled retreating through a 
‘little dirty village’ during the 1812 retreat from Burgos, in which he: ‘got a little dirty billet, 
such as commonly fell to the lot of officers of my rank.’49 In an 1812 letter home, Ensign John 
Mills, a gentry officer in the aristocratic Coldstream Guards, contrasted his experiences with 
superior officers: ‘We are never under cover even of a shrub for this country is not favoured 
with anything bigger than a vine. The rain comes down in torrents. Headquarters and the Staff 
are always snug in houses, and do not care about the weather.’50 Mills’ sense of injustice was 
compounded by his belief that his sufferings stemmed from Wellington’s indifference: ‘you must 
know that our Noble Marquis is not gifted with much feeling – ambition hardens the heart. He 
only regards the comforts of his men as far as it is actually necessary to his purposes.’51 
Highlighting this sense of shared consciousness formed through suffering, is the 1811 poem 
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‘The Subaltern’s Elegy’. Written and printed by a subaltern in the Peninsula, the ‘Subaltern’s 
Elegy’ was composed to resonate specifically with other subalterns. The poem’s author 
described the subaltern as ‘a moping, half starv’d Hero’, and listed the subaltern’s hardships, 
including sleeping on rough ground covered with fleas, and the everyday hunger occasioned by 
living on rations.52 This poem emphasised the capacity of suffering to undermine the lustre of 
military service, especially uniforms.53 In contrast to the image of dashing manhood that was 
propagated by pristine uniforms, the poem’s author instead highlighted: ‘ the crimson Coat 
seem’d o’er with stitches, The torn, degenerate, Regimental breaches, Behold, how pale and 
worn, the once brisk sash is.’54 
In addition to suffering, junior officers could also see their status in the military hierarchy as 
impinging on their sense of ‘independence’, a point also revealed by Kennedy.55 As 
demonstrated by Matthew McCormack, the ideal of ‘independence’ was represented by 
contemporaries as a central feature of Georgian masculinities. ‘Independence’ connoted 
personal autonomy and freedom from dependence, and was held aloft as the epitome of English 
national character and masculine citizenship.56 As noted by several scholars, while the spectacle 
of the army could seduce new recruits, military service was not portrayed in a universally 
positive light in Georgian society. While junior officers often saw their military careers as 
putting them at liberty, contemporary critics could see soldiers as having sacrificed their 
independence. Myerly has highlighted how military uniforms carried a double meaning, with 
the potential for military uniforms to be seen as a sign of the wearer’s submission to external 
authority.57 Furthermore, Carter has also highlighted how critics saw uniforms as a signifier of 
subservience and also noted that the sexual appeal associated with military uniforms could be 
portrayed as a corrupting and effeminising influence.58 None of the junior officers in this study 
reflected on the potentially effeminising effects of wearing a uniform, suggesting that negative 
representations of the army were not inculcated by members of the army; however, junior 
officers certainly felt that the military hierarchy impinged on their sense of independent 
masculinity.59 For junior officers, their meagre income and subservience to superior rank was a 
far cry from the figure of the personally and financially autonomous ‘independent man’.60 The 
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diary of Aitchison is illuminating with regards to the implications of military service for 
independent masculinity, of which financial pressures played a part. The son of a Scottish laird, 
notions of independence were likely to appeal to Aitchison. Reliant on an income from his father 
to maintain the lifestyle of a Guardsman, Aitchison complained: ‘Were any misfortune to deprive 
my worthy parent of the means of supporting me … how could I live! Not by my pay for that is 
barely sufficient for my cloths! … I am compelled to live as cautiously abstemious as a ruined 
debauchee.’61 Complaints about pay were even more common in line officers’ accounts. 
Lieutenant William Grattan noted in his memoir: ‘The life of a subaltern in … a marching 
regiment, where many of us, and I myself for one, had little except our pay, is a perpetual scene 
of irritating calculation from the 24th of one month to the 24th of the next.’62 Keep wrote to his 
mother about a series of expensive uniform changes that occurred, and stated: ‘I think the 
Prince Regent is very inconsiderate in ordering such constant deviations in our uniform.’63 
A lack of personal autonomy was a particular point of contention for subalterns, especially those 
from elite backgrounds. Aitchison saw the army as forcing subalterns into a subservient 
position, stating: ‘these is something in the life of a subaltern on service so nearly approaching 
slavery as generally disgusts … I am galled most at the want of independence which I can never 
gain.’64 Having been denied a captaincy just prior to Waterloo, Lieutenant George Bowles of the 
Coldstream Guards, and the son a wealthy land-owner, wrote to a friend: ‘I regret bitterly 
having to slave through this campaign in the ranks, where nothing is to be seen or got in the 
shape of information, honour, or reward.’65 Promotion to captain did not necessarily banish this 
sense of subordination. Marooned in garrison life in Glasgow for much of the Napoleonic Wars, 
Captain John Sinclair of the 79th Foot wrote to his sister about a family friend:  
I have not been to see Barbara. I intend to call and see her on my way north. I had a 
letter from her this morning in which she is very severe on me. She seems to think 
since I am Captain, that I have the world at my disposal and do as I like. She thinks I 
am much taken with Glasgow, but I assure her that I never was in a place in my life 
that I more sincerely detest. I most sincerely wish I were out of it.66 
Such sentiments were not universal. In a letter to his uncle, Captain Edward Charles Cocks 
described soldiers in a letter to his uncle as: ‘preserving more individual independence than any 
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class of men.’67 In the same letter, Cocks appeared to criticise those who could not see the 
relationship between sacrificing some personal autonomy for a national good: ‘they confound a 
selfish love of individual licence of action with patriotism, but love of liberty if applied only to 
self is an interested and consequently base feeling.’68 Drawn from a wealthy land-owning and 
parliamentary family, however, Cocks was possessed of an outside income that allowed him to 
maintain a high standard of living. He was also regularly employed on intelligence service, 
affording him the opportunity of exercising independent judgement.  
Furthermore, the sense of ‘polite gentlemanliness’ which permeated the British officer corps 
eased potential tensions arising from submission to the military hierarchy. For junior officers, 
being afforded the respect of a gentleman by their superiors was central to how they reconciled 
themselves to the military hierarchy. Respectful treatment from superiors eased possible 
tensions, while also engendering respect for superior officers. Charles Steevens, then a captain 
in the 20th Foot, commented on Sir John Moore ordering him to relocate in the prelude to the 
1809 Battle of Corunna: ‘I thought Sir John Moore made his enquiries and gave his orders to me 
in such a mild gentlemanly way; I was quite shocked with his engaging manners, and so were 
my two subalterns; and I am sure the men of my company seemed, all of them, to be equally 
pleased with him.’69 As perceived by junior officers, the ideal commanding officer blended the 
demands of gentlemanliness and discipline, with gentlemanly conduct stimulating the respect 
which gave rank its weight. Un-gentlemanly conduct in any circumstance could bring even a 
general’s character into question, particularly when overbearing behaviour was directed at 
subordinates. Recalling the first time his regiment paraded before General Thomas Picton, 
Grattan of the 88th Foot recalled his and the other officers’ distaste for Picton’s conduct, after he 
held a drum-head court martial for two soldiers, had them flogged in front of the entire division, 
and then addressed the regiment: ‘in language, not of that bearing which an officer of his rank 
should do … Language like this was enough to exasperate the lowest soldier, equally with the 
colonel.’70 Domineering and authoritative officers were decried as ‘martinets’ or ‘tyrants’ by 
junior officers, who appear to have preferred a milder course of leadership. Crowe stated: ‘an 
officer with gentlemanly feeling, and good sense, could be a strict disciplinarian without being a 
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tyrant as we have witnessed in Sir John Moore and the Duke of Wellington with very many 
others.’71  
Well-liked regimental commanders had their popularity grounded in their gentlemanly 
reputation and conduct, and officers who made accommodating displays towards juniors were 
held in high regard. The behaviour expected of superiors varied between regiments. Imbued 
with a heightened sense of gentlemanliness, Guards officers appear to have appreciated being 
treated with familiarity bordering on equality. Ensign John Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards 
praised his battalion’s new commander: ‘Colonel Brand has succeeded … He is an exceeding 
pleasant man and I live upon the best possible terms with him.’72 Few junior officers had the 
close relationship which Orlando Bridgeman did with his superior officers. Bridgeman 
contrasted his commanders in the 1st Guards with those of his brother, a naval officer: ‘the 
admiral is very strict … When I compare the different way that he is treated by his superior 
officers from that which we experience in the Guards it is very striking, & I am sure he feels it.’73 
Bridgeman, the son of an aristocrat in one of the army’s most aristocratically minded regiments, 
may have owed the good graces of his superiors to his family connections. Having left a letter 
unfinished in his quarters, Bridgeman was surprised to find a note for his mother in the letter 
when he returned: ‘My most respectful compliments to Lady Bradford & I have the satisfaction 
to say her boy Orlando is quite well & very saucy. S[igned] Stopford Major General in charge of 
this miscreant.’74 The lack of these traits made Wellington unpopular amongst some officers of 
the Guards, who criticised his aloofness and occasional indifference to his officers and men. 
Mills stated that Wellington was: ‘not gifted with much feeling – ambition hardens the heart.’75  
While Guards officers placed a greater emphasis on their gentlemanly status, officers from less 
prestigious backgrounds respected superiors who displayed a form of benign paternalism. 
Afraid that he had embarrassed himself as a newly commissioned ensign in the 34th Foot, 
George Bell was surprised to find his first colonel, Fenwick: ‘an amiable man, a good and gallant 
soldier, decided in character, just and impartial.’76 Describing two respected senior officers of 
the Light, Major General Baron Charles Alten and Lieutenant Colonel Barnard, Jonathan Leach of 
the 95th Rifles described their positive qualities as: ‘a thorough knowledge of their profession, 
calm, cool courage, great presence of mind in action, frank and gentlemanly manners, and the 
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total absence of what may be termed teazing those under their command.’77 As will be explored 
in Chapter Five, junior officers could also describe well-liked commanders in more affectionate 
terms, such as describing their colonels as ‘fathers’. Establishing this filial relationship between 
junior and superior officers, however, would have been impossible without the prior formation 
of mutual respect that stemmed from being treated as ‘polite gentlemen’ by superior officers.  
In contrast to their hopes of liberty and freedom that attended their enlistment, many junior 
officers were situated in a position within the military hierarchy which conflicted with their 
sense of ‘independent’ masculinity. Combined with a sense of suffering as a result of their low 
status, this subordination was a significant contributing factor to junior officers’ identities as 
junior officers.  Drawing a distinction between their experiences, and the experiences of 
superior officers, junior officers saw themselves as belonging to a section of the military which 
was defined by their subordination. To a degree, these concerns were moderated by kind 
treatment on the part of superior officers; however, this should not overshadow the 
undercurrent of inferiority which characterised junior officers’ views of their position within 
the military hierarchy. 
 
Promotion 
Junior officers saw promotion as essential to elevating them above the subordination they 
experienced and to affirm their status. Junior officer accounts suggest that a desire for public 
recognition and promotion were inherently bound. In Britons, Colley has demonstrated how the 
British aristocracy cultivated a public image of duty and heroic self-sacrifice for the nation, 
which then influenced individual conduct.78 Junior officer accounts suggest that the effects of 
this culture were twofold. Firstly, junior officers were conscious that their low status made 
them unlikely recipients of public praise, and secondly, that they aimed to be promoted in the 
hope of earning glory. Writing to his brother, Keep was pessimistic at his prospects of gaining 
glory as a subaltern: ‘the experience I have had prevents all anticipation of acquiring renown … 
the forms of the British service seldom admitting that honour to Subalterns or even Captains, 
which make officers of that grade anxious to get their promotion advanced to the rank of Lieut. 
Colonel … then they might have some chance.’79 While Keep highlighted a degree of 
disillusionment with his low status, he also noted how this sense of obscurity made officers 
desirous of achieving promotion. Rank was a tangible marker of status. Aside from much –
desired medals, token examples of recognition could be looked upon with derision. Grattan 
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noted how the extra shilling per day paid to lieutenants with seven years’ service ‘was rarely 
heard of and never thought of but with disgust.’80 
A cursory reading of officers’ memoirs and letters reveals just how seriously junior officers took 
the issue of promotion. Discussions of army lists, the publishing of commissions and promotions 
in the Gazette and the permutations of promotion within a regiment abound in officers’ 
writings. Hoping to obtain a majority in the 16th Dragoons by purchasing into an infantry 
regiment and effecting an exchange back into the 16th, Cocks stated that promotion was: ‘so very 
much of consequence to me that I would mortgage or sell 2/3 of my estate and live on bread and 
water.’81 For officers lacking in other prospects, promotion was the instrument by which status 
could be most easily attained. Ensign Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards noted a 
deceased captain of his regiment who had risked financial ruin to purchase into his regiment: 
‘Poor Martin is a great loss, to his regiment as a most excellent officer, & to his wife & family, 
who I fear are in bad circumstances, he always was a poor man & sunk a part of his fortune to 
enable him to purchase his company.’82 The regimental variations in promotion were not lost on 
junior officers. Rous advised his parents to usher his brother into the 1st Foot Guards, not only 
for their reputation, but for their faster rate of promotion in comparison to the Coldstream:  
if William had gone into the 1st Guards he would have been more than half way up 
the list of Ensigns, with a great chance of getting several steps very soon. I can see 
amongst them many officers who will not remain on service another year, all men of 
small fortune; unluckily our[s] are men of no fortune and are therefore obliged to 
remain.83 
Similarly, Aitchison wrote to his family: ‘In giving my opinion of the regiment George should go 
into … I said a regiment of the Line in preference to the Guards because in the Line the 
promotion is so much the quicker.’84 The officers included above were all from aristocratic and 
landed families. Given the traditional relationship between aristocratic and gentry families, and 
military service, it is possible that their social background sharpened these officers’ desire for 
promotion.   
Promotion rates varied and depended on a number of factors, such as regiment, time spent on 
active service, and whether or not an officer was able to purchase rank. By 1809, the minimum 
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service requirements for promotion ensured that a subaltern could not become a captain 
without three years’ experience, while a majority could not be attained without seven years’ 
service, two of which must have been as a captain.85 While minimum service requirements had, 
technically, been in place during the late-eighteenth century, they were not uniformly enforced 
until the Duke of York’s reforms of the mid-1790s.86 On average, the officers in this study were 
relatively consistent in the time they spent between ranks. An ensign or cornet could expect a 
gap of two years before they were promoted to lieutenant, with no difference in time between 
officers who purchased and those promoted by seniority.87 Some, like John Rous of the 
Coldstream Guards, had to wait nearly four years to become a lieutenant. Purchase had a 
greater effect in being promoted to captain. On average, lieutenants would have served nearly 
nine years before being promoted to captain. Those who purchased rank, however, could 
normally be promoted after six years’ service.88 This rapid rate may be attributed to several 
officers who purchased captaincies after only a few years’ service in the 1790s, before the 
introduction of minimum service lengths; and to some officers who managed to be promoted 
quickly during the Napoleonic Wars. Cocks of the 16th Dragoons became a captain after three-
and-a-half years’ service, having being accelerated up the ranks once his talent was noted by 
Wellington.  
The enforcement of minimum service requirements before promotion could occur ensured that 
ambitious and wealthy officers could not rapidly ascend the ranks through liberal use of the 
purchase system. Being required to serve a minimum period before promotion was possible 
may have contributed to a general sense of irritation at glacial promotion rates. After waiting 
five years and one month for his promotion from ensign to lieutenant, Aitchison warned his 
brother against joining the army: ‘because it does not seem to me so likely to promote what I 
suppose every man has in his view, viz his advancement in the world.’89 Faced with slow 
promotion in the Coldstream, Mills vented his frustration to his mother with cynical humour: ‘If 
I do not make haste I shall be invalided and removed from hence to a Garrison Battalion with 
some other lively old chaps, to do duty at the Cape of Good Hope.’90 Lieutenant Charles Kinloch 
of the 52nd Foot wrote his sister of a fortunate comrade: ‘Robert Mackay expects his lieutenancy 
by purchase to be in the next Gazette, he may think himself very lucky as he has not served 
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above ten months as ensign. I was very near two years.’91 As the majority of promotions went by 
seniority, officers were attracted to regiments with high casualty rates, as deaths or the 
retirement of war-weary officers created vacancies for inferior ranked officers to fill. Having 
purchased  a captaincy in the 99th Foot, Kinloch wrote to his mother that he was reluctant to join 
the regiment, as it was unlikely to see any action: ‘It was raised in 1805 and went out to N 
America the year after, where it has been ever since … The promotion in it hitherto has been 
enormously slow.’92 Shortly after purchasing his captaincy, Kinloch exchanged with an officer of 
the 52nd by paying him a fee, ensuring he never physically left the 52nd. Lieutenant William 
Bragge of the 3rd Dragoons wrote to his father: ‘It must be allowed that War, or rather Service, is 
a famous thing for promotion. I was twelfth Lieutenant when I landed at Lisbon; am now Fifth 
and shall probably be first for purchase by the Time I have served the regular Period as more of 
our Capts and Subs are heartily sick of the business.’93 
John Cookson has warned of the difficulties in examining structural forces in the pre-
bureaucratic state, while Penelope Corfield has highlighted how the growing professional ethos 
of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain developed alongside informal patronage 
networks.94 It is unsurprising, then, to find junior officers attempting to exploit patronage to 
attain promotion. Junior officers sought to use whatever connections they could muster to 
speed their way up the promotion chain. As noted by Michael Glover, being appointed into a 
rank via direct influence from a senior officer was rare: just over seven per cent of regimental 
promotions during the Peninsular War were the result of direct appointment from patronage.95 
While direct appointments as a result of patronage were rare, employing the influence of a 
patron was useful in obtaining a commission in a good regiment, or for officers seeking out a 
position with the staff. The capacity of good connections to lubricate appointments highlights 
the importance of personal relationships within the army, and suggests that focusing on the 
regulations surrounding promotion would obscure an important aspect of promotion within the 
army. Most officers who had a good reputation with their colonel appeared able to rely on their 
good word. George and Maud Simmons, both lieutenants with the Peninsular Army, for example, 
elicited recommendations from their colonels for their younger brother to join the army as a 
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volunteer.96 The letters of Charles Kinloch, a captain with the 52nd Foot are illuminating as to the 
workings and limitations of the patronage system as he sought out patronage for himself to 
obtain a captaincy. Drawn from a reasonably wealthy Scottish gentry family, Kinloch had some 
pre-existing family connections: Kinloch’s uncle was a colonel with the 92nd Foot, while he was a 
cousin to General Sir Thomas Graham. This family connection with Graham was crucial in 
Kinloch gaining the inside word on where an opportunity to purchase a captaincy would soon 
occur. Having met with Graham in London in February 1813, Kinloch wrote to his mother that 
Graham: ‘had mentioned me to the Duke, who had spoken very graciously on the subject, also to 
Colonel Torrens who also promised fair & had got a hint … of a company likely to be vacant in 
the 72nd.’97  
This patronage appears to have paid off, as Kinloch was able to purchase a captaincy in the 99th 
Foot; however, Kinloch hit a snag as his intended exchange back into the 52nd Foot met with 
resistance. Despite agreeing an above regulation price with a captain of the 52nd who would 
exchange into the 99th in his place; Kinloch found his exchange blocked after a letter 
complaining of his slow progress was sent to the Horse Guards.98 Kinloch believed that a 
favourable reference from a superior officer would have resolved the matter, as he wrote to his 
mother: ‘Had General Graham … been in town they [the Horse Guards] would never have 
hesitated to grant it, or if I had any person of the least interest to speak to the Duke on the 
subject.’99 Furthermore, Kinloch was concerned that if his letter of complaint made its way into 
Wellington’s hands, it would irretrievably damage his reputation, and shatter any hope of 
further promotion: ‘it would be a most cruel thing, for it would not only stand in the way of the 
present affair, but might be a bar to any thing I should wish to done hereafter.’100 The day after 
sending this letter, Kinloch received news that his exchange back into the 52nd had been 
completed, owing to the intervention of a general. Kinloch’s travails are suggestive as to the 
importance of patronage in achieving a favourable appointment. Forming a favourable opinion 
with senior officers, therefore, could work to a junior officer’s advantage.  
The use of patronage was a contentious issue for junior officers. The perceived monopoly that 
aristocratic or wealthy officers had on patronage and the ability to purchase rank saw the issue 
of promotions become politicised. Some officers took issue with what they saw as the 
corruption of the system of promotion by aristocratic influence. These sentiments were 
expressed largely in post-war memoirs, suggesting that the growing prominence of a 
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‘professional’ ethos in early-nineteenth century Britain was influential in shaping these officers’ 
writings. Corfield has revealed how a professional ethos that valued technical know-how 
developed in eighteenth-century Britain, which strengthened during the early-nineteenth 
century.101 In exploring ‘middle-class’ identities in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, 
Dror Wahrman highlighted how proponents of ‘professionalism’ drew on established anti-
aristocratic discourses, which attacked aristocratic influence as a corrupting force.102 Writing in 
the post-war period, officer memoirists appear to have been influenced by these forces, as they 
adopted an anti-aristocratic discourse, which argued that meritorious officers were overlooked 
in favour of wealthy or well-connected officers, who effectively received promotion because of 
their social standing. Bell had distaste for: ‘cold aristocratic pride, injustice and partiality’, as: 
‘Promotion went too often by favour, Court influence, political intrigue, or Horse Guards 
interest.’103 
The concept of ‘merit’ was important to these critics, who emphasised the deserving nature of 
overlooked officers. This was particularly the case in post-war memoirs, as officers turned to 
criticising the system of promotions to vent frustration at their unfulfilled aspirations. George 
Wood, a veteran of the Peninsular War, wrote a critique of the military, The Rambles of Redbury 
Rook, as a follow-up text to his memoir, The Subaltern Officer. Both texts display Wood’s 
disillusionment with the military, a key element of which was the preference given to wealth in 
the British officer corps: ‘suppose the officer to have been thirty years in the service, and at 
length by dint of perseverance, which by these gentlemen is called merit, he obtains his 
company. Had he possessed money to purchase, or been blest with friends at Court, he might 
have gained it ten years sooner.’104 Robert Blakeney of the 28th was critical of: ‘the obstacles 
opposed to reward of personal merit by an all-grasping aristocratical interference.’105 What 
constituted ‘merit’ for these officers is difficult to determine, as few offered a definition. 
Attention to duty and competency at drill were both key components of junior officers’ 
professional identity, yet they only constituted part of the ideal of ‘merit’.  Despite some 
exceptional cases, ‘merit’ as conceived by junior infantry or cavalry officers appears to have 
revolved around the qualities of ‘natural’ leadership: bravery, steadfastness and heroism. 
Describing the 1813 battle of Vitoria and the campaign in the Pyrenees, Bell noted that: ‘There 
were deeds of valour achieved by hundreds of British officers, within the last few weeks, that 
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would astonish the soldiers of any other nation in the world … Yet these officers were entirely 
neglected.’106 
Officers who obtained rank through wealth or influence were open to accusations of losing their 
independence, as they entered into a dependent state of subordination to money or a patron. As 
revealed by McCormack, the use of patronage in Georgian political culture had implications for 
masculinity, as voters who were the recipient of a patron’s grace were placed in a position of 
obligation, which undermined their claims to independence.107 Wood had little sympathy for 
officers who purchased commissions, ‘or rather…sell their liberty – for from that moment they 
lose their independence, and, become, I think, even worse than slaves.’108 In contrast to the 
dependence experienced by officers who purchased their rank, Wood emphasised his 
promotion by merit, which subsequently emphasised his freedom from external influence. 
Wood was proud of attaining the rank of captain, ‘in about seven years, without money or 
interest, being, in every sense of the word, a soldier of Fortune.’109 The pervasive influence of 
patronage, however, presented problems for officers critical of such forces. Describing his 
experiences in the Peninsula as a subaltern in the 28th Foot, Robert Blakeney disdained 
aristocratic influence and patronage. Blakeney, however, received the favour of Colonel 
Abercrombie and Lord Lynedoch: 
Here will be seen an officer, high in rank and still higher in reputation…writing in 
familiar language to a subaltern officer, showing anxiety for his interests and using 
every exertion to forward his promotion from no other motive than the belief that 
he had fully discharged his duties to his king and country…I had no introduction 
from influential friends to his lordship.110 
There is an inherent tension in Blakeney’s account between receiving patronage on one hand, 
and being completely opposed to it on the other. Blakeney is far from unique in this sense, as 
many officers, lacking in opportunities in Britain upon demobilisation, used their connections 
within the officer corps to obtain positions within colonial government.111 This combination of 
merit and patronage reflects the development of the meritocratic system in Britain. As shown by 
Penelope Corfield, meritocracy and a concomitant sense of professionalism grew within the 
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existing system of patronage, making distinguishing between the two difficult.112 Vehemently 
opposed to patronage and ‘aristocratic influence’ on the one hand, and willing to exploit this 
same system when it suited their career interests, these concessions highlight the tensions 
between ‘professional’ idealism that espoused the value of merit, and the desire for promotion. 
This tension and apparent compromise between amateur and professional identities suggests 
that the extent to which notions of merit came to dominate junior officers’ concepts of 
promotion was, ultimately, limited.  
 
War as a Trade 
Despite consternation over slow promotion rates and the use of patronage, the officers included 
in this study displayed careerist instincts and a dedication to the army as their career. The 
officers in this study were, generally, willing to serve for long periods. Cookson suggested that 
only one in eight officers left the army within five years during the Napoleonic Wars.113 The 
officers in this study were long serving. Excluding the six officers who died on active service, 
these officers served an average of nearly 21 years before retiring by choice or through 
demobilisation. For the period up to 1820, the officers in this study had served an average of 
nearly twelve-and-a-half years. These lengthy periods of service suggest that the officers in this 
study were willing to persevere with their military careers. In this regard, these officers were 
mirroring their eighteenth-century predecessors. In his study of the training of the eighteenth-
century army, J.A. Houlding noted that the majority of regimental officers were careerist and 
long serving, and ‘got by on steady, competent service.’114  
The careerism of the officers in this study was not just the product of military tradition, but was 
influenced by a peer culture which encouraged duty, and by the determination of officers to 
forge a successful military career. Kennedy argued that a willingness to share in the hardships 
of campaign and battle were the main qualifiers for officers being accepted by their peers.115 In 
addition to these factors, it appears that junior officers demanded application to duty from their 
comrades. Cocks criticised his comrades in a letter to his cousin: 
English officers come out eager to fight, are disappointed if an action does not 
immediately take place and anxious to get home after it is over. They forget that the 
objects of the campaign are oftener accomplished by patience and perseverance 
than by the most brilliant success. They seem not to consider that they have 
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voluntarily entered the service and are receiving the pay of their country and that 
unless they perform what is required of them cheerfully, to the best of their ability, 
they are not doing their duty.116 
Similarly, Thomas Bunbury, then a captain with the Portuguese service, recalled an officer of the 
Hussars with whom he shared a transport to Britain. Bunbury described the officer as: ‘the most 
ineffable coxcomb I ever met with … The Hussar soon let out that he had obtained leave to quit 
the d –--- d country, and that on his arrival in England he would leave the service, which was not 
fit for a person who had the means of living in ease and independence at home.’117 Bunbury took 
issue with the officer, and advised the hussar: ‘that there might be in the boat persons not very 
affluent, and yet who, I hoped, were influenced by higher and more soldier-like feelings.’118 
Junior officers were quick to deride unwilling comrades as ‘amateurs’. While the term ‘amateur’ 
has been used by historians to describe the manner in which British officers approached their 
profession, as well as Britain’s predilection for citizen soldiers over standing armies, junior 
officers may have attached a different meaning to the term.119 Corfield has highlighted how the 
term ‘amateur’ was applied during the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries to members of 
a profession who lacked dedication and collective spirit.120 Junior officers nominated officers 
who arrived at the front seemingly more interested in the glamour of military life than with 
daily duty. Rous of the Coldstream Guards commented on a new arrival in the Peninsula who 
had transferred from a home service cavalry regiment in a letter to his mother: ‘he was looking 
very well and was in high spirits at the idea of being on service, no doubt he will soon cool.’121 
Throughout letters home from the Peninsula, Mills, also of the Coldstream Guards, mocked 
fellow subalterns to his uncle for their military fervour and lack of dedication: ‘Numerous 
amateurs have visited us, but their curiosity is soon satisfied.’122 Mills’ criticisms were also 
directed at individuals, hinting at the coercive power of the officer corps: ‘I am much amused by 
Taylor’s zeal and shall be much mistaken if his return be not as precipitate, as his advance. A 
bivouac in a wet night would settle his ardour.’123 Mills revisited Taylor nearly three months 
later in another letter:  ‘I never saw a regular soldier more sick of it and considering he is an 
amateur, has obtained a wonderful victory over himself, or rather over his military ardour, for 
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he seems now to have given up all idea of turning soldier.’124  The quickness of the officers 
considered by this study to criticise their comrades is suggestive as to their careerist impulses. 
Furthermore, such terms were most frequently used within, or applied to, elite regiments, such 
as the Guards or cavalry. This correlation indicates that these regiments attracted officers who 
were invested in the army only so far as an object of curiosity. 
While junior officers could be disheartened by their lack of personal autonomy and the slow 
promotion rates in the army, they could also confront these problems with substantial resolve. 
In their study of gentry masculinities, Henry French and Mark Rothery highlighted how young 
men from land-owning families who entered into an apprenticeship often complained of their 
loss of autonomy.125 Young apprentices in this situation, however, often met this loss of 
independence with a stoic acceptance of their situation, and resolved to persevere with their 
career.126 Junior officers appear to have approached their careers with a similar resolve. Despite 
writing to his family that the army was: ‘the worst profession that any young man can follow’, he 
nevertheless vowed to continue with it, for having ‘been in four years now it becomes me to 
persevere and I think it improper being indetermined.’127 Aitchison believed he was too 
accustomed to the military to succeed elsewhere, and confessed in his journal two years later: ‘it 
would become me to persevere in and endeavour to overcome all difficulties, to promotion, for I 
am quite unacquainted with business, and now weaned from the necessary habits.’128 Aitchison 
certainly fulfilled these ambitions. He would serve with the army until his death in 1877, after 
achieving the rank of general. Other officers expressed similar sentiments. Faced with slow 
promotion in his regiment, the 23rd Foot, Lieutenant John Christopher Harrison wrote to his 
mother: ‘I shall content myself in going on in the same jog trot way and trust myself to your 
usual doctrine, “Who knows, something may turn up.” It is almost time, the 7th next month 
completes my time, six years’ service in this Corps. It will then fast approach seven years.’129 
Junior officers often highlighted their reliance on their military careers. Often designating 
themselves as ‘soldiers of fortune’, officers of lesser financial means and sons who could not 
expect to inherit land associated their career with their livelihood, strengthening their 
identification with the army as a profession. Officers from lower backgrounds were aware that 
they did not conform to the archetype of the ‘natural’ leaders of the aristocracy or gentry, yet 
were determined to continue their career. William Thornton Keep, an officer from a middling 
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family noted that: ‘The career before me is one I might have chosen had I been born to titles and 
affluence … but being the mere soldier of fortune without any other dependence I am now 
especially urged to pursue it with firmness.’130 A lack of opportunities in civilian life also 
encouraged a sense of careerism amongst socially elite officers. As it was linked to their self-
identity, many socially elite officers could see their reliance on their profession. Commenting on: 
‘All those who have been able have already left us’ having the opportunity of another career, 
Mills remarked that the remaining officers were, ‘chiefly soldiers by necessity.’131 Reflecting on a 
fellow officer leaving the Coldstream Guards during the Peninsular War, Rous implied that other 
Guards officers were dependent upon their military career: ‘Bradshaw is a great loss to us; he 
was generally reckoned a clever, good tempered man and had he been a poor man without any 
other prospect than his profession, would have made a good officer.’132 
This reliance also made officers concerned about what would happen in the event of peace. 
Insecurities feature in officers’ letters home to their families, with many expressing a concern 
about the permanency of their career. During the eighteenth-century, the British army had a 
tradition of expanding rapidly to meet the demands of war, and then being demobilised and 
contracting in size upon the advent of peace.133 Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, junior 
officers saw a correlation between service and fast promotion. As such, junior officers expressed 
concerns about potential peace or defeat derailing their military career. Bridgeman wrote home 
from the Peninsula in 1813: ‘what will become of us soldiers, if there is a peace; I fear promotion 
will then stand still in the regiment.’134 Career officers were anxious about government 
instability, fearing that it would result in a peace treaty with France, particularly following the 
Peace of Amiens in 1802. In late 1809, ministerial resignations left Britain without an effective 
government, until Spencer Perceval was appointed Prime Minister on 30 September.135 
Lieutenant Rice Jones of the Royal Engineers was concerned about this instability, and wrote to 
his father in early November 1809: ‘We cannot imagine what will become of us amidst all the 
changes etc; which are taking place.’136 In his next letter, he implored his father to send news of 
the governmental changes: ‘I am very much obliged for the news you give me; you cannot 
imagine how eager we all are to know what is going on in England; our fate will depend, I 
suppose in great measure upon the stability of the ministry. If you are in London, will you have 
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the goodness to see if it is possible to send me a weekly newspaper.’137 Lieutenant George 
Bowles of the Coldstream Guards wrote to a friend in late 1814: ‘Selfishly speaking, I am bitterly 
grieved at the termination of the war, and of consequence at the total extinction of all my hopes 
of promotion.’138 
Even officers who showed signs of war-weariness could display a concern for their career at the 
advent of peace. Following a harrowing engagement on the Nive in late-1813, where he was 
placed under fire for an extended period, Hennell appeared willing to go on half-pay and wrote 
to his brothers in the aftermath: 
Peace is now I think fairly beyond doubt & it is likely to be speedy & soon. The half-
pay monster is staring some of us lieutenants in the face again. However, I heartily 
wish for it. I have seen the dreadful calamities of war & I find soldiers feel much less 
for themselves than their friends feel for them.139 
Having seemingly reconciled to life without his commission, Hennell applied for a transfer to his 
regiment’s second battalion, then serving in England, and which was likely to be demobilised in 
the event of peace. Less than a month later, however, Hennell was working towards an exchange 
which would secure his post-peace career: ‘the oldest and most experienced officers say that 
there is no doubt that, in case of a peace, the officers of the 2nd batt. would have to go on half-pay 
& it was thought by most that I might get into another regiment for £100 or £150 or I might get 
into a single batt. regiment & then I should not go on half-pay.’140 The sense that officers were 
reliant on their military careers, coupled with a determination to preserve their position, 
suggests that many officers identified closely with the army as a career. 
 
Professional Gentlemanliness 
‘Careerism’ is not synonymous with ‘professionalism’, and an important distinction must be 
drawn between the two. As demonstrated, junior officers could display strong careerist 
tendencies; however, this does not necessarily indicate that junior officers were assiduous in 
advancing their professional abilities. Influenced by the enlightenment emphasis on attaining 
knowledge, the eighteenth century was a period of professionalisation for European armies. As 
highlighted by Christopher Duffy, eighteenth-century European armies were beginning to value 
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technical education for officers. On the continent, the military revolution of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries saw officer training made official and standardised, with most continental 
nations having established military colleges for the training of infantry and cavalry officers by 
the 1780s.141 As further argued by H.M. Scott and C. Storrs, the military revolution saw 
European nobles develop a set of professional qualities between 1600 and 1800 that 
transformed the continental nobility into ‘a caste of military professionals’.142  In contrast, the 
eighteenth-century British officer corps has not traditionally been associated with 
professionalism. Eighteenth-century British officers did not require any formal training before 
they joined their regiments, a trend which continued into the Napoleonic Wars. Duffy 
highlighted how contemporaries from the continent were critical of British officers, and noted 
their inattention to duty and knowledge.143 Roger Norman Buckley was critical of the 
professional standards of British officers, suggesting that most officers saw their careers as 
incidental, and did not recognise the army as a vocation.144 Cookson argued that the British 
officer corps of the Napoleonic Wars only had a loose structure of professionalism, while 
Kennedy has suggested that the ‘gentlemanly amateur’ ethos of the British officer corps, which 
emphasised an officer’s deportment over his professional ability, predominated to the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars.145 
The British officer corps, however, was on an upwards trajectory of professionalisation during 
the eighteenth-century. Ira Gruber suggested that the eighteenth-century saw a growing 
recognition of the army as a profession in Britain, with the effect that officers became 
increasingly aware of their responsibility to the state and to their profession.146 Stephen 
Conway has argued that British officers belonged to ‘military Europe’, and shared in many of the 
same values as their continental counterparts.147 The eighteenth century and the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Era saw significant structural reforms to the British army, which could 
encourage professionalism. A military academy for the training of artillery and engineering 
officers was established at Woolwich in 1741, while the first formal academy for training 
infantry, cavalry, and staff officers, the Royal Military College at High and Low Wycombe, was 
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established in 1799.148 Infantry drill was standardised in the 1792 general regulations, which 
were based on Dundas’ critique of infantry drill and tactics in his 1788 Principles of Military 
Movements, while, as noted in Chapter One, the British officer corps underwent structural 
reform during the 1790s.149 As argued by Cookson, viewing the professionalisation of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century British officer corps purely in structural terms is 
fraught.150 It is important, therefore, to explore how junior officers approached professional 
aims. What emerges from officer accounts is the sense that the military demanded a degree of 
professionalism; at least to the extent that officers should be devoted to learning the 
standardised drill of the army. Tempering this notion was the view that officers should 
approach the army in the manner of a dilettante, highlighting how notions of ‘gentlemanly 
amateurism’ were still central to junior officers’ professional identities. 
There is evidence to suggest that structural reforms of the British army encouraged officers to 
become more professional in their approach. John Blakiston, having had a commission 
purchased for him in a newly raised regiment in 1793 at the age of nine, noted how this gave 
him no professional impetus: 
I had no occasion, like other boys, to study for a profession which I had already 
attained, I could in no way discover either what use musa or musae could be to me 
as a soldier. While in this mood the Duke of York’s regulations, prohibiting school-
boys from holding commissions in the army, came out; and my military pride was 
lowered a peg or two by my being placed on half-pay.151 
Blakiston’s reduction appears to have encouraged him to pursue his military career more 
closely, as he applied himself judiciously throughout his later service with the East India 
Company and the Portuguese army. Similarly, the standardisation of drill appears to have had 
some influence on how junior officers conceived of their duties. Joining the Portuguese service 
and being responsible for the training of a Portuguese company forced Bunbury to learn 
infantry drill: 
After attending the drill parades, and paying especial notice to what was going on, I 
employed myself on returning to my billet by referring to my notes on the King’s 
regulations for this period; and for the first time I became to understand Dundas. 
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Prior to this, I considered it a very stupid book, and beyond all comprehension. I 
went even further and translated into Portuguese the eighteen manoeuvres, which 
afterwards became very generally circulated through the Portuguese army.152 
As a newly commissioned ensign in the 43rd Foot, Hennell devoted himself assiduously to drill, 
writing to his brothers: ‘As a soldier I have much to learn. I am still at drill &, as I see the 
propriety of it, it gives me pleasure.’153 
Together with the requirement that junior officers be schooled in the rudiments of military 
professionalism was a concurrent strain of self-education and improvement. Enshrined in the 
writings of enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and David Hume, British enlightenment 
thought placed a great deal of emphasis on self-reflection, self-awareness and individualism.154 
As products of the enlightenment world, junior officers’ approaches to their military education 
reflect the impact of British intellectual thought on British society. The expanding print culture 
of the eighteenth-century made increasing numbers and styles of books available to willing 
readers. Reading was associated with enlightenment concepts of the ‘self’, and was seen as a 
vehicle to self-knowledge and improvement. 155 While print culture reached down the social 
ladder, it became a potent cultural symbol and was considered a sign of one’s gentility.156 The 
military was not left untouched by the cultural phenomenon of reading. As revealed by Gruber, 
books were central to the professionalisation of the army during the eighteenth century, as the 
military hierarchy used books to disseminate regulations and practices, while individual officers 
read widely as a means of improving their knowledge on warfare.157  
Junior British officers, both at home and abroad, were avid readers. Officers read periodical 
army lists and the London Gazette to find out information about promotions, while also 
requesting newspapers, books and periodicals from family members in letters home. Reading 
also coloured officers’ experiences of war, as the books they read influenced their opinions 
about what they encountered while abroad.158 Any dearth of books was often lamented by 
officers on campaign. It was officers with additional sources of income, therefore, who were best 
placed to benefit from books. During his time in the Peninsula, Cocks requested various titles 
from his family. These included works of fiction, such as Shakespearian plays and Robinson 
Crusoe; educational books on mathematics, history and literature; and, importantly: ‘Any new 
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military book that stands high.’159 Reading had recognisable outcomes. Cocks’ journals include 
long reflections on military works he had read, debating their worth and potential 
permutations. Regimental cultures also played a part in fostering professionalism. Lessons 
learnt from books could be disseminated beyond the individual reader. Bell noted how captains 
in the Peninsula often carried ‘company books’ which were read by the captain and his 
subalterns.160 An emphasis on polite accomplishment, therefore, intertwined with professional 
identities. Self-education was not limited to reading. Desiring a staff position owing to increased 
opportunities for ‘observation and promotion’, Browne took it upon himself to learn Spanish 
upon being posted to the Peninsula in 1809, as he: ‘thought it more probable that officers 
acquainted with it, would be sought for, and brought forward, and the result proved that I was 
correct in this.’161 
Junior officers, however, saw a fine line between studying tactics to enlarge knowledge, and a 
pedantic obsession with the minutiae of military drill and tactics. Gentility implied a set of 
attributes, such as alacrity of thought, bravery and self-mastery, which, it was conceived, gave 
British officers the capacity to meet the demands of officership, and to learn from experience.162 
As revealed by Philip Carter in his study of polite masculinity, placing too much emphasis on 
learning was seen to inculcate pedantry in men, which posed a threat to the perceived benefits 
of polite accomplishment.163  The tension between the necessity of a degree of professional 
knowledge and, a concern over the impacts of pedantry, is reflected in junior officers’ writings. 
Blakiston advocated for a liberal, rather than a specialised education for officers: ‘I am aware 
that British officers are not so much instructed in the theory of their profession as those of other 
armies, but that is, in my opinion, a matter of little consequence. Generally speaking the best 
education for an officer is that which will make him the best citizen.’164 The letters of Edward 
Charles Cocks are especially revealing as to the tensions that existed between polite 
gentlemanliness and professionalism. Cocks was regularly employed by Wellington on 
intelligence duties in the Peninsula and, his talent was celebrated throughout the army. Upon 
hearing of Cocks’ death at the 1812 siege of Burgos, for example, Captain Arthur Shakespear of 
the 3rd Dragoon Guards described Cocks as: ‘a brilliant officer’, while Cocks’ regimental comrade 
Lieutenant William Tomkinson described him as: ‘one of the most distinguished officers of the 
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time.’165  Asked for advice on military careers by his uncle, Cocks also warned against the 
dangers of over-education in his reply: ‘I dislike Marlow. Boys there either become disgusted 
with duty and on joining break loose into all manners of idleness and extravagance of 
behaviour, or they learn to  be military pedants and despise the advice of those who, though 
they do not step just 30 inches every pace, know how to fight their enemy when they must meet 
them in the field.’166 Instead, Cocks advocated a gentlemanly education: 
I like to see a young man on first joining his regiment with the air of a gentleman 
and not of a serjeant-major … A mind free from prejudices, impressed with liberal 
and philanthropic ideas, love of his profession and emulation in it, with a sufficient 
ease of behaviour to render himself at home in society which is strange to him, will 
enable a young man to distinguish himself in the army much sooner than having 
Dundas and even Tempelhoff by heart.167 
Cocks also saw these traits as distinctly British, as he derided German officers as ‘blockheads’. 
Britain’s place within ‘military Europe’ has been the subject of scholarly debate. Conway argued 
that national differences between British and continental officers were overridden by a 
collective sense of professional belonging.168 Mark Wishon, however, has revealed how mutual 
respect between British and German officers was also coloured by the stereotype of Germans as 
boorish and dour.169 Cocks’ views on German officers suggest that he fell into the latter category, 
as he criticised German officers in his diary: ‘Usually ill-educated, their minds are confined to 
their profession … They make capital subalterns and captains, but know too much for power 
and their views are not sufficiently enlarged for high command.’170 
Junior officers, therefore, developed a sense of professionalism which advocated a degree of 
professional knowledge that was still overshadowed by the trappings of gentlemanly 
amateurism. This was not the only conflict which characterised junior officers’ relationship to 
the ‘profession of arms’. Often entering the army after being seduced by the glamour and 
supposed liberty of a military career, subalterns in particular could find military careers 
unfulfilling, as they were subjected to the military hierarchy and condemned to years at a low 
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rank owing to often sluggish promotion rates. There is the sense, however, that junior officers 
saw their time as junior officers as something of an apprenticeship. This view saw officers 
develop careerist instincts, which saw them approach the challenges of the army with 
determination and perseverance. This combination of factors suggests that junior officers could 
come to closely identify with their profession, if not while abandoning the ‘gentlemanly 
amateur’ ethos of the British officer corps.  
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Chapter Four: Regiments, Family, and Friends 
In an 1811 letter to his father, Captain Edward Charles Cocks declared: ‘I beg leave to be 
understood permanently to resign all wish to be in Parliament. I wish to be a soldier and all a 
soldier and only a soldier.’1 Evidently, Cocks saw soldiering as a career which demanded full 
devotion from an individual, devotion which was irreconcilable with his additional role as a 
parliamentarian. In a later letter to his uncle offering advice on military careers, Cocks 
acknowledged that this devotion was not a given, but developed over time: ‘Amid the many 
hundred young men of spirit who compose the officers of our army, I meet with very few who 
are soldiers in their heart. Thank God, however, that number is fast increasing for those who 
have come out boys have grown up in the military habit.’2 In the same letter, Cocks suggested 
that an officer should prioritise the military aspects of his life, and devote himself to his 
comrades as he would his family. Cocks’ views suggest that he saw considerable tension, if not 
incompatibility, between military and family identities: ‘A soldier must regard his regiment … as 
his home. He must sigh after no particular spot and no particular country. If allowed to visit his 
family he must call it going out on pleasure.’3 Cocks’ deep, almost obsessive, commitment to his 
soldierly identity was certainly exceptional. His declarations, however, touch on several features 
of junior officers’ relationships with their regiments and families. 
This chapter explores two broad themes. The first theme is that of junior officers’ relationship to 
their regiments. Junior officers could form collective identities centred on the regiment, the 
institutions which framed officers’ careers. A regiment’s officers was the primary social group 
an officer interacted with, with the regiment regularly alluded to as a ‘family’, while regimental 
conduct was the prism through which an officer’s honour and reputation were judged by the 
public.4 Camaraderie and the maintenance of regimental honour were essential to the formation 
of regimental identities: bonds of friendship ensured that an officer was happily situated in a 
regiment and an honourable reputation encouraged officers to enhance a regiment’s esteem and 
to reflect upon a regiment with a sense of pride. The absence of these values stymied regimental 
identities; however, their presence did not guarantee an inflexible regimental identity. Bonds 
formed through comradeship and honour could be re-built as officers transferred between 
regiments, while officers were also preoccupied with gaining promotion, a situation which 
encouraged fluid regimental identities.  
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The second theme of this chapter is junior officers’ family identities. Regimental identities 
existed alongside, rather than in direct opposition to, officers’ civilian identities. Particularly for 
young or married officers, military service meant being removed from family, separated either 
by barrack life or by overseas service. Tensions certainly arose from this separation and junior 
officers expressed regular anxiety at being forgotten by family members in Britain. Perhaps 
because of this fear of estrangement, junior officers were adept at maintaining their family 
relationships. Letters were a critical medium for maintaining familial bonds. They bridged the 
gap between combatant and non-combatant by acting as a physical reminder of the relationship 
between officers and their families, while also rendering the military experience relatable to a 
civilian audience.5 There were also families who contrived to unite the civilian and military 
worlds, as some officers took their wives and children on campaign, and brothers fought 
alongside each other. The maintenance of two ‘family’ identities, one military and the other civil, 
speaks to the flexibility of the Georgian officer’s character, striding the line between the army 
and civilian society.  
 
The Regimental Family 
Recent scholarship has revealed much about the relationship between armies and civilian 
societies during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. David Bell, for example, has 
argued that the Napoleonic Wars created the perception of distinct ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ 
spheres.6 An important dimension to this scholarship has been the study of combatants’ 
transition from ‘civilian’ to ‘soldier’. As emphasised by Yuval Noah Harari, combatants’ 
interpretations of military life fundamentally altered during the Romantic period.  Soldier-
memoirists began to focus on individual experiences of war, such as basic training and their 
baptism of fire, which were evaluated in terms of their impact on the individual.7 A central 
feature of these narratives was the transformation of civilians into ‘soldiers’, a process which 
could render individuals unrecognisable to their family.8 The experience of British soldiers 
during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, who were increasingly housed in 
barracks instead of being billeted on civilians, suggests that the gap between soldiers and 
civilians would become more pronounced during this period. Focusing on this physical 
separation of the army from society, Catriona Kennedy explored the problematic and conflicting 
entry of British officers and soldiers into the army as they adapted to leaving home, the isolation 
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of barrack life, comradeship, adjustment to the honour code of the officer corps, and being 
subjected to the authority of superior officers.9   
As the British army was organised along regimental, rather than general lines, the primary 
institution in which junior officers’ military experiences occurred was the regiment. The other 
officers in the regiment were often referred to as an officer’s ‘family’. In a letter to his mother, 
Keep summarised the relationship between the officers of the 28th Foot: ‘I have found brothers 
in the officers to whom I have become attached as such, and Colonel Ross’ treatment of us has 
acquired the appellation of a father.’10 As highlighted by Naomi Tadmor and Amanda Vickery, 
the eighteenth-century British family was a fluid construct defined by the boundaries of 
patriarchal authority. The dependents included within that circle of authority, such as children, 
servants, or co-resident relatives, were considered to be a part of the patriarch’s family.11 
Influenced by the cult of sensibility, late-eighteenth-century British family life also had an 
increased focus on close bonds between family members, marked by outward displays of 
affection.12 Both of these conceptions of the family had currency with junior officers. Describing 
their regiments as family spoke to junior officers’ conception of the hierarchical structure of the 
regiment, the domestic setting of the regiment as an officer’s ‘home’, where he slept, ate and 
socialised, and to the relationships contained therein, which were often described in terms of 
father and brotherhood. Often absent from their families, a junior officers’ regimental comrades 
became a network of support, compensating for the lack of direct contact with family. 
Comparing their regiments to a family allowed junior officers to conceive of the hierarchical 
organisation of the regiment, particularly the central, paternalistic authority of commanding 
officers. Although the British state gained more control of regiments during the eighteenth 
century, colonels retained personal responsibility for the financial management of regiments, 
the training of men and officers, the regimental uniform, and the maintenance of cohesion and 
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morale.13 The sense of ownership this control bestowed continued into the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. Patterson described the relationship between his colonel and the 50th Foot: 
‘the regiment was his home, the officers and soldiers were his family.’14As noted by John 
Cookson, interpreting regimental hierarchies as the imposition of rank obscures the nuanced 
relationships which comprised regimental authority.15 As shown in Chapter Three, junior 
officers were more comfortable with taking orders from superiors who treated them with a 
degree of gentlemanly respect. With regards to their regimental commanders junior officers 
expected a degree of paternal warmth and guidance, with respected commanders sometimes 
described as ‘fathers’. By the late-eighteenth century, fathers from polite backgrounds were 
expected to be emotionally engaged with their children and make conscientious displays of 
affection, while continuing in their traditional roles as disciplinarians and material providers.16 
It was these values which junior officers found endearing in commanders. Describing his colonel 
in a letter to his mother, Bridgeman focused on his colonel’s benevolence: ‘It is impossible for 
me to express the all the kindness I have received from Colonel Lambert … all the officers are 
very civil & kind, but Colonel Lambert is just what I should expect from my nearest relations.’17 
As highlighted by Kennedy, being subjected to the authority of superior officers could be an 
affront to junior officers’ sense of independence.18 When administered with respect and 
warmth, however, the imposition of authority was not an impediment to a relationship between 
commanding and junior officers. Despite being severely reproached for not powdering his hair 
before breakfast, Bowlby still respected his first colonel: ‘Of all the Commanding Officers I ever 
had … I admired him the most. He was a strict disciplinarian.’19 After breaching leave 
regulations, Keep wrote to his mother than he was thankful his colonel: ‘behaved in the kindest 
manner to me, gently reprimanding me for my conduct.’20  
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The familial explanation of the regiment also applied to horizontal relationships between junior 
officers. The relationships possible between ‘brother officers’ were broad: eighteenth-century 
terms of kinship could connote affection; however, their usage could also reflect the expectation 
of solidarity, support, and duty, without the suggestion of close friendship.21 Brotherhood as 
conceived by junior officers followed both of these strands, as they identified a sense of 
fraternity provided by belonging to the same regiment, while also using the language of 
sensibility to describe their friendships with one another.22 Fraternal values appear to have 
been largely contained within the regiment. While junior officers socialised beyond their 
regiments, the term ‘brother officer’ was, almost exclusively, applied to present or former 
regimental comrades. This suggests that a broad sense of military and national fraternity, such 
as that identified in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic French armies by Brian Joseph Martin, 
was not as advanced amongst British junior officers.23 Affiliation within a regimental structure 
could quickly form a sense of belonging. After less than two weeks with the 77th Foot, Keep 
wrote to his mother: ‘I have been making wonderful progress … in becoming acquainted not 
only with the routine of my duties, but with my brother officers, as I may now call them.’24 
Shared experiences of barrack and campaign life fostered close friendships which, in turn, 
created a sense of comradeship between a regiment’s junior officers.25 For young ensigns, the 
advice of experienced officers, especially captains, was welcomed. Keep described a young 
captain of his new regiment as: ‘a most excellent character to form a friendship with.’26 Having 
received some dress advice from a captain of the Coldstream, Blackman relayed his appreciation 
to his parents: ‘I consider Captain Lascelles as my friend, he has had some experience.’27  
Generally young, subalterns formed bonds through shared activities of youthful exuberance, 
including exercise, games, and rabble-rousing. Thomas Bunbury recalled his time as an ensign 
in the 3rd Foot, where practical jokes were so rife every officer had to keep his bedroom door 
locked.28 The main target of these jokes highlights the importance of youth to this culture: 
I was very mischievous; and an officer in the regiment was but too frequently the 
object of my pranks. He was a very studious character, had passed his examination 
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with credit at the Military College, and had been a long time in the regiment. As a 
matter of course, he was voted a great bore and a stupid fellow; and on these 
assumptions, we took delight in smoking the ‘old fox’ as he was termed.29 
Having briefly retired to half-pay after falling ill at Walcheren, Keep returned to service with the 
28th Foot. While garrisoned at Berry Head barracks, Keep took to swimming, cliff climbing, and 
other exercises with his fellow subalterns. In a letter to his brother, Keep highlighted how the 
shared danger of these activities brought the subalterns closer together as: ‘a family of officers 
united … by association in our daily amusements and pursuits, engaged in the same glorious 
cause, of the same Regiment and age, dining at one board, and partaking equally in all the 
vicissitudes incidental to such a precarious life.’30  
Shared campaign experiences reinforced comradeship. The dangers and hardships of battle and 
campaign could, quite literally, bring officers together. Recalling the failed 1814 attack on 
Bergen-Op-Zoom, Lieutenant John Dunbar-Moodie of the 21st Foot described how their 
situation, sheltering from cannon fire behind a pile of logs, and wet through, forced officers to 
huddle together: ‘During one of these intervals of stillness, exhausted with our exertions, and 
the cold we felt in our drenched clothes, some of the officers and I lay down along the parapet 
together, in hopes of borrowing a little heat from each other.’31 The willingness to endure 
hardships together was interpreted as a sign of solidarity with one’s comrades. Having just 
returned to his regiment from a stint on staff duty, Cocks wrote to his uncle:  
Regimental service is, in my opinion, always preferable to staff employments. 
Recollect that a staff man shirks all hardship, and while his comrades are snoring in 
their cloaks under the canopy of the sky or perhaps on picquet, not daring to sleep 
for twenty-four or forty-eight hours together, my friend on the staff is undressed 
and lying snug between sheets.32 
Hardships shared in common required mutual support, which reflected devotion to one another 
and cemented friendships. As shown by Kennedy, junior officers expended considerable effort 
in domesticising their barracks to better reflect their ideals of comfort, while shared domestic 
pleasures helped to build bonds between officers.33 The ritual of dining together on campaign 
highlights the importance of shared domestic pleasures to forming and maintaining friendships 
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between officers. Regimental messes were often impractical on campaign; yet junior officers 
still insisted on dining together in small groups, usually centred on a company. The necessity of 
pooling meagre resources forced officers in these groups to rely upon each other for material 
support during testing periods. At the 1809 siege of Flushing, Lieutenant John Garbutt of the 
84th Foot and the other officers of his company combined and shared their alcohol and food, 
which they were obliged to: ‘either buy or steal as we can’.34 Embarking with the 27th Foot for 
the Peninsula, Lieutenant Charles Crowe agreed to mess for the duration with a comrade, 
Radcliffe, who knew Spanish, was a renowned scrounger, and had been excluded from his 
company’s mess. In return, Crowe supplied utensils, as Radcliffe had none. The outcome of this 
arrangement was a: ‘warm friendship between Radcliffe and me, which remained unbroken 
until the regiment was disbanded.’35 Describing a period of debilitating sickness in the 
Peninsula, Lieutenant Moyle Sherer of the 34th Foot employed the language of sensibility to 
express the type of care he received from his comrades, who offered consolation by: 
‘affectionate pressures of the hand’ and by speaking ‘in the manly yet feeling language of 
encouragement.’36 As highlighted by Sarah Knott, the language of sensibility had provided 
American officers with terms to describe the ‘brotherly friendship’ of the American officer corps 
during the American War of Independence, and to the fraternal unity of the officer corps.37 
Sherer’s use of similar language to describe homo-social bonds in the British officer corps 
further highlights how reciprocal care underpinned the brotherhood of the British officer corps.  
The death or departure of comrades provoked poignant reflections on regimental friendships. 
Returning to Portugal in mid-1812 after eighteen months’ leave, Lieutenant John Aitchison of 
the 3rd Foot Guards came across his regiment in a village where they had been quartered during 
1809, only to find the town’s picturesque houses and trees destroyed, and his regiment much 
changed. Aitchison recorded in his diary: 
I became melancholy … enough to draw a tear of sympathy – in bringing to my 
remembrance some amiable men, and the many happy days I had spent with them. 
Such friendship is lasting, and trifles often bring to recollection incidents which at 
the time passed unnoticed – these often occur now … my old friends are almost all 
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gone, so much changed are the officers, that only one other and myself are now 
here.38 
Descriptions of the death of comrades often reflected on the character and quality of the 
deceased person.39 Lieutenant William Tomkinson of the 16th Dragoons recorded his grief at 
hearing of the death of Edward Charles Cocks, who had been in the 16th with Tomkinson for 
nearly five years: ‘in those regiments in which he has been not a man can lament a brother more 
than they do him … From my first joining the 16th … We always lived together, and had I left it to 
him, I should not have paid one-third of my share.’40 Dead comrades could be memorialised in 
group or personal actions, highlighting the commitment implied by comradeship. Blakeney’s 
description of the officers of the 28th Foot drinking together the night before a battle and 
offering anecdotes at which ‘many an eye swam at the recollection of scenes and friends gone 
for ever’ have few parallels, with acts of individual remembrance more commonly recorded: 
Tomkinson distributed Cocks’ personal effects among his friends as mementos, while Browne 
collected a piece of a decapitated comrade’s hair, with the intention of sending it to the deceased 
officer’s friends as a ‘sad, but very precious relic.’41 
Relationships between junior officers were not without their tensions. Hierarchies existed 
between officers of the same rank, and could be calculated to the day using the Army List. The 
imposition or subversion of this hierarchy could produce conflict. Just as in the Georgian 
household, being higher in the regimental pecking order came with entitlements which signified 
status and control.42 As his regiment, the 4th Foot, arrived in Gibraltar, Lieutenant Peter Bowlby 
found himself in a comfortable bunk, however his comfort did not last long: ‘the next day I was 
told by a Captain of the Regiment that he would take possession of it and I must turn out. 
Captain Hill was my friend, but he said if he did not take it some other would.’43 Differences in 
rank did not have to be wide for officers to claim superiority. Lieutenant John Malcolm of the 
42nd Foot recalled an incident on board his transport ship to the Peninsula, where a young 
officer claimed a sleeping spot:  
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A brother of the profession came up and asked him the date of his commission. 
Upon being informed of which, he laid claim to the berth, as being the senior. The 
army list was referred to, and he was found entitled to precedence, - his commission 
bearing date one day previous to that of the other.44  
As eighty three per cent of promotions went by regimental seniority, status within the 
regimental hierarchy was reflective of their prospects for promotion, and promotions which 
circumvented this hierarchy could sting the senior party’s honour.45 Frustrated in his attempts 
at gaining a captaincy, Lieutenant Charles Kinloch of the 52nd Foot expressed his ambivalence to 
his sister at a junior lieutenant being promoted into another regiment: ‘Tom Ramsay had left the 
52nd, he is now a captain in the 47th and although I rejoice at his promotion, it is nevertheless a 
matter of great regret to me … he was several steps junior to me in this regiment.’46 Lieutenant 
George Bowles of the Coldstream Guards wrote to a friend on the eve of Waterloo: ‘I have just 
had the mortification of being superseded in the command of the light infantry company by 
Lieutenant Colonel [Wyndham], who is about two years junior to myself in the Guards and 
army, and has served abroad about as many months as I have years.’47 Similarly, Crowe 
recorded how his promotion from ensign in the 48th Foot, to lieutenant in the 27th Foot angered 
his new subordinates: ‘On parade … most of the lieutenants, and Ensigns Byrne and Radcliffe 
came forward in a body and welcomed me to the regiment, but the other ensigns kept aloof, 
being jealous of my having been put over their heads.’48 Bonds between officers of the same 
regiment, therefore, were conceived of as a filial. These filial connections spoke to the acts of 
comradeship, care, and friendship junior officers expected from each other and their superiors. 
Often shorn of physical contact with their families, bonds formed within regiments could act as 
a substitute for these absent connections, particularly with regards to the paternalism of 
fathers, and the fraternity of brothers.  
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Honour, Glory, and the Regiment 
As well as providing the framework for their lives, regiments also mediated junior officers’ 
sense of honour. As revealed by Kennedy, individual officers’ sense of honour and aspirations 
for glory were inherently connected to their regiment’s conduct, as the reputation of a regiment 
was the primary lens through which the honour of officers was communicated to the wider 
army and the British public.49 Any incident which could bring a regiment’s reputation for quality 
or discipline into question was felt by the regiment’s officers. Keep conveyed to his mother his 
sense of shame at his regiment having to repeat a march during the 1809 Walcheren expedition: 
‘Conceive how ridiculous we appeared! Luckily other regiments had as much to mourn, or we 
should never have recovered from the effects of it.’50 Regiments did not have to be directly 
implicated for the fear of dishonour to creep in. Aitchison noted to his father how Wellington’s 
wide-ranging criticism of the army following the chaotic 1812 retreat from Burgos left officers 
evading accusations of disorder: ‘When censure is general, no one will take it to himself, and it 
would have been better therefore of his lordship to have marked those regiments in which 
“outrages and irregularity of every description were committed” than to have stigmatised the 
whole.’51 The actions of an individual also reflected on the entire regiment, making officers wary 
of dishonour by association. Sitting on a court martial for a fellow ensign of the Coldstream 
Guards, John Rous lamented to his mother the impact the court martial could have on the 
Coldstream’s impeccable disciplinary reputation:  
I am only sorry that he exchanged into the Coldstream before the Court Martial was 
over, since in the four years the Guards have been in the Peninsula there has been 
no instance of any officer or soldier having been brought to a General Court Martial, 
and although everybody that chooses may know that he was not in the Guards at 
the time … many of the line will not know it through envy.52 
An illuminating case study of the relationship between regimental and individual honour is that 
of the 18th Hussars during 1813. During the Battle of Vitoria, officers and men of the 18th 
stopped to plunder French baggage rather than pursue the French. This act incensed 
Wellington, who described the 18th in dispatches after the battle as: ‘a disgrace to the name of 
soldier, in action as well as elsewhere.’53 Upon having Wellington’s disapprobation and threat to 
                                                          
49 Kennedy, Narratives, pp. 83-4. 
50 Ensign William Thornton Keep, 18 Sep. 1809, in Keep, In the Service of the King, p. 63.  
51 Lieutenant John Aitchison, 1 Feb. 1813, in Aitchison, An Ensign in the Peninsular War, p. 227. 
52 Ensign John Rous, 11 Apr. 1813, in John Rous, A Guards Officer in the Peninsula: The Peninsula War Letters of 
John Rous, Coldstream Guards, 1812-1814, ed. Ian Fletcher (Tunbridge Wells, 1992), pp. 52-3. 
53Duke of Wellington, 29 Jun. 1813, in Duke of Wellington, The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of 
Wellington, ed. John Gurwood (hereafter, WD), Vol. VI (Cambridge, 2010), p. 559.  
115 
 
dismount the regiment and return them to Britain conveyed to the officers, Lieutenant George 
Woodberry felt dishonoured by his association with the regiment: ‘O God is it come to this! I 
want language to explore the grief I feel on the occasion, to think I should have come out with a 
Regiment, who have contrary to all expectations acted so differently.’54 Woodberry’s account 
also reveals how their regiment’s reputation was how officers’ honour was communicated to 
the British nation. Woodberry appeared resolved to resign his commission upon Wellington’s 
instruction that promotion would be stopped within the regiment, until he received word that 
the news of the 18th’s shame had been reported in Britain. Woodberry recorded in his diary that 
he was: ‘not at all anxious about going home now I find the regiment has so bad a character in 
England.’55  
A similarly symbiotic relationship existed between the regiment and junior officers’ aspirations 
of glory. As highlighted by Michael Hughes in his study of military culture in Napoleon’s army, 
the concepts of honour and glory were related but distinct concepts. Honour and glory were 
both reflective of an individual’s reputation; however, while honour was maintained as long as 
an individual did not dishonour himself and could be preserved through steady service, glory 
was the renown associated with ‘exceptional achievements’.56 While British officers often used 
‘honour’ as a synonym for ‘glory’, the distinction Hughes drew between the two holds true for 
the British army. Until the institution of the first universally awarded British battle 
commendation, the Waterloo Medal, it was uncommon for British rankers or junior officers to 
have their individual achievements acknowledged. This lack of personal recognition saw junior 
officers’ sense of glory and esteem articulated through regimental achievements.57 Generally 
dissatisfied with army life in 1811, Aitchison still recorded in his diary: ‘I glory in having acted 
in deeds which have immortalised my regiment.’58 George Bell of the 34th Foot recalled his 
delight as a young ensign reading newspapers which reported his regiment’s conduct at the 
1811 Battle of Arroyo dos Molinos: ‘wasn’t I proud to see Sir Rowland Hill’s despatch in print, 
with the few words, which never escaped my memory, viz., “where the 28th and 34th Regiments 
eminently distinguished themselves”?’59 These sentiments were especially strong in regiments 
with dashing reputations. Simmons of the 95th Rifles, a regiment renowned for its daring 
battlefield exploits wrote to his father: ‘You make me blush at the idea or observation in the 
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letter, “a dangerous regiment.” My dear father, the more danger the more honour … When I 
turned soldier it was not for the purpose of admiring myself like a peacock in gaudy plumage; 
no, it was to meet the enemies of my country and go wherever my duty called me, and merit the 
name of a soldier.’60 
The relationship between regimental and individual notions of honour and glory encouraged 
officers to invest in maintaining their regiment’s honour by demanding attention to duty, even if 
they were only temporary members. Having purchased a captaincy in the 60th Foot and awaiting 
a transfer back into the 16th Dragoons, Tomkinson still attempted to capture a deserter as: ‘the 
only service ever attempted for the credit of my regiment.’61 Tomkinson’s transitory status with 
the 60th Foot likely limited his attachment to the regiment; however, his desire to maintain the 
regiment’s honour alongside his own speaks to a rudimentary bond, particularly in light of 
Tomkinson’s use of the possessive term ‘my’ to describe his relationship with the 60th. The 
desire to maintain, reclaim or enhance a regiment’s reputation could stimulate officers to acts of 
bravery. As the prospect of battle loomed again for the 18th Hussars during late 1813, 
Woodberry hoped for redemption: ‘I trust the 18th will recover all Her former glory and add 
new lustre to it. I am determined if I get near them again I will fight like an Hero and will sell my 
life dearly if not supported. Anything I will do to regain our former character.’62  
Junior officers were also responsible for the physical embodiment of their regiment’s honour: 
the regimental colours. Regimental colours were large silk flags, the same colour as the facings 
on the regimental uniform, fixed onto poles, and were used as a rallying point for regiments 
during battle.63 Battle honours were inscribed on the regimental colours, making them a potent 
symbol of the regiment’s history, traditions, and achievements.64 The most junior ensigns in a 
regiment were charged with carrying the colours into battle or on important occasions, creating 
a connection between the carrier and the regiment’s honour. Carrying the 23rd Foot’s colours as 
the British landed at Copenhagen thrilled Browne, noting: ‘when we planted them on the Danish 
shore, we had by no means an indifferent opinion of ourselves.’65 Losing the colours to enemy 
capture during battle was considered a disgrace, occasionally spurring officers to great lengths 
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to protect them.66 Writing to his father, Keep described his frenzied protection of the 28th Foot’s 
colours when they came under French threat during the 1813 Battle of Maya: ‘A violent zeal 
seized me to preserve the Colours, not caring for my life, and I turned immediately and pitched 
myself head long down the ravine, grasping most tightly the staff. Through bushes and briars I 
rolled, and scrambled, heavy shots after me. The exertion was such as under other 
circumstances would have been impossible.’67  
Varying reputations reinforced regimental distinctions, providing a point of pride for officers. 
Tomkinson reflected in his diary that other officers took an interest in the achievements of 
other regiments, not out of a congratulatory spirit: ‘but too often with an intention of finding 
some error to detract from the credit of the affair.’68 Being able to maintain a sense of pride in a 
regiment’s character and achievements, therefore, was essential to the formation of an 
attachment between officer and regiment. Observing the breakdown of the Hussar Brigade, 
including the 18th Hussars, during 1813, Lieutenant William Bragge of the 3rd Dragoons noted to 
his father: ‘They are very conceited and extremely jealous of our Brigade which has been 
working with them and is at present Twice as effective.’69 In contrast, being unable to take pride 
in a regiment could damage the connection between an officer and their regiment. Woodberry 
recorded in his journal how the collective dishonour experienced by the 18th Hussars fractured 
officers’ relationships with the regiment, to the point that he and several others were 
considering leaving the regiment: ‘now half the officers are implicated, so I was informed last 
night, in an unfortunate affair respecting the plunder … The whole may not suffer, but I think it 
likely the whole will leave. … The Regiment, it is plain to see is gone to the devil. God send I was 
out of it.’70 A bad reputation could deter officers from joining a regiment: having purchased a 
captaincy in the 99th Foot, Kinloch expressed his reluctance to join his new regiment to his 
mother as the 99th was: ‘in every respect by no means a desirable regiment to remain in, two 
officers have been tried by court martial within these twelve month.’71 The regiment was the 
primary institution from which junior officers could extract honour, a central component of 
their military identities. Being situated in a regiment which did not satisfy this need could, 
ultimately, undermine an officer’s sense of belonging in, and attachment to their regiment.  
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Regimental Identities 
Fraternal bonds and an honourable reputation were essential in binding junior officers to their 
regiments. There is also evidence to suggest that junior officers identified with regiments as 
abstract institutions with a culture and legacy that transcended the individuals who made up 
the regiment. All British regiments had distinguishing features: uniforms, badges, and colours, 
which varied markedly between regiments.72 The creation of regimental cultures and identities 
had begun formally during the eighteenth century, as battle honours were instituted from 1762 
and regiments adopted regional place names during the 1780s.73 As argued by Kevin Linch, 
however, the practice of demobilising the army following a conflict ensured that unless a 
zealous colonel chose to invest in and celebrate a regiment’s history, regimental cultures built 
up during times of war dissipated upon its conclusion.74 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars saw regimental identities become firmly embedded, as regiments developed organic 
identities based around distinguishing characteristics, regimental achievements and history, 
national characteristics, and music.75 New nicknames for regiments proliferated during this 
period, highlighting the capacity of conflict to create and cement regimental traditions.76 
Nicknames were formulated after an extraordinary regimental feat, a distinguishing 
characteristic, or act of infamy: the 11th Foot acquired the name ‘The Bloody Eleventh’ after 
heavy casualties at the 1812 Battle of Salamanca, the 95th Rifles were variously dubbed the 
‘Sweeps’ or ‘Grasshoppers’ after their unique green jackets, and the 58th Foot were christened 
the ‘Steelbacks’ after a number of the regiment’s men were flogged for stealing beehives in the 
Peninsula.77 While some regiments with striking characteristics had more distinguishable 
identities than more generic regiments, official steps were taken to celebrate the culture and 
history of every regiment. During the latter stages of the Peninsular War, the Horse Guards 
began to collect information around which regimental identities could form. This was reflective 
of the evolution of the idea of the regiment from an organisational concept to a transcendent 
institution, a trend which was built upon and expanded during the nineteenth century.78 
Cookson has argued that British regimental identities were stronger amongst rankers than 
officers, with eighty per cent of private soldiers serving with a single regiment, fostering a 
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strong bond between rankers and their regiment.79 Pre-1815, eighty per cent of the officers in 
this study had spent their entire career with one regiment, barring brief exchanges into other 
regiments to gain promotion. With a similarly static career pattern as the rank and file, the 
officers in this study could be expected to exhibit fierce regimental identities. Junior officers’ 
post-war memoirs reflect a desire to commemorate not just their own service, but their 
regiment’s achievements of the near past, suggesting that regiments emerged from the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with distinct identities. It is in memoirs where regimental 
nicknames were most commonly referred to: Captain John Patterson took delight in being a part 
of the 50th Foot, or ‘Dirty Half-Hundred’, so named because of their regimental number, and the 
black facings to their uniform; while Bell commemorated the ‘select and high-caste officers’ who 
were part of the 34th Foot or ‘Cumberland Gentlemen.’80 Post-war memoirs, particularly those 
written from the 1830s onwards, were written at a period when celebrating regimental culture 
was becoming more commonplace, with the publication of regimental histories.81 Officer-
memoirists could be conscious of their role in forming regimental identities. Patterson wrote his 
1837 memoir as a memorial to the 50th Foot: ‘Among the various military narratives, written to 
edify the world, nothing has yet transpired regarding the old Fiftieth … the high esteem in which 
I hold the companions of many a hard fought day prompts me to offer this feeble record of their 
services.’82  
Contemporary sources also suggest that junior officers were receptive to regimental culture and 
identities, particularly in regiments in with unique characteristics. The 95th Rifles were one of 
the most celebrated and recognisable regiments of the Napoleonic wars, not least for their green 
jackets, which was at once an attraction for prospective officers, and a source of pride for 
members of the 95th. Recalling his reasons for transferring from the 70th Foot to the 95th, Leach 
referred to seeing the 95th in training at Shorncliffe Barracks, where he: ‘took a particular fancy 
to it, and ever afterwards wished most ardently to wear a green jacket.’83 In a letter to his 
parents from the Peninsula, Simmons took particular delight in describing the capacity of the 
95th to strike fear into the French: ‘Some deserters that came from the enemy stated that the 
French did not like those green fellows at all; we made sad havoc amongst them.’84 The officers 
of the 23rd Foot appear to have had a remarkable investment in their regimental culture. 
Nominally a ‘fusilier’ regiment, the 23rd’s officers took pride in the distinctive hairstyle, a small 
plait attached to the top of the head with a comb, which this designation allowed them to sport. 
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Lieutenant Thomas Henry Browne recorded the revulsion that the 1808 general orders 
standardising army hairstyles caused: ‘the order was obeyed in sulky silence by the Officers, and 
particularly by those, who had been distinguished, by a luxuriant plait.’85 Having agreed to 
ceremonially remove each other’s plaits with a carving knife in the mess, some officers then 
decided to burn their plaits, others preferring to retain them as mementos.86 
As highlighted by Cookson, regiments with a distinct national character fostered the strongest 
regimental identities.87 The most celebrated and distinctive national regiments were the 
Highland regiments; however, other regiments were also distinguished by their national 
character. Browne, an English officer of the 23rd Foot, or Welsh Fusiliers, described the 
ceremony performed by the regiment’s officers on Saint David’s Day, where a drummer-boy 
rode a goat around the mess room, selling leeks to the officers, who were then required to eat 
the leek in its entirety.88 The size of the leek was proportional to how much service an officer 
had seen with the regiment: experienced officers received small leeks, while new officers: ‘have 
presented to them the largest Leek that can be procured, and unless sickness prevent it, no 
respite is given, until the last tip of the its green leaf if inclosed in the unwilling mouth; and day 
after day passes before the smell and taste is fairly got rid of.’89 Crowe, then a new English 
officer serving with a distinctively Irish regiment, the 27th, or ‘Inniskilling’ foot regiment, faced 
an initiation ceremony on Saint Patrick’s Day where he was ‘christened an Irishman.’90 Crowe 
recorded the ceremony, performed by the regimental surgeon, in his diary: ‘He immersed a 
large shamrock with its roots and the earth attached, in a plated goblet containing more than 
the third of a bottle of wine, and ordered me to kneel. He then dipped his finger in the wine, 
made a cross on my forehead, and profanely naming the Trinity, christened me.’91 
For Browne and Crowe, the expressions of Welsh or Irish national identity within their 
regiments contributed to their regimental attachment. Despite being English officers in non-
English regiments, the national cultures of their regiments provided a point of differentiation 
from other regiments, and a tangible regimental culture to affix their affections to. The 
somewhat off-putting regimental ceremonies they partook in were seen as key steps of 
initiation. Despite being chastened by the blasphemous overtones of his ‘christening’, Crowe still 
recognised it as an ‘ordeal’ he had to pass before becoming ‘established’ as a member of the 
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27th.92 Similarly, Browne saw the leek ceremony as pivotal to breaking in new officers, noting 
the ceremony: ‘may be a nasty way of making a Welsh Fusilier – and so it is.’93 There is little to 
suggest that junior officers shared in the same regimental culture as the rank and file, indeed 
officers’ appropriation of regimental customs appears to have served to reinforce the distinction 
between officers and rankers. The initiation rituals described by Browne and Crowe took place 
within the closed society of the officers’ mess, while Browne stressed that hair worn by the 
23rd’s officers was different to that of rankers.  
There were, however, limits to junior officers’ regimental identities. While certainly still 
present, junior officers’ regimental identities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
were more fluid than the image presented in post-war memoirs. Regimental cultures were 
celebrated by officers; however, fraternal bonds and honour could be reconstructed as officers 
moved between regiments. Having transferred from the 77th Foot to the 28th Foot, Keep wrote to 
his brother: ‘I fear I would make a poor soldier, were it not for the companionship in peril of 
those I am attached to … I should be fixed in any Regiment, as soon as my affections are fixed in 
it.’94 Initially experiencing difficulty in ingratiating himself with his new comrades in the 27th 
Foot owing to his reputation as a problematic member of his previous regiment, Crowe worked 
hard to retrieve his character with his new comrades and, after passing through his regimental 
initiation, stated in his diary: ‘After all these trials I considered myself fully established.’95  The 
expectation that officers would be invested in their regiment’s honour ensured that 
rudimentary bonds could be formed with almost any regiment. As highlighted by Kennedy, 
British officers had an overriding concern for personal reputation, which diluted their 
investment in national or regimental honour.96 That an officer would ensure that a regiment 
maintained its honour, therefore, was as much about individual as regimental honour. Captain 
Jonathan Leach, an officer who readily transferred from the unfashionable 70th Foot to the 95th 
Rifles early in his career, stressed his commitment to the 70th’s honour if nothing else: ‘No man 
is worthy to wear the uniform of his corps, be that corps what it may, who is not as tenacious of 
its good name as of his own individual character, and as ready to stand forward in its defence.’97  
Junior officers’ attachment to their regiment was tempered by the limitations of the regimental 
framework for conveying status upon junior officers. Should a regiment not face combat, junior 
officers faced little prospect of attaining recognition. Lieutenant George James Sullivan of the 1st 
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Life Guards had his expectations of glory dashed, as his regiment never faced the French during 
his time in the Peninsula: ‘Every individual seemed inspired to pluck a laurel for his rising 
country, but in this hope the Brigade were disappointed, as they never had the good fortune to 
be sent into action during the Peninsular War.’98 Junior officers in the Peninsula could also be 
critical of Wellington’s dispatches, which they felt understated their achievements. Lieutenant 
John Mills of the Coldstream Guards wrote to his sister to criticise Wellington’s dispatch from 
the Battle of Salamanca: ‘We are much disappointed at Lord Wellington’s dispatch, he has made 
as little of it as possible and a story well told is you know half the battle. His Lordship may fight 
but hang me if he can write.’99 As noted in Chapter Three, junior officers’ relatively low rank 
could result in a sense of obscurity, as they saw praise as primarily bestowed on regimental 
commanders. As they were reliant on promotion to achieve recognition, junior officers’ had a 
preoccupation with personal advancement that saw some junior officers prioritise their 
promotion over their regimental identities. Garrisoned at Halifax in North America during 1808, 
Browne thought this sedentary service curtailed his prospects of promotion: 
My time was passing thus happily, and yet I could but palpably perceive, that I was 
making no progress in my profession, there was no promotion whatever in the 
Regiment … I had a pining for that sort of service, which would bring advancement 
with it … and I seriously thought of exchanging into some other Regiment.100 
Despite staying with his regiment for a time, Browne would later seek a staff appointment 
outside his regiment, citing the increased opportunities for: ‘observation and promotion, 
Officers of the Staff had over those who remained with their Regiments.’101  
The potential for promotion drew officers into less glamorous services. Having accepted a 
captaincy with the Portuguese army in 1809, Lieutenant James Girdlestone of the 31st Foot 
stressed the material advantages of this appointment to his friends:  
I am now going to give you some news which I am sure will astonish you all: I 
expect I shall be but a few days longer in the 31st Regt … To remain in the Regiment 
I could not expect a Compy. in less than four years according to the general 
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promotion in the Army, and this gives me the rank of Captain in our service 
immediately.102  
Being promoted outside a regiment does not necessarily indicate a lack of affinity with the soon 
to be departed regiment, as officers lamented leaving their comrades. Girdlestone elaborated: ‘If 
I get this, I of course leave the 31st Regt. which I assure you I do with regret, but must not mind 
that, the only way in the Army is to get on when you can, an opportunity once lost may never 
occur again.’103 Promoted into the Inniskillings from the 48th Foot, Crowe similarly lamented the 
loss of friends, toasting his fellow officers in the 48th’s mess as: ‘some kind friends with whom I 
could live and die.’104 Further, instead of receiving condemnation from their soon to be former 
comrades for leaving the regiment, Girdlestone and Crowe instead received congratulations, 
hinting at a wider acceptance of the prioritisation of promotion over the collective identity of 
the regiment. Regimental identities amongst junior officers were, therefore, malleable. Based on 
the values of comradeship and honour, which could be reconstituted between regiments, 
regimental identities could be reconstructed as officers moved between regiments in the 
pursuit of their ultimate aim, promotion.  
 
Family Ties 
Given that soldiers were largely separated from their families, it is possible that regimental 
bonds could supplant family identities, particularly with regards to the emotional support 
offered by comrades acting as a substitute for the emotional support provided by family 
members. Junior officers, however, retained a strong sense of themselves beyond their 
regiments and continued to exercise their relationships with their families. Kennedy stressed 
the multiplicity of the junior officer’s character, whose individualism and status as an ‘officer 
and a gentleman’ helped maintain civilian identities.105  Despite their integration into the 
‘regimental ‘family’, junior officers were adept at maintaining links with their families in Britain. 
Military service entailed separation from families and friends for the majority of officers; 
however, junior officers and their families used frequent correspondence to exercise their roles 
as family members and involve each other in family life. In his classic account of English early-
modern family life, Lawrence Stone argued that the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
saw the development of the ‘nuclear family’, which was characterised by close bonds between 
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near family members.106 Stone’s argument has been revised by Naomi Tadmor, who highlighted 
how Georgian conceptions of the ‘family’ remained broad; however, the warm family bonds 
Stone identified were a feature of polite Georgian family life.107 It was this family life that junior 
officers aimed to keep alive through letters. Throughout their military service, junior officers 
turned to their family members for support and comfort through letters, a practice which 
highlights some of the tensions in family identities that military service entailed, but also how 
potential fissures were resolved. This section explores this juncture in junior officers’ identities 
through letters sent between junior officers and their families, and highlights how the reciprocal 
practice of writing helped officers and their families maintain close bonds.   
For the majority of junior officers, military service necessitated separation from their families: 
parents, siblings, wives, and friends were left behind as officers entered into barracks or joined 
their regiments on overseas service. For the upper and middle classes from which the majority 
of junior officers were drawn, family life was shaped by the cultures of politeness and 
sensibility, which stressed closer familial bonds, but maintained patriarchal authority of the 
household.108 With an average age of eighteen years at the time of their first commission, for the 
majority of officers in this study, joining a regiment or departing for service abroad entailed 
leaving the family home. This juncture was already recognised in landed and elite families as a 
critical stage in developing an adult identity, which was negotiated by parents through advice in 
letters.109 The removal from family could be jarring. As a new ensign with the 4th Foot, Peter 
Bowlby was unceremoniously abandoned by his father after two days with his new comrades, 
arriving at the local inn to find his: ‘father had left early without having given me any notice of 
his intention.’110 A more common experience was a sense of angst at losing the moral support of 
the family, particularly that of mothers. Departing for the Peninsula in 1812, Bridgeman wrote 
to his mother: ‘Adieu, best of mothers, I live in hope that we shall meet before we sail as much as 
I do wish to see service, I cannot look forward to the thoughts of parting from all I love without 
grief.’111 Although a less frequent experience for junior officers, becoming separated from wives 
produced similar sentiments. Entering into barracks in Ireland, Second Captain William 
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Granville Eliot of the Royal Artillery lamented their separation in a letter to his wife in England: 
‘with … pleasure I shall look back on those few short hours we spent in each other’s arms & shall 
look forward, with anxiety & pleasure, to the renewal of them.’112 The language used by officers 
to describe their emotions at being separated from family was styled to remind of the bonds 
that remained between individuals, despite separation. By employing emotive language and 
focusing on their ‘grief’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘pleasure’, officers were able to describe this experience in 
terms which reminded the recipient of the officer’s devotion and affection.113 
Entering the military was recognised as a potential source of estrangement from family life. 
Lieutenant John Harrison of the 23rd Foot noted to his mother that fear of dishonour forced a 
comrade to reconsider visiting his family on leave: ‘He would have wished to have gone home in 
consequence of the death of his brother, but does not deem it consistent with his honour. You 
see when a man goes for a soldier, he sacrifices many things.’114 By refusing to countenance 
leaving his regiment bound for the West Indies, a region renowned for its high death rate from 
disease, Lieutenant Edward Teasdale of the 54th Foot appears to have brought himself into 
conflict with his brother. Teasdale expressed his concern to his mother:  
Now that I am talking of respecting one’s relatives, it puts me in mind of a notion I 
sometimes have, that my Brother … is not exactly pleased with the way I am going 
on. However as my own judgement does not condemn me, it cannot be helped … I 
am really desirous of being in the good graces of my relations, though I may not 
always have gone the right way to work.115 
Letters sent between junior officers and their families were simultaneously the means by which 
junior officers maintained family relationships and a sign of the difficulties inherent in those 
relationships. Letter writing was already an established means of maintaining bonds of kinship, 
however, the importance of letters was amplified for officers on overseas service.116 As 
suggested by Kennedy, officers’ style of correspondence formed a ‘bridge of identity’.117 Sending 
and receiving letters contributed to the maintenance of civilian identities in other ways. 
Receiving a letter confirmed the presence of the recipient in the thoughts of the sender; assured 
the well-being of the sender; and allowed officers to participate in family life from afar. In his 
study of the role families played in the ‘emotional survival’ of British soldiers during the First 
World War, Michael Roper emphasised the reciprocal act of sending and receiving letters as a 
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tangible demonstration of the relationship between combatants and civilians, and highlighted 
the ‘evocative’ and ‘vivid’ sign of affection which letters conveyed.118 In this respect, junior 
officers were energetic in their attempts to maintain bonds with their families: officers 
corresponded with a wide range of family, friends, and patrons. Officers established regular 
patterns of writing: while in the Peninsula, Lieutenant George Harvey Percival of the Coldstream 
Guards had an arrangement with his aunt whereby they would ‘write once a week if it was only 
one line.’119 The routine of letter writing can make communication appear as a duty officers felt 
they had to discharge; however, the intermittency of contact via letters ensured that each letter 
was an important symbol of the well-being of, and ongoing relationship between, families.  
Letters from home were received as a sign of the ongoing bonds between soldier and civilian, 
and brought relief to officers undergoing hardship. Jennine Hurl-Eamon has revealed the 
‘emotional succour’ which letters between soldiers and their wives provided during the 
eighteenth-century.120 Junior officers’ letters suggest that this was true of other family 
relationships. On the march in the Peninsula, First Lieutenant Rice Jones of the Royal Engineers 
described letters from his father as: ‘the only comfort I can enjoy in this country.’121 During the 
interminable 1810 to 1812 Siege of Cadiz, Bridgeman begged his mother to write every 
fortnight, stating: ‘if you knew the real, the very, very great pleasure I have in hearing from any 
of you, you would not, I’m sure, grudge the time it takes you to write. Now you well know the 
pleasure there is in receiving a letter in England, but here the pleasure is double, treble, in short 
the greatest pleasure I have.’122 In contrast, not receiving letters was considered a 
disappointment. Captain William Bragge of the 3rd Dragoons wryly noted to his father: ‘I have 
only received two shabby Postscripts from Lucy. I have not heard from Jack this Twelvemonth 
and I am not certain that either Charlotte or Champ can write, never having seen a Letter from 
either.’123 Not receiving a letter could be perceived as a sign of indifference. Serving in Jamaica, 
Teasdale rebuked his mother:  
This letter is the fourth I have written to you without having received any from you 
in return. It is almost impossible they can have not arrived; and if yours had only 
been directed to Jamaica I should undoubtedly have received them … I am 
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extremely anxious to hear from my family, it is almost eighteen months since I have 
had a letter from you.124 
Officers’ letters also suggest that their family expected letters regularly. In a letter to his father 
from the Peninsula, Aitchison outlined his ‘sincere regret at receiving so very few letters from 
home. You have experienced disappointment at not receiving a letter from me – judge my 
feelings by your own.’125 
Letters were physical evidence of the sender’s well-being, and a sign of interest in the person 
enquired after. Having not received a letter from his father for several months, First Lieutenant 
Rice Jones of the Royal Engineers feared for his father’s welfare: ‘I assure you I begin to feel 
quite uneasy, fearing that something or other has happened to prevent you writing.’126 Late in 
writing home for Christmas in 1811, Ensign William Thornton Keep of the 28th Foot hoped that 
he had not caused anxiety in his family, writing to his mother: ‘ere you partook of your 
Christmas Dinner … news of my good health, I know, would have gone some way to increase 
your felicity.’127 The dangers of sickness, wounding, and death all encouraged officers to write 
home with news of their safety more frequently. In the wake of battle, officers were quick to fire 
off a letter reporting their survival. Following the 1813 Battle of Vitoria, Keep wrote to his 
mother: ‘I have only a few minutes to write a few lines to you, to assure you of my safety, after 
our engagement of yesterday … I am now amongst my companions who have been lucky to 
escape uninjured, with a pannier for my writing desk, whilst they too are busy in gratifying their 
friends at home.’128 Should an officer be wounded, they were especially keen to assuage any 
fears their family had, especially as lists of wounded were published before the officer could 
write home. Wounded during the 1812 storming of Badajoz, Lieutenant Charles Kinloch of the 
52nd Foot downplayed his wound  to his mother: ‘this is the first opportunity I have had of 
writing & as you will most likely behold my name is amongst the list of wounded, it is just as well 
I should tell you what sort of clink it is.’129 
Letters allowed officers and their family members to exercise their relationships as relatives, 
siblings, sons, and parents. Officers’ letters frequently highlighted the civil elements of their 
character as a means of maintaining relationships with family members and to insulate 
themselves from concerns over their barbarisation.130 Cocks stressed the scarcity of battle and 
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the filial bonds of comradeship as evidence of the army’s humanity in a letter to his uncle: ‘Few 
regard soldiers in their true light … Men unused to war and ignorant of its ways regard soldiers 
as pernicious characters because they always figure them as intent on the destruction of their 
enemy, but a soldier only meets his foe now and then and he is every day engaged in reciprocal 
offices of kindness with his comrades.’131This trend is particularly evident with regards to 
officers of landed or aristocratic backgrounds, whose letters are replete with references to their 
gentlemanly and sporting exploits. Cocks wrote to his sister from winter quarters in Portugal: ‘I 
have been often accustomed to write to you, my dear Margaret, on those books I happen to have 
lately read.’132 Having obtained leave to visit Greece while serving in Italy, First Lieutenant 
Charles Dansey of the Royal Artillery wrote a lengthy description of his trip to his uncle, who 
had a particular interest in travel: ‘having accomplished that much of my tour, I choose this 
period to give you an account of part of it … I may flatter myself that it will be of interest to 
you.’133 Emphasising their humanity, leisure time and polite accomplishments instead of 
military matters allowed officers to render their experiences familiar to a civilian audience, 
while maintaining a shared culture which reminded civilians and soldiers of the common 
ground they shared.  
For married officers, military service could be expected to place a strain on their marriage. As 
highlighted in Chapter Two, the British officer corps could be disdainful of marriage, with 
attitudes towards women shaped by the character of the rake as much as by notions of polite 
gentility. As noted by Jennine Hurl-Eamon, however, the rakish character of the Georgian army 
was tempered by overlaps with another figure of Georgian masculinity: the domestic 
householder.134 Georgian husbands were expected to strive towards domestic harmony based 
on the principles of benevolence and compassion, and to ensure that husbands and wives were 
what Amanda Vickery described as ‘equal souls’ in their marriage.135 Eliot was separated from 
his wife and newborn daughter when he travelled first to barracks, then on to the Peninsula in 
1808, a separation that caused a degree of angst. Yet, through the medium of letters, Eliot still 
sought to exercise his role as household provider, and a caring husband and father.136 Living on 
his rations to save money, Eliot regularly sent bills for money home, and also sought to remain 
emotionally engaged with his family. Just after his daughter’s birthday, Eliot wrote to his wife: ‘I 
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kept my dear little darling’s birthday on the 9th and could not get her out of my head for a 
moment the whole day. Kiss her for me, every night & morning.’137  
The most important relationship which officers, particularly young officers, worked to maintain 
was with their parents, who were among officers’ most regular correspondents. Officers were 
constant in their desire to appear as dutiful and loyal sons, and saw regular letter writing as a 
demonstration of those qualities. In barracks in Britain, Kinloch wrote to his mother out of a 
sense of necessity: ‘I really have not a word to say for myself and merely write as you express a 
wish to hear from me.’138 As revealed by Henry French and Mark Rothery, parents from gentry 
and aristocratic backgrounds were accustomed to using letters as a tool of parenting from afar, 
as they encouraged their sons to adopt standards consistent with their expectations of 
gentlemanly conduct.139 Junior officers received similar advice. Martha Freer, the mother of 
three Napoleonic-era officers, wrote to her son Edward, who had just been commissioned into 
the 43rd Foot, and advised him to always moderate his behaviour:  
I hope my dear boy that you will be prudent and careful for I can assure you that it 
is entirely out of our power to help and assist in any degree – do avoid that part of 
the regiment which is gay and giddy – always remember that by a strict and steady 
conduct you will gain the respect of your superior officers.140  
Officers were certainly aware of the need to keep their behaviour in line with family 
expectations and honour, and sought parental approval. Captain William Warre of the 52nd Foot 
wrote to his father that his: ‘happiness so much depends upon your approval of my conduct.’141 
Girdlestone hoped that his decision to transfer to the Portuguese service was in line with his 
parents’ expectations: ‘What I have done has been with the advice of our Colonel and the rest of 
my friends in the Regt., and I hope my father and mother will approve of it.’142  
Although officers looked forward to receiving letters from both parents, there is some 
suggestion that certain officers sought different responses from mothers and fathers. Mothers 
were generally written to as a primary point of contact, and as an intermediary with other 
relatives. Teasdale implored his mother to keep him abreast of all family developments: ‘And 
when you write, have the goodness to tell me a little more of the family; my poor cousins may be 
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dead for all I know … if ever I return to Darlington, and do not know some of my relatives; for 
you never put me in mind of them.’143 Ideals of polite Georgian motherhood stressed the 
importance of mothers acting as carers, and were associated with the values of compassion, 
tenderness, and devotion. 144 The tone and content of letters to mothers reflect this expectation, 
as officers looked to their mothers for emotional support during periods of distress, which was 
also a feature of British soldiers’ letters during the First World War.145 Having received a poor 
prognosis of his full recovery from a wound to his neck, Keep hesitantly wrote to his mother:  
I am not so well inclined as I have been, to take up the pen to address you – feeling 
unwilling to impart to you anything to disturb the pleasing expectations my 
previous letters may have inspired. Do not however suppose it is about myself only, 
that I am possessed with this feeling for it refers equally to melancholy scenes 
which I have lately been witnessing, and the illness and death of the poor woman, 
not only in the same house but room where Waring and I have been billeted.146 
There is evidence to suggest that mothers extended emotional support through their letters. 
Following his wounding during the storming of San Sebastian, Ensign Orlando Bridgeman of the 
1st Guards received a compassionate letter from his mother which gave Bridgeman: ‘more 
delightful misery than I ever felt before.’147 Bridgeman followed up in a later letter,  
I had not time to answer the kindest letter that ever was written by a mother to a 
child … I assure it completely unmanned me … I cannot allude to any particular 
sentence in your letter, they all express too much for anything I could say to answer 
them, but I am sure it is worth receiving twenty wounds to receive one such 
letter.148 
Despite some shared characteristics, such as descriptions of landscapes and current events, 
letters sent to fathers tended to be less emotive than letters sent to mothers, and included more 
discussions of an officer’s conduct and expenditure, a trend which likely reflects the idealised 
role of fathers who used their role as material providers and disciplinarians to guide their sons 
from adolescence to adulthood.149  
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These details are almost exclusive to letters sent between fathers and sons, and are especially 
prominent in the letters from wealthy, landed, or aristocratic families, who were more likely to 
be paying an allowance to their sons. As calculated by Burnham and McGuigan, a Guards officer 
could expect to spend five pence more than he earned daily on basic expenses, let alone any 
additional costs.150 Despite being paid more than officers of the line, therefore, Guards officers 
could not maintain such lifestyles without additional income. Henry French and Mark Rothery 
have revealed how eighteenth-century English elites attempted to instil desirable qualities in 
their sons through the medium of letter writing once their sons had left home.151 Officers in the 
ostentatious Guards’ regiments were conscious of how their expenditure could appear as 
profligate, and often iterated their attempts at economy. Drawing an additional £200 pounds 
against his father, the 1st Earl of Bradford, to cover these expenses, Bridgeman justified this by 
arguing his economy: ‘believe me there is not an officer of the Guards who starts with a smaller 
stock than myself … if you reckon everything I said … you will not think me very expensive.’152 
Bridgeman also appealed to his father’s sense of family reputation by reminding his father: ‘you 
said that you always wished me to go on as my fellow officers.’153 Ensign John Lucie Blackman of 
the Coldstream Guards and the son of a director of the Bank of England, found himself in 
constant defence of his expenditure. Following his purchase of campaign equipment, Blackman 
received a rebuke from his father: ‘I think you spend too much money … I have paid Mr 
Reynolds’ agent here £80 odd pound for a variety of articles, furnished you from Lisbon … I 
think the pony and forage totally unnecessary expense.’154 Fearful of placing a strain on his 
relationship with his father, Blackman enlisted the Coldstream’s assistant surgeon and family 
friend, Maynard, to reassure Blackman’s father that his expenditure was necessary and ‘not 
viciously incurred, either by gambling, or on any other purpose than those to which his ill luck 
and want of sufficient food have forced him.’155 Letters, therefore, not only allowed officers and 
family members to a general connection with their family, but nourished specific bonds 
between officers and their family. The exercising of the roles of sons, siblings, mothers, and 
fathers through letters reinforced the importance of these relationships to officers, ensuring 
that officers remained invested in their civilian identities. 
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Families in the Field 
Given the pangs of separation that could accompany military service, it is unsurprising to find 
junior officers fantasising about having their families alongside them. Keep regularly wrote to 
his younger brother, Samuel, recounting his regimental experiences. Consistent in these letters 
was Keep’s belief that Samuel would enjoy military life. In August 1812, Keep wrote: ‘I wish my 
dear Sam I could describe so clearly all I witness that you might suppose yourself here among 
us. It is probable you would then feel inclined to enlist with us and become an aspirant after 
military fame.’156 Still only twenty-one years old in 1812, Keep was in an unlikely position to be 
able to bring his brother into the army with him. Other, older officers had more material 
discussions with their families about joining them on campaign. Eliot wrote from Portugal to his 
wife in September 1808: ‘Were we sure of remaining the winter here I should wish above all 
things to have you come out but a winter’s passage with the uncertainty of remaining in the 
country I think are much against it. Consult with your friends & if they think it advisable, come if 
you can.’157 For a handful of officers in this study, having their wives, children, and siblings with 
them in the army was not a fantasy, but a reality. Soldiering could be a family affair: sons of 
officers were an important social category of new officers, brothers served alongside each other, 
while each regiment had a contingent of ‘army wives’, who wedded soldiers and officers before 
or during campaign, and followed the regiment thereafter.158 That military service could be 
undertaken alongside family members not only highlights how officers maintained a sense of 
their civilian selves, but also how military and family lives could intertwine.  
Military service did not necessarily mean physical separation from one’s spouse, or abandoning 
the role of householder and provider. Hurl-Eamon has argued that marriage was a crucial step 
in eighteenth-century soldiers’ progression from youth to manhood.159 This was certainly the 
case for Harry Smith, who married a Spanish girl while a twenty-four year-old captain with the 
95th Rifles in the Peninsula. Smith saw his marriage as requiring him to develop patriarchal 
attributes. A self-confessed ‘wild youth’ before his marriage, Smith saw his newfound 
responsibility as requiring a greater attention to duty, so that he might provide for his wife: 
‘love would incite me to exertions in the hopes of preferment, the only mode I had to look to for 
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a comfortable maintenance.’160 Other officers married as an antidote to military unhappiness. 
Lieutenant George Bourne of the 85th Foot was one such officer. During Bourne’s service, the 
85th was a in a perpetual state of turmoil, and was racked by internal disputes and officers being 
brought to court-martial.161 The 85th fell apart, to the point that in 1813, all of the 85th’s officers 
were sent to other regiments, and its colonel forced to resign.162 Against this backdrop, Bourne 
married in 1810 in the hope of providing some domestic stability away from the ‘delightful’ 
confines of his barracks, where he was exposed to: ‘the envied and much enjoyed society of our 
beloved lieutenant colonel.’163 Eventually retiring from the regular army in 1813, Bourne aimed: 
‘to quit I hope for ever the unsettled turmoil of either a military or genteel life for a quiet 
country occupation.’164 
Married officers made attempts to have a fulfilling domestic life with their families. Bourne, for 
example, arranged to be placed on recruiting service in Britain and was always accompanied by 
his wife, with the two having a daughter in March 1812.165 As he managed to remain in Britain, 
Bourne may have had an easier time in keeping his family together than officers on overseas 
service. Yet there is evidence of fulfilling family lives taking place on campaign. Captain Peter 
Jennings of the 40th Foot was accompanied by his wife and children on the 1806 South American 
expedition, where his new-born daughter was baptised in a Catholic monastery.166 After their 
marriage in the Peninsula, Smith’s wife followed him for the rest of the war, and throughout his 
lengthy career. Smith’s memoir suggests little tension between the demands of the service and 
his marriage: ‘My duty was my duty – I gloried in it; my wife even still more so, and never did 
she … complain if I was away.’167 Furthermore, being in close proximity allowed Smith and his 
wife to provide the support other officers were forced to seek through letters. Smith stated: ‘we 
were happy – oh, how happy, often amidst scenes of distress and privation that would have 
appalled stouter hearts, not devoted like ours!’168  
Due to the scarcity of accounts left by junior officers who maintained wives and children on 
campaign, there is a lack of detail surrounding the daily life of these families. The experiences of 
brothers who served in the army together, however, highlights how family life could continue in 
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a military setting. It was not unusual for officers to have brothers serving in the army, or even in 
the same regiment. The Freer and Simmons families, for example, both had three sons in the 
army during the Napoleonic Wars. In the Freer family, John, the eldest, served with the Royal 
Artillery, while William and Edward, the second and third eldest, were both subalterns in the 
43rd Foot. The Simmons brothers were George, the eldest, who served with the 95th Rifles, Maud, 
a lieutenant with the 34th Foot, and Joseph, who joined George in the 95th during 1812. Sibling 
interactions in Georgian Britain were weighted towards eldest sons, with a growing social 
expectation of warm sibling relationships. Vickery highlighted how the law of primogeniture 
placed eldest sons in a position of authority, as they inherited patriarchal authority.169 Amy 
Harris also suggested that elder sons held sway due to primogeniture, but also observed that 
the eighteenth century saw increasingly close fraternal bonds, and a social emphasis on equality 
between siblings.170 Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall have also highlighted the increasing 
closeness of bonds between siblings during the late-eighteenth century.171 The experiences of 
brothers in the army suggest similarly close bonds existed between brothers on military service. 
Brothers on campaign sent letters to each other; however, there was also the potential for 
physical meetings as a way of maintaining bonds. Cocks found ample time in the Peninsula to 
visit his brother, a captain in the 2nd Dragoon Guards. Cocks wrote to their cousin describing the 
brothers’ adventures: ‘We live pretty well – lots of pretty girls, espanolitas, and we pass our 
time here very fairly.’172 Second Captain Charles Dansey dined with his brother, a captain in the 
88th Foot, whenever possible in the Peninsula, and wrote to his mother: ‘In one of our first day’s 
marches we passed near Hen’s cantonments & I broke off to go & breakfast with him, roused 
him out of bed and made him parade an extra ½ dozen of eggs, he rode on with me and having 
his revenge for his breakfast out of our dinner.’173 The lengths brothers went to in visiting each 
other could be considerable. George Simmons of wrote to his parents of his meeting with Maud: 
‘I saw my brother some days back … I walked over a mountainous country above twenty miles 
to shake hands with him once again.’174 That officers could seemingly detach themselves from 
their regiments to visit nearby brothers suggests that there was little tension between the 
demands of duty and the desire to maintain bonds with brothers.  
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Physical contact allowed brothers to provide material and emotional support to one another, 
and to recreate communal family life. That junior officers travelled beyond their regiment to 
provide and seek support may suggest that support offered from a family member held more 
weight than support from regimental comrades. William Freer wrote to his elder brother John, 
thanking him for visiting his younger brothers as they recovered from wounds sustained during 
the 1812 Siege of Badajoz: ‘Your affection in coming to Lisbon when we were wounded will 
never be erased from my heart. Oh! What pleasure it would give me to see you in France … I 
long much to see you – we would talk at length about family affairs.’175 The three Simmons 
brothers were all involved in the 1812 retreat from Burgos, and helped each other through the 
appalling conditions on the retreat. George noted in his diary that: ‘My brother Maud came to 
me, being very hungry. I luckily had just got a bag of biscuits from a store. He loaded himself and 
went back to his corps.’176 Joseph also wrote to family, recalling George’s assistance to him on 
the retreat: ‘Near the end of the retreat I was so bad that I could hardly bear to sit upon my 
horse with dysentery and ague, so that my brother had me, as well as his duty, to mind.’177 
Brothers who met often wrote letters home together. Convalescing together after their 
wounding at Badajoz, William and Edward Freer wrote a joint letter reassuring their family that 
they were safe, William teaching himself to write his part of the letter left-handed, as his right 
arm had been amputated, while George Simmons reviewed Joseph’s letters to his parents, and 
added postscripts.178 In terms of significance, style, and content, joint letters mirrored the 
letters officers sent individually. The act of writing mutually, however, suggests an attempt at 
creating a sense of communal family life, with a dialogue between several members.  
Having brothers nearby was not a universal blessing, and there are suggestions of tensions 
between brothers. In a letter to his elder brother John, William Freer wrote of his 
disappointment at Edward’s lack of letter writing: ‘I shall not make the least excuse for Edward 
and shall tell you candidly that it is sheer idleness that prevents his writing.’179 Upon receiving 
word that his father intended to get another of his young brothers a commission in the 43rd 
Foot, William wrote again to John: ‘My Father means to put Tom in the 43rd next volunteering. I 
shall kick against that, for too many brothers do not agree well in a regiment. I do not mean to 
say that is the case with Edward and myself.’180 The death of a brother, however, was the 
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greatest risk of having siblings on active service together. Edward Freer died during the 1814 
Battle of Nivelle. Distraught, William described Edward’s death in a letter to John: 
during a short halt I was abruptly told of my brother’s death. I borrowed my 
company officer’s horse and hurried to the spot where he lay with his servant 
wounded by his side. The wound he received was instantaneous death … He never 
spoke. I could remain but a few minutes with him – gave directions for his burial to 
be in perfect Regimentals and forced myself from him to re-join my Corps which 
was again advancing.181 
The demands of returning to his regiment during battle evidently stymied William’s capacity to 
attend to his brother, and interrupted his grieving process. Kennedy argued that battlefield 
deaths during this period were narrated in an idealised manner, with a focus on the deceased’s 
character and sacrifice as a way of assigning meaning to loss, while civilians’ conceptions of 
deaths in war were mediated through the sanitised, heroic language of battlefield despatches.182 
These factors appear to have shaped how the Freer family coped with Edward’s death. Martha 
Freer wrote to John in December 1813: ‘What comfort to my afflicted heart to know that the 
dear boy had fulfilled his duty and was prepared to stand before his maker with an unblemished 
character.’183 In a similar vein, William wrote home in February 1813, hoping for peace: ‘Oh! 
What a happy day that will be … to see collected at your fireside your family enjoying those 
blessings which the exertions of so many years have at last led us so speedily to expect. ‘Tis true 
our losses have been great but Memory will revere them.’184  
While the interactions between brothers on campaign reveal a level of mutual dependence, 
what emerges from officer accounts is the paternal role elder sons assumed with their younger 
brothers. As noted previously, fraternal relations in Georgian Britain were weighed in eldest 
sons’ favour, as they inherited patriarchal authority.185 Elder brothers evidently expected to 
exercise a degree of influence over their younger brothers, as they offered advice and acted as 
patrons. John Freer wrote to William, then a lieutenant, asking if he would consider joining: ‘the 
Portuguese service with Rank as Captain, promotion and pay going on the same in the 
British?’186 The letters and journals of George Simmons reveal the level of influence elder 
brothers could expect to have on their younger brothers. As highlighted in Chapter Two, 
Simmons entered the regular army in the hopes of being able to provide for his family. In doing 
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so, Simmons appears to have aspired to the model of domestic householder identified earlier in 
this chapter. Simmons assumed much of the responsibility for his family’s well-being, regularly 
sending home money, and sending his parents regular instructions to see that his younger 
siblings were attentive to their studies. Having just joined his regiment, Simmons wrote home: 
‘Make them good scholars, I have not the least doubt of soon taking them off your hands.’187 
Simmons also turned patron for his brothers. Upon hearing that Joseph had joined the navy 
instead of the army, Simmons sent money to save him from ‘perdition and ruin’, and took steps 
to see him sent to the Peninsula as a volunteer.188 
Simmons’ exertions were not limited to financial support and advice to his parents. Once in the 
Peninsula with his brothers, Simmons took an interest in their conduct, and attempted to make 
them self-sufficient. Upon learning that Maud had a debt in London, Simmons informed his 
parents, that: ‘I have put him upon an economical plan of paying for every article as he procures 
it, or go without it.’189 Simmons took an even stronger interest in Joseph’s well-being, and saw 
him transferred into the 95th Rifles alongside him. Simmons wrote home stating why:  
The task of instructing Joe will be a pleasure to me as far as my humble abilities go. I 
know Maud has not paid that attention to him I could have wished. I wrote him 
several plans how to proceed, but instead of studying they were playing, I suppose. 
However, that will not be the case with me. I shall make him keep my accounts, and 
set him systemically to work for some hours daily when we are not otherwise 
employed.190 
Simmons’ aim throughout appears to have been to foster independence and prudence in his 
brothers. Simmons wrote home of Joseph’s lack of progress in December 1813: ‘I got him placed 
in another company, as the boy wanted me to take care of his money and concerns. As I am a 
bird of passage, I wished to teach him to take care of himself, for fear he might be deprived of 
me one day or another; he then would be at a loss.’191 In this regard, Simmons was attempting to 
promote the same qualities that parents attempted to instil in their sons through letters. 
Simmons’ adoption of the paternalistic role was noted by those around him, particularly 
regarding Joseph. Simmons reported home in 1813: ‘I have got the name of an old fellow. All the 
women say I am his father and laugh when I tell them he is my brother.’192 For Simmons, 
therefore, the army was not a barrier to the maintenance of a family identity, but the means by 
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which he hoped to secure his family’s future. Far from being in tension, the two had a 
complimentary relationship, to the point that Simmons’ military identity could be viewed as an 
extension of his family identity.  
Junior officers certainly came to identity closely with their regimental comrades, and could 
identify with an abstract concept of their regiment. Yet, there is little to suggest that junior 
officers saw their relationships with their comrades or regiments as supplanting the civilian 
aspect of their identities. Cocks’ expectation that officers be totally committed to their regiment 
and comrades, to the detriment of their family ties, was exceptional, and likely overstated his 
case. Cocks himself combined the military with his family life, regularly writing letters to his 
family members and visiting his brother on campaign. It may be more beneficial to consider the 
duality of junior officers’ character, albeit with attachments firmly weighted towards the family. 
Junior officers, therefore, maintained two concepts of the family. The first and strongest was 
civil, and focused on the family. Despite stressing the fraternal bonds of the regiment, junior 
officers frequently sought the support of their families, and took great strides to maintain 
relationships and connections with family members via letters. For some families, military and 
family lives were indistinguishable, as families shared campaign experiences. The second was 
military, and based on the mutual bonds formed within the regiment. This concept was more 
fluid than junior officers’ family identities, and allowed for officers to form multiple 
attachments. As noted by Neil Ramsey, most officers’ memoirs of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, the sources where regimental identities are most prominently displayed, 
ended with the soldier returning to the civilian world, a narrative feature which pointed to the 
existence of a personal identity outside of the military.193  
For some officers, the pull of seeing Britain was too much, regardless of their regimental 
attachment. Upon resigning his commission while in the Peninsula, Lieutenant Charles Dudley 
Madden of the 4th Dragoons reflected in his journal: ‘Took leave of my Regt. with a considerable 
deal of regret, as leaving what had been my home for near 3 years, but the prospect of seeing 
England so soon, over balanced every other reflection.’194 Other officers noted that an ideal life 
would balance the military and civilian spheres. Celebrating nine years in the army, Second 
Captain William Webber of the Royal Artillery received a set of letters from home containing 
news of the death of a family friend, causing Webber to reflect on the value of happiness in the 
military and civilian worlds: ‘This day 9 years ago I obtained my commission and hope the next 
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nine years may pass over with as few troubles, but with more domestic happiness, which has of 
late been interrupted by the death of one most dear to us.’195  
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Chapter Five: Duelling Culture and Personal Honour 
British officers saw themselves as the embodiment of honour. For junior officers, losing their 
reputation as a ‘man of honour’ could result in their demise as an officer. Being considered 
dishonourable could see junior officers ostracised by their peers, hounded out of a regiment, or 
brought before a court martial. Yet, for all the importance junior officers placed on honour, the 
definition of ‘honourable’ conduct, and the lengths officers were expected to carry the defence 
of their honour to, remained sketchy. Junior officers’ commentary on the 1811 suicide of Colonel 
Bevan of the 4th Foot highlights how perceptions of honourable conduct could differ, even 
within the army. After being singled out by Wellington for his believed failure to contain the 
French breakout from Almeida in May 1811, Bevan committed suicide, rather than live with 
ignominy.1 Lieutenant William Tomkinson of the 16th Dragoons lamented Bevan’s suicide as a 
regrettable exercise in personal honour: ‘Lord Wellington was much enraged at this, and would 
never allow the thing to be inquired into, nor admit of any excuse…Colonel Bevan of the 4th 
Regiment was so much hurt at the expression in Lord Wellington’s despatch… he put an end to 
his existence, though certainly no blame was attached to him.’2 In contrast, Captain Thomas 
Henry Browne viewed Bevan’s suicide as a failure to deal with professional pressure, and 
revealed his scepticism of the conceptions of honour which led to his demise: 
[Bevan] … wrote an affecting farewell to his Regiment and shot himself. There have 
not been wanting those who have blamed Lord Wellington for this act of a gallant 
and sensitive mind, but it is hard indeed if a General commanding cannot, at his 
discretion, use terms of censure or of praise…Officers of superior rank were 
included in the same disapprobation with Lieut. Colonel Bevan, and yet they bore it 
calmly, and in a very few weeks nothing more was thought of the affair.3 
Tomkinson’s observations sympathise with a code of masculinity which prioritised an officer’s 
sense of gentlemanly honour over bodily welfare, while Browne’s approval of other officers who 
reacted ‘calmly’ to Wellington’s criticisms suggests that a concurrent strain of masculinity was 
also in existence, which did not see personal honour as being more valuable than an officer’s 
life.  
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As suggested by John Lynn in his study of honour and virtue in the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic-era French army, honour was a nebulous concept which operated on several levels 
of meaning.4 This is also true of the British army of the same period, where honour could tie 
individual officers to their regiments, or to the nation. This chapter explores duelling culture 
within the British officer corps to investigate personal honour, and examine how honour 
impacted on relations between officers. Duelling was central to eighteenth-century British 
debates over honour. Early-eighteenth century conceptions of honour in Britain were inherently 
bound to an aristocratic code of conduct which stressed the importance of reputation and 
courage to social status, to the point of defending both by fighting a duel.5  Under the code of 
honour, any dispute or insult which impugned a gentleman’s reputation was expected to be 
responded to with a challenge. Failure to do so was seen as a failure of courage, compounding 
the dishonour experienced by the offended party.6 As the eighteenth century progressed, 
however, the honour code and duelling were increasingly out of step with civilian mores, 
particularly with the values of politeness and the increasing importance of the rule of law.  
Donna Andrew has revealed how, by the late-eighteenth century, there were three main schools 
of thought about duelling: those who applauded duelling; those who acknowledged duels as 
unfortunate, but necessary; and those who opposed duelling outright.7 Despite declining in 
frequency throughout the eighteenth century, duels continued to be fought and were especially 
prominent within the military. Christopher Duffy and Armstrong Starkey have highlighted how 
the importance of aristocratic conceptions of honour and courage to eighteenth-century 
European armies made duels more likely within the army.8 The ongoing importance of an 
aristocratic honour code to the British army is reflected in the number of duels fought by army 
officers.  Robert Shoemaker revealed that military duels made up nearly half of all reported 
duels fought in Britain during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.9  
The prominence of duels amongst army officers has seen army officers included in wider 
studies of duelling. As yet; however, there has been no specific study of duelling within the 
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army.10 Duelling culture was not as absolute as it has appeared in some scholarship on honour 
and the army. Some scholars have suggested that the officer corps’ emphasis on honour ensured 
that there was a degree of inevitability to officers fighting a duel once they had been drawn into 
a dispute. Starkey argued that duelling was virtually a necessity for officers to prove their worth 
in eighteenth-century armies, particularly for officers of non-aristocratic backgrounds who 
needed to display their willingness to adhere to an aristocratic code of conduct.11 Duffy similarly 
argued that duels were the unavoidable outcome of the aristocratic code of honour which 
dominated eighteenth-century European armies.12 Arthur Gilbert has explored the relationship 
between military law and honour during the eighteenth century, and revealed how officers 
could be brought to trial by their peers if they failed to defend their honour in a duel.13  
Junior officer accounts and general courts martial records from the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars suggest that duelling was coming under increasing criticism within the officer 
corps by the late-eighteenth century. While maintaining an honourable reputation amongst 
peers was essential for junior officers, it was not inevitable that officers would fight a duel to 
preserve their honour. Junior officers drew on critiques of duelling culture, and could seek 
redress through courts martial, which diminished the importance of duelling within the army. 
Furthermore, duels appear only intermittently and as an object of curiosity in junior officer 
accounts suggesting that duels were not unheard of, but occurred infrequently. Only two of the 
seventy-seven officers considered by this study, David Powell and Thomas Evans, admitted in 
their narratives that they had fought a duel. The first section of this chapter reveals how officers 
could articulate criticisms of duelling culture and repudiate a staunch obsession with personal 
honour. The second section examines courts martial records where officers were brought to 
trial for acting uncivilly to other officers, or for duelling offences. These records suggest that 
recourse to military law was an important factor in weakening duelling culture. The third 
section explores the importance of personal honour to comradeship between officers, and 
highlights how this relationship could lead officers to fight a duel to preserve their honour. The 
final section considers the relationship between personal honour and the military hierarchy, 
and reveals how submitting to authority could conflict with their sense of personal honour.  
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Confronting Honour 
The honour code and duelling, its most infamous component, were the subject of intense debate 
in eighteenth-century Britain, with these debates attracting considerable scholarly attention. 
The honour code was an elite form of masculinity that demanded a gentleman should prioritise 
his honour and reputation over his personal welfare. A gentleman’s honour was conceived of as 
an outwardly projected value, and was grounded in the esteem which other gentlemen held 
him.14 As highlighted by Markku Peltonen, gentlemanly honour in early-eighteenth century 
England was bound to notions of civility. Being treated with civility by other gentlemen was an 
indication that an individual was considered as a gentleman by his peers.15 Being treated 
uncivilly by being the recipient of an insult or slight, therefore, could be perceived as an affront 
to a gentleman’s sense of status.16 Whether or not a gentleman was deemed to be 
‘dishonourable’ after having been insulted was his response. Duelling was theorised as a way of 
protecting honour after receiving an insult. By challenging the insulting party and then facing 
fire, the offended gentleman demonstrated his willingness to risk his bodily welfare in defence 
of his reputation amongst his peers. In doing so, a gentleman proved his courage, a vital 
component of elite masculinity.17 Conversely, by failing to respond to an insult in an appropriate 
and timely way cast doubt on whether a gentleman valued his reputation and could face 
derision from honour conscious peers.18 There was an important class element to duelling. By 
highlighting their courage in such a way, elites reiterated their place at the head of society, with 
their courage seen to demonstrate their utility to the nation.19 
Eighteenth-century European armies were seen to adhere to these values stridently, 
particularly within the officer corps. A strong investment in honour was theorised to instil a 
sense of duty in officers, as a concern for personal reputation was seen to compel officers to 
demonstrate their courage and regulate their conduct in war.20 Some military theorists 
supported duelling within the military, as the practice would ensure that only men who valued 
bravery and courage would remain in the army. In the 1790 text, The Principles of Duelling, 
Samuel Stanton, a former British lieutenant, argued for the value of honour and duelling culture: 
‘No character can be more respectable that that of a man of real courage and honour; when a 
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man possesses one of those amiable qualities, the other constantly accompanies it.’21 A concern 
for honour as it related to duty was seen to stem from a zealous defence of personal honour, 
which included duelling. V.G. Kiernan highlighted how duels fought between officers over points 
of personal honour were seen to inculcate courage and the wider commitment to duty that was 
demanded of eighteenth-century army officers.22 Within the pressurised world of the officer 
corps, refusing to fight a duel when insulted was a considerable slight on an officer’s honour, 
which could see an officer ostracised as lacking in courage.23 In his study of the relationship 
between military law, honour, and the eighteenth-century British officer corps, Arthur Gilbert 
highlighted how regiments used courts martial proceedings to pass judgement on officers who 
refused to defend their reputation.24  
Set against these established values of honour and courage were increasing criticisms of the 
code of honour and duelling. The arguments against duelling were manifold; however, the code 
of honour in Britain was particularly undermined by the rise of politeness as a model of male 
interaction which undermined the ideological basis of honour and duelling culture. ‘Polite’ 
critiques of duelling undermined the image of duelling as a symbol of gentility and refinement. 
As highlighted by Philip Carter in his study of polite masculinity, an obtuse defence of one’s 
honour and duelling were portrayed as ‘brutish’ by proponents of polite sociability, who valued 
magnanimity, civility, and self-restraint in interpersonal conduct.25 Similarly, Peltonen revealed 
how critics of duelling saw refinement as the path to ensuring ‘true’ civility, as opposed to 
artificial civility imposed by the threat of violence.26 In two important studies, Shoemaker has 
revealed how a combination of cultural factors, such as evolving conceptions of honour, a belief 
in polite interaction, and the growing importance of the courts as an arena for conflict 
resolution all combined to reduce the number of duels fought during the eighteenth century.27 
Furthermore, the principles of honour were coming under criticism, as distinctions were made 
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ honour. As highlighted by Andrew, critics of the honour code saw an 
overbearing concern for honour to be little more than an attempt at asserting authority, rather 
than a reflection of internal virtue.28 Despite the strong concern for honour amongst army 
officers, the army was not insulated from these debates over honour. After devoting 
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considerable space to defining ‘true’ from ‘false’ honour, the Military Mentor informed 
prospective officers that, ‘The principle of Duelling is very far from constituting an essential and 
necessary part of true courage.’29 As highlighted by Carter, polite theorists were engaged in 
attempting to redefine honour as it related to the military. Polite ideals stressed that courage, 
bravery, and honour were the product of refinement, rather than anger or violence.30 
Shoemaker has suggested that not all officers were adherents to the honour code, with many 
officers favouring refinement, rather than the belligerent defence of reputation, as the measure 
of honour.31 
It was through the prism of these debates that junior officers interpreted duelling culture within 
the officer corps. It is evident from junior officer accounts that not all junior officers were 
adherents to the honour code. Some officers saw duellists within the military as proponents of 
an outmoded and shallow culture, who attempted to force other officers to fight duels to assert 
their authority. Two instances described by Lieutenant Thomas Evans of the 8th Foot and Ensign 
Robert Bakewell of the 27th Foot, best illustrate how officers could apply arguments against 
duelling. Both officers were from families of reasonably low social standing. Evans was the son 
of inn keepers, while Bakewell was from a small farming family. Stationed in Minorca in 1800, 
Evans fought a duel with an officer of his regiment after two officers fraudulently accused him of 
failing to attend a point of duty.32 Evans was convinced that this was an attempt to coerce him 
into a duel, which he did so reluctantly. Evans wrote in his diary: ‘finding explanation only 
provoked a further degree of (what I am satisfied was premeditated) brutal insolence, I was 
obliged (painfully I confess) to meet them this morning.’33 Bakewell faced similar provocation 
from McChord, a senior lieutenant who had taken temporary command of his company on 
arrival in Portugal. Following a disagreement over payment to the company’s soldiers, McChord 
threatened Bakewell with confinement. In response, Bakewell: 
told him that he had not the power, he still persisted in having that legal influence, 
in answer to which I said, “You lie Sir, nor will I advance money for them,” when he 
immediately turned round, and said that was just what he wanted nor did he 
dispute me any longer … he insisted on fighting me, for telling him the lie.34 
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Aside from McChord’s goading, Bakewell, an English officer in the Irish dominated Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, was suspicious that he had fallen prey to a conspiratorial group of Irish officers: 
Phillips [McChord’s second] press’d hard for me to accept Sampson for a second, but 
as these four Irishmen was complete strangers to me, that is William Moore – the 
captain, and James McChord, R. Phillips, J.W. Sampson subalterns … I thought it 
prudent to have somebody with me that would see justice done, and who I knew 
would have an interest in my reputation.35 
While Bakewell’s account plays off the stereotype of the Irish as fiery duellists who existed on 
the edges of European politeness, this incident illustrates how provocation could be used, even 
by seconds, who were expected to act as mediators in disputes.36 
In describing their opponents, Evans and Bakewell drew on anti-duelling critiques which 
undermined duelling by representing the proponents of duelling as self-serving and damaging 
to society.37 In Evans’ case, honour is depicted as a destructive force, the cause of incivility, 
rather than its guarantor. By encouraging violence as a way of testing Evans’ sense of honour, 
the antagonists had promoted disharmony.  It was the power of honour to subvert the respect 
which was seen to unite the officer corps which outraged Evans, as the deliberate insults he 
suffered came from two of his ‘brother officers.’38 In Bakewell’s account McChord is portrayed 
as distinctly lacking in virtue, an opportunistic bully who had only briefly held his new-found 
authority before he ‘lustily attacked’ the unsuspecting Bakewell.39 Compounding this image was 
McChord’s subsequent disbarment from joining the regiment on campaign, with his captain 
citing previous poor conduct.40 McChord, therefore, was cast as an outlier: a man of honour 
ostracised by legitimate authority and the rule of law. Completing the farcical image of duellists 
was the unwillingness of proponents of the honour code to adhere to their own rules: upon 
joining the 27th, Phillips complained of Bakewell not fighting McChord, but when challenged by 
Bakewell: ‘however anxious he was for me to fight McChord, he would not stand the brush 
himself.’41 
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The opposition to duelling culture is reflective of a wider debate about the relationship between 
honour and the military. There is evidence to suggest that the staunch protection of individual 
honour was seen by some officers as unnecessary. Preparing siege trenches for the 1807 siege 
of Copenhagen, Captain Charles Pasley of the Royal Engineers, received what he believed was 
unfair criticism of his work from a colonel: ‘[D’Arcy] says it would draw us into a focus of fire & 
that some people who think themselves brave would only have their brains beat out in the 
attempt. Loudly he calls us two insidious gentlemen.’42 While still stung by this condemnation, 
Pasley chose instead to ignore the affront and noted: ‘Disapprobation unmerited in all cases 
only deserves contempt for two days.’43 Often, the values of the honour code were contrasted 
with a growing concern for military expediency, a contributing factor in the growing 
professionalisation of the British officer corps. This was especially true of junior officers 
criticising superiors for prioritising their personal reputation over the demands of a particular 
situation. The questioning of this relationship can be seen as early as 1794. Describing an 
engagement during the Low Countries campaign, Lieutenant Thomas Powell of the 14th Foot 
was critical of the actions of his general, whose sense of honour made him reluctant to 
withdraw: 
our Genl. Being tenacious of his Honour & never having the command of an out post 
before, did not think it rite to retire without Seeing the Enemy, altho he could hear 
their shot very plain, & did not obey Hammerstein’s orders, by making an excuse of 
their not being in writing. In consequence of the ignorance and obstinacy of our 
Commander keeping us in this situation, we were perfectly cut off from the Town in 
a short time.44 
The aristocratic Captain Edward Charles Cocks of the 16th Dragoons similarly reflected on the 
value, or otherwise, of personal honour to cavalry units on outpost duty: 
In an open country eight or ten men cannot think of fighting and can always gallop 
away, whereas stronger picquets do not think it honourable to retreat without at 
least skirmishing with the enemy’s advanced guard. Then they get men and horses 
wounded and, on trying to bring them off, the whole get into a scrape.45 
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Evidently, ‘honour’ as conceived of by junior officers was not synonymous with the principles of 
the honour code which idolised the defence of personal reputation at the expense of other 
concerns. Extreme displays of concern for personal honour, such as fighting a duel or refusing to 
retreat from combat, could be seen as outmoded and detrimental behaviour. 
 
Duelling and the Law 
A key argument used against honour and duelling culture during the eighteenth century was 
that this informal code of conduct and dispute resolution undermined the rule of law by placing 
authority in the hands of individuals.46 Duelling was illegal under both civilian and military law. 
Section 7 of the articles of war was an explicit attempt to stifle duelling culture within the 
military: any officer who used provoking language, sent a challenge, acted as a second, or 
pressured another officer into a duel could be court martialled and was liable to be cashiered.47 
Illegality alone was not enough to prevent duelling. In his study of duelling in eighteenth-
century England, Stephen Banks highlighted how courts were reluctant to condemn duellists, 
and argued that severe penalties imposed by the courts did not contribute greatly to the decline 
of duelling culture.48 Furthermore, proponents of duelling argued that duelling provided a 
means of redress for offences that could not be adequately dealt with in the court room, 
resulting in what Banks described as an undercurrent of ‘general derision’ towards gentlemen 
who used the courts to resolve disputes.49 As demonstrated by Gilbert, similar tensions between 
law and honour existed within the eighteenth-century army. In a study of regimental courts 
martial records, Gilbert found that courts martial acted as ‘honour courts’ as well as criminal 
courts, with regiments using the charge ‘conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman’ to 
bring officers who violated the accepted code of honour within a regiment to trial. Importantly, 
this could include officers who refused to respond to insults with a challenge.50 
As noted by Shoemaker, the rise of polite values weakened the relationship between 
gentlemanliness and honour, and violence.51 The reduced expectation that gentlemen would 
respond to insults with violence was likely to have made other forms of dispute resolution, such 
as the courts, more appealing to offended parties. In this instance, the flexibility of military law 
allowed regiments to remove dissolute officers’ from their regiments and to resolve disputes 
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without officers resorting to duels. As highlighted by Gilbert, the vagueness of the charge of 
‘conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman’ allowed for regiments to employ it to resolve a 
range of offences, such as honour disputes, which defied categorisation in an prescriptive law 
code.52 By examining general courts martial records from the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars this section will explore the relationship between military law and honour. A 
general courts martial was the highest level of military justice. While courts martial were 
conducted at the regimental level, only a general courts martial had the authority to condemn a 
soldier to death, or to dismiss an officer from the service for ‘conduct unbecoming an officer and 
a gentleman’.53 
The malleability of this charge gave it a broad scope, and allowed officers to be tried for offences 
which could traditionally have resulted in a duel. The importance of polite interaction to the 
officer corps ensured that officers who did not adhere to the expectations of civility could lose 
favour amongst their comrades. This could include being brought to trial. General courts martial 
records feature several examples of officers who were brought to trial for acting uncivilly 
towards other officers. In May 1805, Lieutenant James Blake of the 44th Foot was cashiered after 
calling a captain: ‘a jack-ass and a fool’, and for ‘using threatening, menacing, and insulting 
language’ to another lieutenant.54 Not content with insulting one officer, Lieutenant Eastcourt 
Cresswell of the 94th Foot was brought to trial in October 1808 for: 
disturbing the harmony of the Officers at the mess of the regiment … [and] 
persisting in defiance of the sentiments of his brother Officers, to use provoking 
speeches and gestures, snapping his fingers, and … declaring in a most violent and 
contemptuous manner, that he did not care one damn for Lieutenant Colonel 
Campbell … or for any Officers in the regiment.55 
 Ensign Henry Stanton of the 8th Foot was also cashiered after similar offences which he 
committed over a two month period in mid-1805. These included following the 8th’s surgeon 
home: ‘and wantonly and grossly insulting him in the public streets; returning after this 
transaction to the Mansion-house and publicly insulting the corps’, as well as confronting 
another ensign of the 8th: ‘shaking his stick at him in a menacing manner, and desiring him to 
consider it as a horsewhipping.’56 Confrontations where officers invoked a ‘horsewhipping’ was 
likely a deliberate attempt by officers to provoke a challenge. In civilian society, horsewhipping 
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a gentleman was particularly insulting, as it implied the recipient was little more than an animal 
or a criminal, and could quickly draw a challenge.57 In each of these cases, the actions of the 
officers charged were the type of offences which gentlemen could have conceivably responded 
to by issuing a challenge. As the offended parties chose instead to pursue the matter through the 
courts, however, it may be theorised that there was little risk of these officers being considered 
‘dishonourable’ for failing to call out the offensive officers. 
Highlighting how the law could supersede duelling as a means of dispute resolution were courts 
martial where officers were brought to trial for attempting to provoke another officer into 
challenging them to a duel. Whereas Gilbert identified several regimental courts martial from 
the mid-eighteenth century where officers were found guilty for allowing themselves to be 
insulted, general courts martial records from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars suggest 
that attempting to provoke a duel with other officers was unacceptable.58 In 1812, Lieutenant 
Charles White of the 4th West India regiment was cashiered for assaulting an officer who refused 
to fight a duel with him.59 White was also acquitted of another charge, at the same trial, where 
he encouraged two officers of his regiment to fight a duel, rather than reconcile.60 In February 
1812, Lieutenant Dominick French of the 82nd Foot was cashiered for a range of duelling related 
offences. These included three attempts at provoking a duel by: ‘using abusive and provoking 
language’ towards other officers; fighting one duel; and attempting to recruit another officer to 
act as his second in a duel.61 Importantly, the officer who fought a duel with French was not 
brought to a general court martial, suggesting that the officers of the 82nd took particular issue 
with French’s conduct in deliberately provoking a duel, rather than the other officer who 
challenged him. French’s trial is part of a trend of officers being brought to trial for attempting 
to provoke another officer into a challenge. That these officers were brought to trial by their 
comrades, and often found guilty, suggests that contemporary criticisms of honour and duelling 
culture were being inculcated by the officer corps. Within these courts martial, it can be seen 
that offering offence was seen as the dishonourable act, rather than unwillingness to send a 
challenge. 
Military justice could also be a means by which officers sought to clear their names of 
dishonourable conduct. As noted by Gilbert, officers could request a court martial in the hope of 
clearing their name and honour when accused of an honour crime.62 Lieutenant Charles Kinloch 
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of the 52nd Foot suggested as much in a letter to his mother where he described the suicide of 
Colonel Bevan of the 4th Foot: ‘[Bevan] was blamed (& I really believe unjustly) by Lord 
Wellington in his dispatches for the escape of General Brennier & the garrison of Almeida, since 
applied for a court of enquiry that he might have an opportunity of clearing his own character 
and that of the regiment which his lordship thought proper to refuse.’63 There is evidence to 
suggest, however, that there could be a degree of ambiguity in some regiments over how 
honourable courts martial were. Being found guilty in a court martial could have serious 
consequences for an officer, who could be suspended or dismissed from the army, or cashiered, 
the process by which an officer was reprimanded in front of his regiment and stripped of his 
commission.64 Lieutenant George James Sullivan of the elite 1st Life Guards cavalry regiment 
described one occasion, where he negotiated for an officer who had insulted another to leave 
the regiment, rather than face a court martial: ‘Kelly of course was delighted I had succeeded for 
him & I also felt happy in being able to rescue a man from disgrace for if he had been tried there 
was nothing to have saved his being ruined.’65 
While submitting oneself to judgment in court martial could be seen as honourable, it did not 
follow that bringing another officer to trial was also seen in the same light. The expectation that 
commanding officers act with paternal warmth and respect junior officers as gentlemen could 
complicate matters of military law. Evans noted how his colonel bringing a captain of his 
regiment to a court martial for using insulting language towards him went over badly with the 
regiment’s officers: 
‘Tis impossible to describe the sensation this unfortunate dispute has created in the 
Regiment; Colonel Drummond who has always been beloved in the Corps, is not at 
present spoken to but by very few Officers; it is alleged by some that his conduct has 
very much changed and that these officers have been the cause of that change which 
has produced so many unhappy differences betwixt the Regiment and the 
Commanding Officer.66 
The imbalance in rank between Drummond and the officer he prosecuted appeared to have 
been considered as a break in the commander-junior officer relationship and it is possible that if 
the captain were brought to a court martial for insulting a fellow captain or subaltern, that 
Drummond would have been viewed more favourably.  
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Nor was it a foregone conclusion that the law would prevail over the honour code, as suggested 
by two courts martial of officers from the 66th Regiment during the Peninsular War. Relating to 
trials of six officers, the surviving duellists and seconds, these courts martial appear to have 
attracted interest because one of the duellists in each case was killed.67 Occurring in the 
Peninsula in June 1809 and May 1810, the fatal outcome of these duels appears to have been 
vital in bringing them to Wellington’s attention, who ordered both courts martial.68 Despite the 
gravity of both these courts martial, all parties were acquitted of the charges brought against 
them. The courts martial findings provide few specifics, other than ruling that the charges were 
unproven, making it difficult to determine why these trials came to nothing. A lack of evidence, 
either non-existent or withheld, almost certainly played a role. In the cases of Captain Arthur 
Morris and Lieutenant Henry Blake, both charged with being seconds in a duel in which 
Lieutenant William Brodie died, there was no one at the trial to give evidence: ‘the Court 
proceeded to give public notice for the appearance of any person who could give evidence on 
the trial; but no person having appeared … the Court were of the opinion the prisoner was Not 
Guilty.’69  
There are several possibilities as to why officers were unforthcoming with evidence. The first is 
that there was no case against the accused officers. While conceivable, this is an unlikely reason. 
In both instances, Wellington had received reports from courts of inquiry into the causes of the 
duel and still proceeded with the courts martial.70 Another is the potential for one court martial 
to have a flow on effect in terms of charges: the Articles of War dictated that any officer on guard 
who knowingly ‘suffered’ or allowed another to fight a duel would be considered as a 
challenger, and resulting court martial proceedings could potentially implicate other officers.71 
Together with these factors, it is probable that the officers of the 66th Regiment did not see the 
duellists as criminals and ‘closed ranks’ to ensure that the matter proceeded no further. This is 
suggestive as to the presence of a culture within the 66th which condoned duelling. To bring the 
duellists and their seconds to trial would have been perceived as unnecessary and detrimental: 
the duels had resolved the dispute, while courts martialling the officers would have served only 
to bring them, and their regiment, into disrepute. 
Not only could the relationship between law and honour be ambiguous, the two could also be 
conflated, as demonstrated in the August 1811 court martial of Lieutenant Edward Tully of the 
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75th Regiment of Foot. Tully was arraigned on the charge of: ‘scandalous and infamous 
behaviour, unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman’ for, amongst other reasons, 
failing to pay debts and embezzling money from the regiment.72 Importantly, the officers of his 
regiment also brought charges against Tully for acting dishonourably on two occasions. On the 
first occasion, it was alleged that Tully: ‘submitted to be struck by an Officer of the regiment, 
without taking any notice whatever of it.’73 After another altercation with the same officer, Tully 
also found himself under suspicion for: ‘making use of gross and ungentlemanlike language, 
which drew upon him the opprobrious epithet of coward.’74 Here, Tully’s refusal to adequately 
respond to being struck by another officer, rather than the act of hitting another officer, was 
seen as the dishonourable action, as were Tully’s later use of offensive language and his wearing 
of the insult of ‘coward’. On the surface, this trial supports the suggestion that fighting a duel 
was essential for officers who had been insulted to maintain their honour. This certainly 
appears to have been the case in the 75th regiment, where the honour code was perceived as 
law. As Tully was found not guilty of these two charges; however, it can be seen that the law 
could provide protection for officers who found themselves on the wrong side of the honour 
code. Rather than submit to fighting a duel in line with his comrade’s expectations, an officer 
could take his case to the courts, where the weight of military law would provide some 
protection from his comrade’s accusations.  
 
Civility, Duelling, and Comradeship  
‘Civility’ was inextricably linked to junior officers’ identities as ‘polite gentlemen’ and to 
eighteenth-century conceptions of honour. As highlighted by Peltonen, being treated uncivilly 
by a gentleman could see a gentleman forced to respond with a challenge to preserve his 
honour.75 Junior officer accounts suggest that civility and honour were linked for junior officers, 
as officers who acted uncivilly could be ostracised by their comrades. The diary of George 
Woodberry, a young lieutenant with the 18th Hussars, is revealing as to relationship between 
civility and honour. Woodberry’s diary reveals how his regiment suffered poor morale 
throughout 1813, owing in no small part to several dissolute officers in the regiment. The 
divisions between the 18th’s officers highlight how junior officers’ honourable reputation 
amongst their peers was contingent on their reputation as a ‘polite gentleman’. The officer who 
did not conform to the standards of gentlemanly conduct found acceptance difficult. Woodberry 
contrasted himself with Dolbel, an unpleasant comrade:  
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Thank God I think I am so much beloved by my brother officers … on the contrary 
there’s Mr. Dolbel [who] the whole have cut! and shall not be surprised to hear of 
his leaving the Regiment. Colonel Murray a few days back refused to sign a 
recommendation in his favour to get him made Lieutenant. The unmanly manner in 
which he boasts of his amour with Lady Charlotte Howard at Brighton will bring 
down on him the disgust of every man of Honor.76 
Having been undermined by a comrade, Burk, Woodberry linked his dishonourable actions with 
a lack of gentlemanliness: ‘What a despicable fellow is our Capt. Burk. There’s not a grain of a 
gentleman in him. He is the laughing stock of the Brigade. Sgt. Taylor he has brought to a Court 
Martial this morning, merely to annoy me, and because he thinks I have got too popular in the 
Regiment.’77  
Unsavoury actions by officers which had the potential to attract negative attention to a regiment 
were swiftly responded to. Officers who were embroiled in a scandal, for example, could be 
obliged to resign, as noted by Keep in an 1809 letter to his mother: 
We have lost many officers lately one way or another, among others Abbott and 
Smelt. The former was a Quaker and forced to resign, and the latter got himself 
involved in a very awkward affair at Southampton with an Inn Keeper’s daughter, 
whose father entered an action against him, that has furnished a subject for the 
newspapers, and amusement for the gossips all round the Country of Hants.78 
Informal solutions and punishments appear to have been attractive as they circumvented the 
public course of military justice and kept these issues ‘in house’. In a letter to his uncle, Ensign 
John Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards remarked of a friend, Cornet Charles Bishop of the 
16th Light Dragoons, who was on the verge of ostracism: ‘I am quite grieved at having again 
heard of the disgraceful manner in which Charles Bishop is still going on, several people have 
spoken to me advising his getting an exchange, for his conduct is so ungentlemanlike that it is 
impossible he can be allowed to continue in the regiment.’79 
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Alongside civility, courage was a crucial aspect of the army’s honour code. As demonstrated by 
Kennedy, British officers expected each other to display their bravery and courage by facing 
battle, with those who avoided duty or displayed cowardice being open to accusations of 
effeminacy, and could be ostracised.80 Officers who were suspected of avoiding battle or going 
on campaign could draw the ire of their comrades. Woodberry wrote of a comrade who had 
remained in Britain rather than joining the 18th Hussars in the Peninsula:  
Lieut. Dunkin wrote to Colonel Murray from Brighton that he felt himself much hurt 
when he heard I was come out with the Regiment over his head, that his greatest 
wish was to go on service with the Regiment and was now ready to come 
immediately. All very fine talking – he knew I was coming out near a fortnight 
before we sailed, yet never troubled himself till near two months after. So much for 
Dunkin & the white feather.81 
Some officers expressed concerns that they could be falsely accused of cowardice. Describing his 
choice to join his regiment at the 1813 Battle of Vitoria when he had a legitimate reason to be 
absent, Ensign George Hennell of the 43rd Foot suggested that his absence may have been 
misinterpreted as cowardice: ‘You will see by my preceding letter that I might have been absent 
from the battle of the 21st [Vitoria] as I was on command, yet such is the high sense of honour in 
our regiment that in all probability they would have joked me about it for some time.’82 
Junior officers, therefore, would only pay fealty to their comrades when they were convinced of 
their honour. This relationship between honour and comradeship could draw junior officers 
into duels when their peers expected other officers to defend their honour at the risk of injury 
or death. Duels appear to have occurred infrequently, suggesting that alternative forms of 
dispute resolution were generally effective. Furthermore, duels were the end point of a process 
of mediation that could see disputes resolved amicably. Before a duel took place, each duellist 
was expected to enlist a ‘second’, who would act as an intermediary between the two parties, 
attempt to reconcile the duellists where possible, and oversee any duel which arose from the 
dispute.83 As noted by Banks, the honour of ‘seconds’ could also be at stake in duels, suggesting 
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that duels could entangle individuals not directly related to the dispute. 84 This occurred in the 
case of the 18th Hussars when some officers refused to act as a second for an officer: 
Now those very men have always pretended the greatest friendship for him, hung to 
him like leaches. But Dolbel had a large stock of hams, tongues &c. He had likewise a 
private servant, who always cooked good dinners. … when the man wanted their 
assistance and advice, they had not known him long enough, he was nearly a 
stranger unto them. They therefore declined the honour. The more I see of the 
World, the more ingratitude I discover in it.85 
This process of mediation appears to have prevented a reasonable number of disputes from 
reaching the stage of a duel. Acting as a second on several occasions where he circumvented 
duels, Sullivan boasted: ‘my friends never once apologised, yet it was a painful thing to be 
concerned in among brother officers.’ 86 Similarly, Keep managed to secretly reconcile two 
officers of his regiment who were intent on fighting a duel. In a letter to his mother, Keep 
revealed: ‘had it been found out my conduct would have been considered highly dishonourable, 
and I should have been termed a liar etc. … and have got into a hobble perhaps myself.’87 
In certain instances, duelling was a means by which an officer could maintain his honourable 
reputation amongst his comrades once his gentlemanly reputation had been brought into 
question. In duels, the values of civility and courage converged, as officers could maintain their 
honour through a conspicuous display of courage after they had been treated un-civilly. This 
concern over reputation suggests that honour was an outward value, as further highlighted by 
the performative dimension of duels. As noted by Matthew McCormack, performance was 
central to Georgian masculinities, with men expected not only to espouse certain characteristics, 
but to embody them in their actions.88 Duelling was a physical manifestation of an officer’s 
honour. By taking part in a ritualised duel, an officer stated his willingness to risk his welfare for 
his reputation, while his braving injury or death proved his courage to his fellow officers. As a 
ceremonial form of violence which took place in front of an audience of ‘seconds’, duels were 
somewhat theatrical. There were no commonly accepted rules to duelling during the eighteenth 
century; however, and details such as how far apart combatants should stand, or how many 
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shots should be fired, depended on the individuals involved.89 Just as in civilian society, the form 
that military duels took varied. Sullivan described one duel in the Peninsula, where two officers 
fired at each other across a river, while Lieutenant David Powell of the 14h Light Dragoons 
fought one duel where his opponent: ‘put himself in the most determined attitude with his legs 
far asunder by which means his body was lowered.’90  
The threat of being challenged to a duel was seen to regulate officers’ behaviour, and to ensure 
that the rules of civil interaction were maintained. Describing an argument between two officers 
of his regiment, Keep noted to his mother that the threat of a duel was an accepted result of 
uncivil behaviour: ‘The rules of the service are very rigid in these cases, so that no two officers 
can have the privilege of calling each other names even without being compelled to call each 
other out.’91 Woodberry described one instance in 1813 where attempts to correct the uncivil 
behaviour of a comrade, Dolbel, proved fruitless, raising the spectre of a duel: 
Smith seriously afraid he must call Dolbel out & fight him before he can bring the 
fellow to a true sense of honour & good behaviour; being in the same house with 
Dolbel, Smith is compelled to put up with a great deal of insolence, and it’s more 
than Kennedy & Smith can do to keep him at all in bounds.92 
Smith’s hope that a challenge would have a corrective effect on Dolbel highlights how duels 
could act as a prop for polite masculinity within the officer corps. The threat of violence for 
officers who breached the accepted standards of civility acted as a regulatory mechanism, 
ensuring that these standards were maintained. There are also examples, however, of the 
opposite occurring. Newly arrived at his regiment in the West Indies in 1804, Ensign Thomas 
Staunton St. Clair noted that a spate of recent duels had shattered the regiment’s camaraderie: 
‘At the mess-table I noticed a great reserve among the officers, as if each considered himself 
liable to a challenge for expressing his ideas upon any subject whatever.’93  
Within certain regiments, it was when a challenge was not forthcoming after an insult being 
offered that junior officers could find their honour under question. Woodberry described one 
incident, where the officers of the 18th assembled to pass judgement on two officers who 
quarrelled in front of the entire regiment, and: ‘came to the unanimous resolution that they 
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ought to be required to [re]sign immediately.’94 While the 18th’s commander overruled the 
officers in the hope of using the encounter as a warning, he suggested that a duel would have 
seen the officers save face: ‘Major H. told them of the sentiments of the officers … that the 
language made use of by both was such which ought to have obliged gentlemen to have had 
immediate recourse to arms & that death alone ought to have settled it between them.’95 
Describing a series of insults that were not met with challenges, or where an officer refused to 
fight, Sullivan noted that it was common to see these officers hounded out of the regiment: 
‘Davis for not noting the first insult offered by Kelly was obliged to sell & struck out of the Regt 
… Lt. Moore was situated much like Davis towards Kelly & he was also turned adrift – Lt. Mayne 
nearly shared the same fate.’96 It is likely that honour and duelling culture was strongest in 
regiments with a strong aristocratic culture. Serving with the 18th Hussars and the 1st Life 
Guards, Woodberry and Sullivan were both in aristocratically inclined cavalry regiments, 
suggesting a correlation between these elite regiments and the expectation that officers would 
fight a duel after having been insulted.  
The importance of duelling to individual officers’ identities as ‘men of honour’ should not be 
overstated. While officers may have considered fighting a duel to be necessary, junior officers 
often viewed duelling culture as coercive. The fear of being dishonoured or ostracised could 
shame unwilling officers into fighting a duel. Having just fought a duel, Evans wrote in his diary: 
‘However detestable is the professed duellist, I find it impossible, some time or other in man’s 
life, to avoid being concerned in one, without suffering insults and insolence.’97  Fearful of being 
involved in a duel, Keep wrote to his mother that he would, nevertheless, go through with one 
rather than face dishonour: ‘it is not the most agreeable alternative to be obliged to shoot each 
other. There is no other however, unless you should happen to be quite by yourselves, or 
compromise your honour in the company of a third person, which indeed most of us have too 
much pride to do.’98 In these cases, duelling culture appears hollow, with officers motivated to 
fight out of fear, rather than a belief in the principles of duelling. While maintaining an 
honourable reputation amongst other officers was essential for junior officers, this was not 
necessarily equated with duelling. Officers could be ostracised for failing to adhere to the 
standards of polite gentlemanliness and civility, without a duel taking place. Furthermore, even 
when a duel occurred, a lack of belief in duelling culture on the part of duellists suggests that 
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contemporary criticisms of duelling were undermining the importance of duelling in 
maintaining relations between officers.  
 
Challenging Authority 
As well as informing horizontal relations between officers of comparable rank, personal honour 
could also influence vertical bonds between superior and junior officers. In his study of 
American army officers, Morris Janowitz argued that the American officer corps inculcated 
many aspects of British aristocratic codes of military honour, which included personal fealty to 
superior officers.99 Junior officers’ expectation that they be treated with paternal warmth and 
gentlemanly respect likely encouraged loyalty to commanders that was personal, rather than 
structural. Ensign John Mills of the Coldstream Guards noted how personal ties counted for as 
much as rank in matters of authority: ‘On this day was decided a question between Sir G. 
Stirling, Coldstream, and Captain Horne, 3rd Guards. Sir B. Spencer and General Campbell 
decided that a superior officer of a different (or even the same regiment) had not right to put an 
inferior officer under arrest whilst the inferior’s commanding officer was on the ground.’100 
While Mills’ account is of a disagreement between two senior officers over a point of authority, 
this episode is still illustrative of the connection between personal relationships and the 
boundaries of authority. Authority based on personal bonds could undermine regimental 
cohesion, as subordinate officers displayed divided loyalties. Writing to his mother, Keep 
described how a dispute between three field officers of his regiment, had divided the junior 
ranks: ‘This sort of jealousy frequently exists in Regiments, so much so that sometimes the 
officers are divided into parties and won’t speak to each other. A good deal exists here, some 
officers being adherents to Whitelock, some to Maddison, and others again to Spry.’101  
The emphasis on personal bonds between superior and junior officers could become entangled 
with honour disputes, and a superior officer who was seen by his subordinates as acting 
dishonourably could undermine his authority. The 8th Foot was thrown into turmoil in the 
winter of 1799 and 1800, as its colonel brought a captain to court martial, an action which was 
seen by sections of his regiment as dishonourable. Seeing the officers of his regiment speaking 
out in defiance his colonel in the wake of this incident, Evans reflected on how personal 
connections overrode the structural authority of rank: ‘Many officers shewed the greatest and 
open indignation at the sentence … I could wish Officers would less indulge their personal 
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feelings on matters of a Military Question.’102 In the hope of ending the turmoil which was 
plaguing the regiment, the 8th’s officers later attempted to resolve the problem by forcing 
officers to respect authority on their honour, with every officer signing an accord: ‘binding each 
of them to constant support of their Commanding Officers.’103  
Within this context, junior officers could interpret being censured by superiors as an affront to 
their gentlemanly honour, as evidenced by instances of junior officers challenging superior 
officers to duels. Of twenty-six general courts martial of junior officers for duelling related 
offences in the period 1796-1815, ten involved a challenge being sent to a superior officer.104 In 
these cases, challenging, or attempting to provoke a challenge from, a superior officer was a 
means of contesting authority. In several of these courts martial, disputes arose from matters of 
daily duty and reprimands delivered from senior to junior officers. In 1802, Lieutenant Alex 
Bruce was court martialled for abandoning guard duty in disobedience of orders from his 
captain, and also for having sent that same captain a challenge four days later.105 While the 
record does not make clear what occurred in the interval between Bruce absenting himself from 
duty and the sending of the challenge, the proximity of the two events makes it likely that they 
are connected, and that the challenge was sent in response to the fall-out over Bruce’s 
inattention to duty. This theme can also be seen in the 1813 court martial of Ensign Alexander 
Blood. Having being imprisoned for brawling with a fellow ensign and abusing other officers, 
Blood challenged his lieutenant colonel after being ordered under arrest.106 Even adhering to a 
regiment’s uniform could create tension between superiors and subordinates. In 1812, Captain 
J. Francis L’Estrange of the 3rd Foot was court martialled for continual refusal to appear on 
parade dressed in his uniform and carrying his sword. Additionally, L’Estrange was also brought 
to trial on the suspicion of having sent his regiment’s commander a challenge in response to 
being ordered to wear his uniform.107 In each of these instances, the obstinate refusal of junior 
officers to accept the authority of senior officers not only illustrates the value which junior 
officers could place personal honour, but how this sense of honour could exist in a state of 
tension with the military hierarchy. 
The tension between honour codes and military hierarchies could create an ambiguous 
situation where it was unclear how and when junior officers should act in defence of their 
honour. One such situation is apparent in the unpublished memoir of Lieutenant George James 
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Sullivan of the 1st Life Guards. Sullivan’s relationship with his commander, Major Camac, 
demonstrates how junior officers could be obliged to balance the demands of personal honour, 
while remaining respectful of military law. Just as his regiment was preparing to depart Britain 
for the Peninsula, Sullivan came into conflict with Camac over a maid servant. Having been 
denigrated by Camac to members of the regiment, Sullivan sought Camac out for an explanation. 
Camac responded by stating, that, if Sullivan was: ‘offended with what he had said, I was not to 
consider him my Commanding Officer, that he wore a brown coat and was my humble servant at 
any time I pleased to call him out.’108 Suspecting a trap, Sullivan refused to offer Camac a 
challenge, given that a subsequent court martial would ‘ruin’ him.109 Despite refusing to offer a 
challenge, Sullivan also felt it necessary to see that his honour was not questioned, and ensured 
that there were witnesses to the exchange:  
retorted the major immediately, “Is that what you mean?” intending to infer that I 
was afraid to call him out. “No, Major Camac” said I, “If you go to such lengths and 
oblige me to speak out, I beg to tell you there stands Captain Whale, and if you will 
repeat before him what you have said to me I will fight you in five minutes.”  “I shall 
not, Sir” replied the gallant Major and away he turned upon his heels..110 
While Sullivan’s memoir is consciously anti-militaristic and drew on eighteenth-century anti-
aristocratic discourses to portray Camac as corrupt and vain, Sullivan’s account is still revealing 
as to the precarious situation in which junior officers could find themselves in relation to 
honour codes and the military hierarchy. Sullivan’s unwillingness to call out a superior for fear 
of a court martial, yet his unwillingness to compromise his honour highlights how honour was a 
complex concept for junior officers. While being honourable was an imperative and ensured an 
officer’s ongoing acceptance by his peers, the defence of that honour could also be an undoing.  
Personal honour and its associated qualities of gentlemanliness and bravery were central to 
interpersonal relations within the British officer corps. Maintaining an honourable reputation 
amongst other officers was essential for junior officers, which they were expected to display 
through their personal courage and by acting civilly towards other officers. It was not inevitable, 
however, that the British officer corps’ continuing association with an aristocratic honour code 
would lead junior officers into duels as a way of proving their honour to their comrades. Army 
officers were amongst the most prominent duellists in eighteenth-century Britain and may have 
been more likely to fight a duel than civilians, yet the army was not immune to the growing 
criticisms of duelling. Junior officers could be disdainful of duellists, while general courts 
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martial records suggest that military law was generally effective at curtailing duels. While 
occasional instances of duels or potential duels are evident in junior officers’ accounts, there is 
the sense that junior officers could be drawn into these disputes unwillingly, rather than 
through a belief in the value of duelling.  
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Chapter Six: Leading the Ranks 
The retreat of the British army to Corunna during late 1808 and early 1809 was, perhaps, the 
most tormenting experience British soldiers endured during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. With food in short supply, the British retreated through the Galician 
mountains during the dead of winter; plagued by cold, rain, and snow; and harassed by the 
pursuing French army. Discipline broke down, as soldiers turned to plunder to survive, and the 
retreating army left stragglers behind. In amongst the chaos, British junior officers struggled to 
maintain discipline. Lieutenant Robert Blakeney of the 28th Foot described the scenes as his 
regiment marched into, and staggered out, of a Spanish town: ‘Beimbibre exhibited all the 
appearance of a place lately stormed and pillaged. Every door and window was broken, every 
lock and fastening forced. Rivers of wine ran through the houses and into the streets, where lay 
fantastic groups of soldiers.’1 So it continued, Blakeney and his fellow officers using: ‘every 
exertion to restore order and discipline’ on the remainder of the retreat, including the execution 
of a ranker for plunder.2 By turning to corporal punishment to enforce authority, Blakeney 
seemed to conform to the popular image of leadership in the eighteenth-century British army, 
where a socially remote officer corps maintained control over the rank and file through severe 
discipline. Another officer on the retreat, Captain Alexander Gordon of the 15th Hussars, offered 
a more nuanced approach to leadership, noting in his journal that he and his fellow officers: 
‘exerted themselves to the utmost of their ability to preserve order and secure the comfort of 
the soldiers.’3 Gordon’s account certainly prioritised discipline; yet he also iterated how officers 
cared for their men, suggesting a softer approach to leadership.  
Scholarship on the relationship between British officers and rankers during the eighteenth 
century has traditionally focused on the social disparity between officers and rankers, and the 
coerciveness of military discipline. Junior officers were drawn from across the gentlemanly 
classes, and were socially remote from the rank and file, the majority of whom were drawn from 
the labouring classes.4 The social distinction between officers and rankers has been frequently 
highlighted in studies of the eighteenth-century army, and has traditionally been seen as 
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imbuing officers with an indifference towards their men.5  In his study of desertion from the 
eighteenth-century army, Arthur Gilbert portrayed army discipline as overbearing and 
constrictive, as officers relied on corporal punishment to keep men in the ranks.6 Similarly, 
Edward J. Coss viewed military leadership as offering ‘the stick without a carrot’, and further 
emphasised officers’ preference for corporal punishment as a way of maintaining discipline.7 
Recent scholarship, however, has revised the view of officer-soldier relations in the eighteenth 
century British army. Sylvia Frey has highlighted how British officers during the American War 
of Independence were generally reluctant to use corporal punishment to maintain order, 
preferring to inculcate the values of honour and duty to motivate troops.8 John Cookson argued 
that military authority was contingent on the successful maintenance of reciprocal 
relationships.9 In an important essay, William P. Tatum highlighted soldiers’ agency in 
protesting against grievances, which resulted in officers exercising ‘negotiated authority’ over 
the rank and file.10  
This chapter is about British junior officers’ attitudes towards the men they commanded, and 
the factors that shaped their identities as leaders, both on and off the battlefield. Public attitudes 
towards common soldiers were evolving during the late-eighteenth century. The cultures of 
sensibility and Romanticism encouraged the view of soldiers as individuals, while artworks and 
literature were beginning to portray soldiers as objects of sympathy.11 This evolution was 
reflected in the training of armies, particularly in light infantry regiments, which were trained to 
make use of soldiers’ intuition.12 The effects of this evolving view of common soldiers are 
evident in junior officers’ identities as leaders. The changes brought by these evolving attitudes 
present a challenge to the traditional view of leadership within the army during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Junior officers certainly expected deference from their 
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men, and were not wholly averse to the use of corporal punishment to ensure order, yet they 
also aimed to build an understanding of the men under their command and were not immune to 
the suffering of soldiers. British junior officers’ leadership style, therefore, may best be 
described as a form of paternalism. This style of leadership fused established patterns of 
leadership, such as aristocratic martial codes, with emerging views over the humanity of 
common soldiers. The first section of this chapter explores how junior officers’ attitudes 
towards the rank and file were affected by evolving public perceptions of common soldiers; and 
how, as polite ‘men of feeling’, junior officers sympathised with their men during periods of 
suffering. The second section reveals how a belief in the humanity of the rank and file shaped 
junior officers’ conduct as they sought to establish a familiarity with rankers, and to alleviate 
hardship where possible. The third section addresses the matter of discipline. Here, the greatest 
conflicts in junior officers’ identities as leaders can be seen, as arguments over corporal 
punishment highlight how junior officers saw two sides of rankers’ character. The fourth section 
explores junior officers’ conduct in battle, where the values of ‘natural’ leadership, such as 
bravery and honour, were vital. Delivered with a moral high-handedness, which could range 
from benign displays of care, to a harsh acceptance of corporal punishment, leadership as 
practiced by British junior officers was grounded in the assumed social and moral superiority of 
the officer corps.  
 
A ‘Parcel of Devils’? 
Lieutenant William Grattan of the 88th Foot, or Connaught Rangers, held somewhat conflicting 
views of the rank and file of his regiment. An Irish Protestant officer in charge of predominantly 
Irish Catholic soldiers, Grattan acknowledged his soldiers’ propensity for theft and destruction 
of property, yet nevertheless found his charges’ wit and humours endearing. In his memoir, 
Grattan summed up his views on his soldiers: ‘I cannot bring myself to think them, as many did, 
a parcel of devils, neither will I by any means try to pass them off for so many saints!’13 The 
popular image of the British redcoat during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has 
not been a positive one. Coss has persuasively argued that perceptions of the British soldiers 
during this period have been negatively skewed by derogative remarks made by British officers, 
most notably Wellington’s early-nineteenth description of his soldiers as: ‘the scum of the 
earth’, which allowed subsequent historians to portray British soldiers as criminals or brutes.14 
The extent to which junior officers saw their soldiers in this light is debatable. Cookson has 
argued that Wellington’s views reflected the majority view of officers, who saw soldiers as 
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belonging to a ‘culture of the poor’.15 Junior officers certainly saw themselves as socially and 
culturally different from the rank and file; however, it does not follow that officers saw rankers 
as a homogenous collective of brutes or savages. Anecdotal evidence suggests that junior 
officers’ perceptions of their men were not fixed, and officers could recognise soldiers’ 
admirable qualities.  
Officers and rankers were drawn from unequal social backgrounds, yet birth and wealth were 
not the only distinctions between officers and rankers. Officers emphasised the cultural 
differences between themselves and their men to explain and buttress their authority. The rank 
and file’s vulgarity was a source of disgust for officers. Ensign George Hennell wrote to his 
brothers about the behaviour of his men before a battle:  
The conversation among the men is interspersed with the most horrid oaths 
declaring what they will do with the fellow they lay hands on. What they intend to 
get in plunder, hoping they will stand a chance that they may split two at once. Then 
someone more expert at low wit than his companions draws a ludicrous picture of a 
Frenchman with a bayonet stuck in him or something of the kind, which raises a 
loud and general laugh. Others describe what they have achieved in this way … They 
marched off … & for amusement by the way commenced their wit upon each other 
with grossness and sometimes [in] point hardly to be exceeded.16 
The British army in the Peninsula were involved in storming the fortresses of Badajoz, Ciudad 
Rodrigo, and San Sebastian, with Badajoz and San Sebastian accompanied by subsequent 
violence, rape, and destruction that Charles Esdaile has described as a ‘war crime’.17 British 
officers’ views of their men’s conduct after the storming of fortresses in the Peninsula highlight 
how junior officers could see their men not just as vulgar, but as savage. Robert Blakeney of the 
28th foot described the behaviour of soldiers after the 1812 storming of Badajoz: ‘every species 
of outrage was publicly committed in the houses, churches and streets, and in a manner so 
brutal that a faithful recital would be too indecent and too shocking to humanity.’18 
Even here, however, British officers’ views of their men were pockmarked with ambiguity. The 
storming of breaches was horrific: 3, 500 British soldiers died during the Siege of Badajoz 
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alone.19 Officers acknowledged soldiers for their bravery. Captain Henry Ross-Lewin of the 32nd 
Foot was at a loss to explain the behaviour of the 88th Foot in the looting following the siege of 
Badajoz, and emphasised the duality of soldiers’ characters: ‘It is painful to contemplate so rapid 
an alteration of light and shade in the soldier’s character! To behold him one hour a hero and 
the next a brute.’20 While condemning soldiers’ conduct after a siege, junior officers excused the 
violence and plunder of their troops on the grounds that they were acting within established 
rules of war surrounding sieges. In the case of a siege, it was accepted that the defenders could 
surrender once a breach was made in the defences, and be allowed to leave the fortress 
peacefully, or decide to fight on, on the understanding that the attackers did not owe the 
inhabitants any grace if they were victorious.21 Junior officers appear to have accepted this 
practice, which resulted in the view that soldiers’ conduct after sieges was unpalatable, but 
legitimate. Describing the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, Captain Jonathan Leach of the 95th Rifles 
conceded that: ‘When a town is stormed, it is inevitable that excesses will be, as they ever have 
been, committed by the assailants, more particularly if it takes place at night.’22 Shocked at the 
plunder of the troops at Badajoz, Hennell stopped short of accusing his men of murdering the 
town’s inhabitants. In a letter to a friend, Hennell noted they would have been within their 
rights to do so: ‘I hear our soldiers in some instances behaved very ill-I only saw two [behaving 
ill] and stopped them both … By the laws of war we are allowed to kill all found in a town that 
stands a storm and our soldiers declared they would do so, but an Englishman cannot kill in cold 
blood.’23 
One key difference officers saw between themselves and their men was a differing degree of 
humanity, often expressed in terms of contrasting levels of sensibility. The late-eighteenth 
century culture of sensibility made a virtue of feeling and sensation, as polite men and women 
responded to moving stimuli with emotional responses, such as tears.24 As shown by G.J. Barker-
Benfield, sensibility was seen as an acquirable attribute through exposure to stimuli, such as 
literature or music, but was also used to reinforce established hierarchies, with the degree of 
sensibility displayed by an individual seen to underline social standing.25 As shown by Catriona 
Kennedy and Sarah Knott, late-Georgian officers used the language of sensibility to distinguish 
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themselves from the ‘coarseness’ of common soldiers.26 Captain John Blakiston, recalled his 
astonishment at the seeming obliviousness of his men before the 1813 storming of San 
Sebastian: 
[I] could not help observing, with some degree of astonishment, that, with a very 
few exceptions, they were all, even the headmost (who were, in fact, a forlorn hope), 
in a profound sleep. Now many of these men would probably the next morning 
betray considerable fear, and some would perhaps behave like rank cowards, for all 
are not brave. Whence, then, this insensibility to their situation?27 
Attempting to explain the brutishness of their men, officers looked to the cultural background of 
rankers. Captain George Wood of the 82nd Foot noted in his memoir that officers and soldiers 
bore adversity differently, owing to their different constitutions: ‘the men of course [were] more 
burdened, but then they are from infancy more inured to hardships and proportionably better 
able to bear the inclemency of the weather, and the fatigues and privations incident to war.’28 
Reflecting the assumption that personal character was the product of experience, junior 
officers also noted the potentially brutalising effects of war on the rank and file. Following 
the 1812 siege of Badajoz, Captain John Kincaid of the 95th Rifles came across two soldiers 
who had both lost a leg in the storming of the breach, only to be ignored by their 
comrades. Astonished at the callousness of their comrades, Kincaid remarked: ‘It is 
wonderful how such scenes as these will deaden men’s feelings, and with that apathy it 
enables them, to look upon the suffering of their fellow creatures!’29 During the harrowing 
1812 retreat from Burgos, staff officer Captain Thomas Henry Browne reflected on the 
effects that the warfare had on men and officers: 
it was about this time that I began to remark the different effects of continued 
warfare like that of the Peninsula on the character of the officers & common 
soldiers. The latter appeared to me, to become daily more ferocious & less fit to 
return to the duties of citizens…The officers on the contrary seemed to become 
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more thoughtful & humane & more anxious to exert themselves in softening the 
misery with which they were surrounded.30 
In junior officer accounts, there is an evident hierarchy of feeling they employed to distinguish 
themselves from the rank and file: by emphasising their capacity to feel, junior officers affirmed 
their own moral and social superiority over the rank and file.31  
The characteristics that officers used to distinguish themselves from their men, however, also 
allowed for an appreciation of rankers’ humanity. Suffering was a feature of soldiers’ accounts 
of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, particularly in memoirs of the Peninsular 
War. As revealed by Neil Ramsey, soldier memoirists recounted their personal experiences of 
suffering in an appeal to early-nineteenth century reading tastes, and cultivated a ‘shared 
sympathy’ between author and reader.32  Gavin Daly has highlighted how British soldiers in the 
Peninsula weaved accounts of suffering into their narratives, as part of their identities as 
‘romantic travellers’.33 Suffering was central to junior officers’ military identities, as it fed into a 
wider narrative of subordination and obscurity. Aside from detailing their own suffering, junior 
officers were witnesses to the suffering of others, including the rank and file. Being attuned to 
the suffering of others was a feature of late-eighteenth century cultures of sensibility and 
sentimentalism, and was employed in humanitarian campaigns, such as the abolition 
movement.34 Public perceptions of common soldiers were also touched by this culture, which 
created the potential for soldiers to be seen as an object of sympathy. As shown by Philip Shaw, 
artistic representations of military suffering began to address the suffering of common soldiers 
during the late-eighteenth century, and cut across topics of wounding, grieving, and loss.35  
There is evidence to suggest that junior officers’ perceptions of their men were influenced by 
the evolving perception of common soldiers. These sentiments are most strongly presented in 
memoirs, suggesting that officer memoirists were stressing their own humanity to a reading 
audience who were increasingly sympathising with soldiers. There are sufficient references to 
common soldiers’ suffering in contemporary accounts, however, to suggest that these ideas 
were not the preserve of the post-war period. Junior officers often expressed their sympathy for 
soldiers who were experiencing suffering on campaign. After a march on a bad road in torrential 
rain in the Peninsula to the point where he was ‘completely knocked up’, Lieutenant James Hope 
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of the 92nd Foot noted to a friend how his own hardship paled in comparison to that of rankers: 
‘When this was my situation, who had neither musket, knapsack, canteen, or haversack, what 
must the poor soldier have suffered, who had to march encumbered with all these - a weight a 
little under three stone?’36 Junior officers stressed their proximity to the rank and file as giving 
them a unique perspective of their hardship. Ensign John Mills of the Coldstream Guards wrote 
to his mother about Wellington’s policy in the Peninsula of marching the men into villages 
during the day, and then into bivouac again in the evening: ‘God knows we have had marching 
enough by day and night and have not grumbled, but added to all this to be unnecessarily and 
experimentally harassed is heartbreaking…Himself and the General Officers not feeling them 
[the men], are not as well aware of them as we are.’37  Blakiston recalled a 25 mile long march in 
the heat of the Peninsula: 
On such occasions the situation of an officer commanding a company is worse than 
that of a slave-driver. To have to urge the men beyond their strength, and to be 
obliged to turn a deaf ear to their entreaties to be allowed to fall out, until the poor 
wretches sink from exhaustion, or are pronounced incapable of proceeding by the 
surgeon, was by far the most disagreeable duty that fell to my lot. The General 
commanding the Division may censure the Brigadier, the Brigadier may find fault 
with the Commander of Battalions, and the last may rate the Captains for the 
number of men left behind on the march, without any great expense of feeling; but 
to the latter officer, who comes in immediate contact with the soldiers whose 
sufferings he witnesses it is really heart-rending.38 
By highlighting his own distress at having to force his men to march on through tough 
conditions, Blakiston portrayed himself as an object of sympathy; however, his account also 
reveals his sympathy for the men he commanded, suggesting that he viewed his men as 
thinking, feeling beings. Furthermore, Blakiston emphasised his own proximity to these events, 
indicating that junior officers felt themselves more exposed to their men’ suffering than 
superior officers. 
By expressing sympathy in this manner, junior officers were certainly affirming their own 
identities as polite ‘men of feeling’, but viewing their men as objects of sympathy also allowed 
for a broader recognition of their qualities and character. In contrast to the view of soldiers as 
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callous, some officers also noted the humanity of the rank and file. Captain John Harley, the 
quartermaster of the 48th Regiment, applauded his men’s conduct on the retreat from Burgos. 
Harley witnessed his men as they attended to the officers’ mess cook, who had just given birth 
to twins: ‘As the regiment had no tents, this poor creature was obliged to lie under a tree; the 
soldiers indeed, like men, taking off their coats to cover her.’39  Suffering was not purely 
observed as a brutalising force, as some officers saw their men caring for each other. Lieutenant 
Moyle Sherer of the 34th Foot described his men as, ‘charitable and generous’, and suggested 
that: ‘frequent exposure to hardship, privation, and danger, make them friendly and ready to 
assist each other.’40 The manner in which rankers bore their sufferings engendered a degree of 
respect from officers. In this regard, junior officers reflected the values of the cultures of 
politeness and sensibility. As noted by Philip Carter, people who faced suffering with resolve or 
cheerfulness were viewed with more compassion than those who languished.41 Blakiston 
applauded the ability of soldiers to remain cheerful on long marches in the Peninsula: ‘The 
troops were …  a good deal fatigued, and began to evince the usual consequences of a long 
march in worn out shoes and sore feet; but notwithstanding this and the privation they had 
undergone in the scarcity of provisions, they were in high spirits.’42 Ensign William Thornton 
Keep wrote home to his mother from the Peninsula in 1812, applauding the behaviour of his 
troops on a march in the heat of summer: ‘Discipline was easily preserved for the conduct of the 
soldiers was exceedingly praiseworthy. Burdened as they were with the heavy loads they had to 
carry, some poor fellows were often deplorably jaded, but cheerful and uncomplaining.’43 Junior 
officers, therefore, maintained two seemingly contradictory views of the rank and file. On the 
one hand, they could see common soldiers as coarse and brutish, and lacking in feeling. On the 
other, they expressed a deal of sympathy for their men’s plight in undergoing suffering. These 
conflicting attitudes manifested themselves in a paternalistic style of leadership, which stressed 
the social and moral superiority of officers, yet also grounded their leadership in the principles 
of benevolence and care. 
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Officer-Soldier Relations 
Much of the scholarship on relationships between eighteenth-century British officers and 
soldiers has focused on the social and ideological barriers that were erected between the two 
groups. Coss highlighted the lack of recognition officers paid to rankers in their accounts to 
suggest that the officer corps had a ‘disinterestedness’ in their men, owing to the social gulf 
between the two groups.44 The social divide certainly inhibited the formation of close, personal 
bonds between officers and soldiers. Few officers, only five-and-a-half per cent during the 
Peninsular War, had been commissioned from the ranks.45 In addition to structural barriers, the 
officer corps also displayed cultural obstacles to interaction between officers and soldiers. As 
highlighted by Arthur Gilbert, the officer corps’ honour code produced a culture in which 
associating too closely with rankers could result in an officer being ostracised, or court 
martialled.46 This culture which emphasised a degree of distance from the ranks persisted into 
the Napoleonic Period, with the logic that overfamiliarity would jeopardise the deference 
soldiers owed their officers as social superiors. As ‘gentlemen’, junior officers expected their 
men to respect their social standing, and to emulate their example. Ensign John Rous of the 
Coldstream Guards wrote to his father: ‘Gen. Paget has joined us, and is universally liked by the 
officers and must soon be so by the rest of the men, since whatever is liked by the former is 
always so by the latter, at least in regiments like the Guards.’47 The aristocratic culture of elite 
regiments such as the Coldstream Guards likely reinforced the culture of deference; however, a 
similar emphasis on the social authority of officers can be seen in less celebrated line regiments. 
Grattan advocated a degree of separation between officers and soldiers, and described the 
leadership style of the 88th Foot: ‘We approached their [the soldiers’] quarters as seldom as we 
possibly could - I mean as seldom as was necessary - and thereby kept up that distance between 
officers and privates so essential to discipline.’48  
Maintaining a respectable distance between officers and soldiers was certainly a feature of the 
leadership style of junior officers, yet this is not to suggest that junior officers saw their 
authority as the straightforward imposition of rank or class power. Recent scholarship has 
revealed the complex relationships that characterised eighteenth-century officer-soldier 
relations. Tatum has demonstrated how soldiers were not passive members of the regimental 
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hierarchy, as they variously protested against, complied with, or negotiated the terms of 
military authority.49 Similarly, Cookson has highlighted the vertical and horizontal bonds that 
characterised inter-regimental relations.50   Maintaining these relationships with the rank and 
file evidently required an understanding between officers and soldiers of their expectations and 
rights. Officers cultivated vertical bonds with their men and saw a shared regimental interest, 
trust and, at the least, a basic understanding of character between officers and men as essential 
to maintaining discipline and authority. Advice literature emphasised the importance of this 
relationship. The Regimental Companion saw familiarity as essential in maintaining order in 
battle, and instructed infantry officers:  
to make every soldier in his company so thoroughly acquainted with his word of 
command, that in the midst of smoke, noise, and even under circumstances of 
momentary confusion, his voice should always be the principal and governing 
impulse of the company’s movement. On this account, officers should be shifted as 
little as possible from the different companies to which they have been originally 
attached.51 
The Companion advised cavalry officers further: ‘Every subaltern officer ought, as soon as 
possible, to get acquainted with the names and characters of the men of the troop he belongs 
to.’52  
Junior officers noted that it was easier to command men who they were familiar with. Officers 
who found themselves in charge of soldiers from assorted regiments routinely complained 
about the difficulty of maintaining control. Marching a detachment of reinforcements to the 
front in the Peninsula, Captain Charles Ramus Forrest of the 3rd Foot recorded his arrival: ‘The 
men of the detachment were immediately drafted off to companies & thus ended my command, 
a duty from which I was most happy to be relieved and one on which I had met with much 
trouble and anxiety.’53 Captain Alexander Gordon of the 15th Hussars expressed similar 
sentiments during the 1809 retreat to Corunna:  
I have seldom experienced greater satisfaction that I felt on transferring the men of 
my detachment to their respective regiments. I had been heartily sick of my 
command from the commencement of the march, for, although the conduct of the 
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individuals of my own regiment was most exemplary, nothing could exceed the 
insubordination of the rest.54 
In battle, the importance of familiarity was amplified. Recalling his time as a ranker with the 
56th Foot, William Surtees attributed the failure of the 1809 expedition to Walcheren on the lack 
of understanding between men and officers, as the army had been assembled from militia 
drafts:  
the officers of course neither had that knowledge of the characters of their men, 
which is so essential, nor had the latter confidence in their officers, which only 
service together for some length of time can engender, and which is absolutely 
necessary to secure an unreserved and active obedience to their commands.55 
Lieutenant William Tomkinson of the 16th Dragoons wrote in his diary after the Siege of 
Badajoz: ‘The detachment to the gorge was chiefly from the 88th regiment. Men in detachment 
do not know their officers, nor officers their men. There can be no regimental esprit … and when 
men are not known by officers, they may do anything with impunity.’56  
As officer accounts only occasionally refer to individual soldiers, the nature of relationships 
built between officers and soldiers are difficult to reconstruct. It is likely that hours spent on the 
drill ground bred familiarity. As highlighted by Rory Muir, drill was not only important for 
battlefield efficacy, but was also critical in fostering regimental morale.57 Coss highlighted how 
drill built soldiers’ confidence in their officers, as long as drill was executed competently.58 
Growing professional standards in the British army saw officers required to be competent at 
putting their men through drill, however, drill also necessitated interaction between men and 
officers beyond the giving of orders. John Cooke, a subaltern with the 43rd Foot, noted that new 
officers were required to learn drill alongside rankers, recalling that an: ‘officer was not 
considered clear of the adjutant until he could put a company through the evolutions by word of 
command, which he had practised in the ranks. It generally took him six months in summer at 
four times a day, an hour at each period, to perfect all he had to learn.’59 Ensign William Bell of 
the 88th Foot wrote home about his routine as a new ensign: ‘I have been out at six o’clock in the 
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mornings for some time past – since I joined the regiment. We are drilled with the men exactly 
the same as the privates.’60 
Benevolence on the part of officers was a crucial feature of officer-soldier relations. Junior 
officers sought to earn their men’s respect through acts of care and kindness. Cookson argued 
that the social stratification of officers and soldiers imbued officers with a substantial degree of 
moral responsibility to act generously towards their men.61 Furthermore, junior officers were a 
part of an institution with established practices of care. Erica Charters has revealed how Britain 
acted as a ‘caring fiscal-military state’ during the Seven Years’ War. Charters demonstrated how 
the military valued cleanliness, order, and disease prevention; and attended to the health and 
well-being of common soldiers and sailors.62 These values are reflected in the way junior 
officers treated their men. The figure of the caring subaltern or captain is a staple of junior 
officer accounts, as many officers allowed minor breaches in discipline to ease the lot of 
soldiers, or attempted to alleviate suffering where possible. The appalling conditions which 
accompanied marches or retreats in the Peninsula often compelled officers to attend to their 
men. Keep wrote home to his mother from the Peninsula: ‘Both Nelson and I had been much 
under … censure in the early part of or journey for letting the men help themselves to oranges 
growing unprotected on the road … Nelson shed tears of vexation at our misfortune, though I 
cared little about it, the poor soldiers being often so distressed with thirst.’63 Officers could take 
a more active role in supporting their men. During the 1812 retreat from Burgos, Second 
Captain William Webber of the Royal Artillery took what steps he could to ensure men did not 
fall behind: ‘Those men who were weak or sickly were fast dropping in the rear, certain of 
falling into the hands of the enemy unless we would mount them on our carriages, which 
feelings of humanity in opposition to a sense of duty almost tempted us to do as far as we could - 
but from the numbers of our sick, we only brought on three.’64 Lieutenant John Aitchison of the 
3rd Foot Guards described the retreat to his father: ‘I have seen sick soldiers rolled up in their 
blankets, lying by the roadside, left for want of conveyance, perhaps to die … I had one from my 
own company left to his fate (having lost the use of his limbs in the retreat) and after exhausting 
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my own means, by carrying on my private mules another in the same state.’65 The sympathy 
junior officers displayed towards soldiers can, at times, appear to be more about affirming their 
moral and cultural superiority. There is certainly an element of that in officer accounts; 
however, as noted by Barker-Benfield, sentimental culture was attuned to this criticism, and 
stressed the importance of acting humanely towards objects of sympathy.66 Sympathy for 
soldiers and attempts to alleviate suffering are linked in officer accounts, suggesting that junior 
officers’ saw an important tangible dimension to their identities as ‘men of feeling.’  
Shared campaign experiences also had the effect of dissolving the barriers between officers and 
soldiers. Second Lieutenant George Simmons of the 95th Rifles appeared to have a greater 
understanding of his soldiers by sharing in their hardship. Simmons wrote to his parents: 
Even the strongest in outward appearance would lie down, or rather fall down, and 
say positively they could not go any farther. The officers of our regiment – most of 
them rode on horses or mules – did not experience the fatigues so materially. As I 
had no money to spare, I was obliged to walk, and, God knows, if illness had 
intervened or I had not been able to march, my case would have been dismal.67 
In particular, the chaos and suffering which attended retreats in the Peninsula saw the 
distinction between officers and soldiers break down. The 1809 retreat to Corunna, and the 
1812 retreat from Burgos, saw the army fighting against brutal winter conditions and the 
pursuing French army, while short on transport and supplies, often going days without 
adequate shelter.68 Suffering on these retreats was shared between officers and soldiers alike, as 
a shortage of supplies forced officers to eat acorns found in the forest or to turn to plunder. In a 
letter to his father, Aitchison described the retreat from Burgos: ‘We slept on the bare wet 
ground for 6 nights following the middle of November (sometimes after marching from 
daybreak til dark) and in that time there was but one night and one day without rain or hail.’69 
In terms of human suffering, however, nothing compared to the retreat to Corunna. Gordon 
noted of the retreat to Corunna: ‘The miseries to which the troops were exposed increased at 
every step … Many of the officers were destitute of shoes or stockings, with their clothes in rags; 
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it may, therefore, be imagined that the privates were in a most deplorable condition.’70 The 
extremity of such conditions had a levelling effect. Gordon wrote in his journal of a night on the 
retreat: ‘I felt thankful at being able to obtain a share of some wet straw in the narrow loft of a 
miserable hovel, which was occupied by at least a dozen persons- officers, soldiers and 
servants- all distinction of ranks being levelled by the distress and danger to which all were 
exposed.’71  
The more mundane routine of attending to men’s cleanliness also drew attention from junior 
officers. Sickness was a constant issue for the British army during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. Soldiers in the West Indies were particularly vulnerable to disease: Michael 
Duffy calculated that 43, 750 soldiers and non-commissioned officers who served in the West 
Indies between 1793 and 1801 died from disease, at a rate of nearly 51 per cent.72 Expeditions 
in other climes were less severely impacted by disease, yet sickness was still a concern. Ten per 
cent of soldiers on the 1809 Walcheren expedition died from ‘Walcheren Fever’; while the 
British army in the Peninsular suffered 55, 000 disease related deaths in the period 1810-
1814.73 Junior officer accounts suggest that they were concerned about the effects campaign 
conditions had on rankers’ health, and feature regular observations on the general health of the 
army. Serving in the Peninsula, Webber wrote in his diary during the summer of 1813: ‘Our 
army was never more healthy, indeed I should think troops in England cannot be in a better 
state.’74 Webber applauded the improvements made to the army’s organisation in this case, 
particularly in the wake of the disastrous retreat from Burgos: 
The soldiers have tents and although they are much crowded … the nights are 
sufficiently cool to prevent their feeling any ill effects … During the last campaign 
they had none and it was very trying to the strongest constitution to lie down, after 
a long march, exposed to the mists or dampness of the night air. It is a pleasure to be 
in an army so well regulated as this, in which the wants of the solders are so much 
considered.75 
Junior officers not only saw the value in improved regulations, they also actively sought to keep 
their men clean. The confined spaces of transport ships were an area of concern for officers. On 
board a transport ship for the West Indies with his regiment, Captain Thomas Powell of the 14th 
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Foot and his fellow officers instituted a rigorous regime of cleanliness to ensure that sickness 
did not take hold. Soldiers and their families were kept on the upper deck during the day; the 
sleeping decks were washed daily, and then fumigated five days a week. In addition, each 
soldier bathed three times a week; was provided with two clean shirts a week; and were 
paraded twice a day to ensure that their hands and faces were clean.76 Powell further 
recommended: ‘The men should often parade without their shoes and stockings, to see if they 
keep their Feet Clean.’77 Lieutenant Peter Bowlby of the 4th Foot was not impressed with the 
conditions of one ship bound for the West Indies: ‘I found the transport very dirty, to occupy 
myself I obtained permission from the Captain of my regiment who commanded on board to set 
to work cleaning the ship; which was effectually done.’78  
Being over-zealous in attending to the rank and file was often perceived by junior officers as 
creating an extra burden for soldiers, which in turn would limit the respect they afforded to 
officers. A relaxed air to discipline was seen to imply trust in the rank and file. Keep wrote to his 
mother, describing how his captain undermined his own authority by subjecting his men to 
unnecessary discipline:  
Our captain in command … [would] trouble the men by a thorough examination of 
their packs, often when tired and falling asleep … The men’s packs, lest they should 
have disposed of any of their wardrobe for liquor on the march, are thus required to 
be looked into … it was an unnecessary annoyance to all parties, particularly the 
suspicion of it to good soldiers who had no intention of the kind, and he was very 
unpopular with them.79 
Evidently, junior officers were not only interested in the physical well-being of their men, but 
also in their morale. Garrisoned in Halifax in North America in 1807, Browne found himself 
stationed in a battery as the sole officer in charge of fifty men for a period of several months. 
This situation presented Browne with something of a dilemma. As the only officer in the station, 
and with little prospect of activity outside the daily routine of drill, Browne could have had 
considerable difficulty exerting control over his men. Instead of subjecting his men to a routine, 
however, or maintaining order through fear of corporal punishment, Browne chose to establish 
a working arrangement with his men to keep their morale intact. A keen fisherman, Browne 
crewed a small boat with soldiers, and caught food for his men: ‘I bought fishing lines, and used 
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to occupy myself and the crew of my boat in fishing for my little garrison – we caught fish in the 
greatest abundance, and the men were capitally supplied with it.’80  
Browne took other measures which featured a greater involvement from his men, as he put his 
soldiers to work. He ordered two acres of land be cleared by his soldiers so they could grow 
potatoes, and also devised a novel way of alleviating boredom:  
The barracks in which we lived was on a bare rocky bit of ground, and it occurred to 
me that I would make a garden to it. For this purpose, instead of having parade with 
my men, I used to order them on fatigue for about an hour each day, and as I had 
masons and all other sorts of trades in the company, the rough stones all about the 
place soon assumed the shape of a regular garden wall.81  
 Far from lacking understanding of his men, Browne was familiar enough to recognise that his 
soldiers possessed skills which could be put to meaningful ends. His soldiers appear to have 
appreciated this diversion, as Browne reported in his diary: ‘The men took a hearty and good 
humoured interest in this little improvement, and before two months were over, I had the 
satisfaction of seeing a remarkably pretty garden added to the Eastern battery.’82  
Nor were officer-soldier relationships one-way. Officer accounts occasionally highlight the 
affection rankers could hold for officers, suggesting that caring or brave officers were admired 
by their men. During preparations for the Walcheren campaign, Ensign William Thornton Keep 
turned to his men for advice on what gear he should take abroad: ‘I shall provide myself with 
half a dozen shirts only, 1 pair of boots, pantaloons and a great coat, 4 pairs of cotton stockings 
and three of worsted. I bought these by the advice of old soldiers who vouch for the benefit I 
shall derive from them with wet feet.’83 Rankers could also demonstrate their appreciation to 
popular officers. After the 1813 Battle of Vitoria, Lieutenant George Woodberry of the 18th 
Hussars received a present for attempting to prevent another officer, Carew, from being 
captured by the French: ‘Capt. Carew’s troop presented me yesterday with a most beautiful 
poodle dog, that they took at Vitoria, for my conduct with them at that glorious battle. It was a 
gift from the whole troop who had kept the dog amongst them since the victory.’84 This was not 
an isolated occurrence. Lieutenant James Hope of the 92nd Highlanders wrote to a friend about a 
gift he received after the 1815 Battle of Quatre Bras: ‘I received a message from a wounded 
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soldier, named Robinson, begging me to speak to him, as he had in his possession a book which I 
would like to read. I complied with his request-received the book; and, on opening it, was truly 
astonished to find it the History of Scotland’s champion, Sir William Wallace.’85 Similarly, Ensign 
Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards returned to his company after the 1813 storming of 
San Sebastian to find his men relieved that he had survived. One ranker commented: ‘why damn 
it sir, we thought you had been kilt upon that there breach; & real I be damned glad to see thee, 
that I be.’86 The social distinction officers perceived between themselves and their men ensured 
that they expected their men to show the deference which befitted their social position; yet 
officer-soldier relations were more complex than the imposition of class authority. Junior 
officers saw maintaining a respectful relationship with their men, characterised by a degree of 
familiarity and understanding, as essential for maintaining authority. Importantly, junior 
officers aimed to cultivate this relationship by acting with benevolence towards their men, 
attending to their care and morale. 
 
Corporal Punishment 
There was, however, another side to discipline in the army. The threat of corporal punishment 
loomed large in the lives of common soldiers. Rankers could face beatings or floggings for 
offences such as being absent from duty or theft, and were subject to the death penalty for the 
more serious crimes of desertion, assault, murder, and striking an officer.87 All but the most 
severe crimes were dealt with at the regimental level, effectively leaving discipline to the 
discretion of regiments.88 The degree of corporal punishment within the late-eighteenth century 
British army has been a matter of significant scholarly debate. Coss argued that corporal 
punishment, in particular flogging, was so prevalent within the British army during the 
Napoleonic period that it was nearly an ‘inevitable event’ that soldiers would be flogged at some 
point.89 Other historians have offered a more nuanced view of corporal punishment. Andrew 
Bamford has highlighted how the army rewarded commanding officers for avoiding corporal 
punishment in all but the most severe cases of indiscipline, and removed officers who were too 
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willing to use flogging as a disciplinary measure.90 Furthermore, G.A. Steppler has highlighted 
how the scale of punishment varied much between regiments during the late-eighteenth 
century, owing to different regimental cultures.91 Corporal punishment was just one disciplinary 
option employed by the British army. In studying the daily order books of the 7th Hussars in 
1813, T.H. McGuffie found that infractions were routinely punished without the use of corporal 
punishment, with the regiment preferring to employ other methods, such as: reducing non-
commissioned officers to privates; placing men on extra drill; and by ordering men to wear their 
jackets inside-out.92 As highlighted by J.R. Dinwiddy, public attitudes towards flogging were 
becoming more critical of the practice by the start of the nineteenth century.93 From 1800 
onwards, the scale of flogging in the army was attracting the attention of reformers in the press 
and parliament, as well as some senior army officers, who hoped to reduce the number of 
floggings within the army to increase troop morale.94 
The tensions between the established practice of flogging as a disciplinary tool, and the growing 
public condemnation of the practice, are evident in junior officers’ accounts. Junior officers’ 
attitudes ranged from the view that corporal punishment was a regrettable, but necessary tool 
in cases of ill-discipline; to outright condemnation of using the lash to maintain discipline. It is 
evident that many junior officers saw recourse to flogging as an appropriate and justified 
measure. After a shortage of food saw the troopers of the 3rd Dragoons steal corn intended for 
the regiment’s horses, Lieutenant William Bragge of the 3rd Dragoons wrote to his father: ‘in 
order to put a stop to such ravenous Appetites we have been under Necessity of flogging every 
Irishman and many twice or three Times over.’95 Bragge’s reference to Irishmen being the 
recipient of floggings may suggest a prejudiced view of Irish soldiers as particularly in need of 
corporal punishment to keep them in line, or a discriminatory view that Irish soldiers 
committed more crimes than their non-Irish comrades. Although most floggings took place after 
a court martial had passed judgement on a soldier, junior officers also meted out corporal 
punishment at their discretion. Junior officers who followed this course appear to have favoured 
the use or threat of violence in instances when they did not have established relationships with 
soldiers. To maintain control over his detachment of stragglers on the retreat to Corunna, 
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Gordon was: ‘on one occasion obliged to draw my sword on a private of the --- to enforce 
obedience to the order to turn out for a march.’96 Placed in charge of a detachment of men en 
route to North America in 1812, Lieutenant John Le Couteur of the 104th Foot, a seventeen year-
old graduate from the Royal Military College, faced a disciplinary crisis on board his ship when 
he limited the supply of alcohol to the men. Le Couteur recorded in his journal that the soldiers 
attacked their one-legged sergeant and: ‘threatened to pitch me overboard, a brat of a boy who 
had never seen a shot fired.’97 After the soldiers attacked the sergeant again the following day, 
Le Coutuer used violence to restore order, drawing his sword on the soldiers, and sending two 
offenders to another ship in the convoy: ‘one to be well flogged, the other to look on.’98  
Junior officers appear to have seen flogging as a deterrent, rather than an attempt to reform 
offenders. What emerges from officer accounts is the sense that coming down hard on minor 
infractions would provide a salutary lesson for other soldiers, and ensure that discipline was 
maintained. On arrival in the Peninsula, Woodberry sat on a court martial, and recorded his 
conflicting views on the outcome:  
Sat on a court martial this morning for the first time on two men for unsoldierlike 
behaviour to their officers. They were both punished this afternoon before the 
Regiment. No one can detest corporal punishment more than I do, but 
subordination must be kept up or we shall soon go to the dogs. I am very much 
afraid some of our men will get themselves into serious trouble when we join Lord 
Wellington’s army, for if they go on with any of their drunken tricks there, Lord W. 
may perhaps shoot some of them.99 
Gordon blamed many of the problems of the army during the Corunna retreat to General Sir 
John Moore’s unwillingness to properly punish ill-disciplined soldiers: ‘I must consider his own 
vacillating conduct as the primary cause of the evil, which was increased by a culpable lenity 
towards flagrant offenders, the effect of which was to encourage breaches of discipline.’100  
The deterrence value of corporal or capital punishment was heightened by the ceremonial 
nature of floggings and executions. When a soldier was flogged or executed, the soldiers’ 
regiment was formed to watch the spectacle.101 Having seen four soldiers, one from his 
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regiment, the 88th Foot, and three from the 60th Foot, executed for desertion, Grattan 
commended the marching of a regiment past the corpses of the executed soldiers: 
This is a good and wholesome practice, for nothing so much awakes in the mind of 
the soldier, endowed with proper feeling, the dishonour of committing an action 
which is almost certain to bring him to a disgraceful end, while it deters the bad 
man from doing that which will cost him all that he has to lose- for such persons 
have no character- his life.102 
While he was not in a position to have soldiers flogged in full view of the regiment, Le Couteur 
still hoped to make an example of a punished soldier. When the flogged soldier returned to the 
ship, Le Couteur: ‘Made Him strip before the whole who could parade and marched him along 
the ranks … declaring to them that … I would carry out the articles of war with full rigour. There 
was no more trouble – My troops were in hand.’103 
It is evident from junior officer accounts that corporal or capital punishment was a broadly 
accepted feature of military discipline, which was necessary for ensuring that soldiers remained 
in line. There were, however, nuances within this broad acceptance, as well as dissenting views 
that corporal punishment was immoral. Although there was broad recognition of the necessity 
of corporal punishment, there is evidence to suggest that officers did not take pride in having 
men flogged.  As noted by Bamford, reliance on corporal punishment to maintain discipline was 
viewed by the army as a failure of leadership.104 As such, officers saw a lack of corporal 
punishment as the sign of a good regiment. Bridgeman wrote home about his regiment, the 1st 
Foot Guards: ‘it is in the finest order possible, we do not know what corporal punishment is, & I 
do not think men can behave better than these do, but to be sure they are guardsmen.’105 Nor 
were junior officers beyond mercy once a soldier was found guilty of a crime. It appears that 
officers’ knowledge of soldiers’ character was critical in their decisions to punish. In describing 
the executions of deserters, Grattan noted the convicted soldiers: ‘were bad characters, save one 
… He received testimonials from the captain of his company … highly creditable to him, and 
Lord Wellington … resolved that his pardon should be promulgated.’106  
When acting as junior members of courts martial, junior officers sometimes portrayed 
themselves as shocked observers to corporal punishment, and emphasised their powerlessness 
to prevent severe punishments from being meted out. This suggests that certain officers were 
                                                          
102 Grattan, Adventures of the Connaught Rangers, Vol. I, p. 234. 
103 Lieutenant John Le Couteur, journal, Mar. 1812, in Couteur, Merry Hearts Make Light Days, p. 56.  
104 Bamford, Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword, pp. 66-7.  
105 Ensign Orlando Bridgeman, 10 Jun. 1812, in Bridgeman, A Young Gentleman at War, p. 29.  
106 Grattan, Adventures of the Connaught Rangers, p. 232.  
184 
 
keen to distance themselves from a law code that they found arbitrary and cruel. In his 
unpublished memoir, Bowlby recalled his time as a young ensign: 
Nearly every morning we had a punishment parade. It was my place to attend every 
court martial as a supernumerary. I was surprised at the trifling offences men were 
tried for – one man was tried for not being clean on parade and received a sentence 
of two hundred lashes. As a supernumerary fortunately I had no vote on these 
occasions.107  
Furthermore, there were officers who argued against the use of corporal punishment as a 
disciplinary measure. Hennell, a devout dissenting protestant, criticised flogging in a letter to 
his brothers:  
After getting breakfast, I was for a court-martial which occupied me till 5 o’clock 
trying 16 prisoners for plundering &c. All except two were punished by flogging 
that night, each receiving 50 or 100 lashes. I do not now think it proper to give you 
my opinion upon flogging. Suffice it to say that I always bear in remembrance that I 
am accountable to a superior tribunal whose Judge has said “Blessed are the 
merciful for they shall obtain mercy.”108 
While there are criticisms of corporal punishment in contemporary sources, the strongest 
proclamations against the use of corporal punishment can be found in junior officers’ memoirs, 
reflecting the revived public campaign against flogging during the early 1830s.109 Memoirists 
who were critical of corporal punishment often referred to events they witnessed in the army as 
shaping their anti-flogging views. This suggests that they were not only writing to suit shifting 
public sensibilities, but also to be actively involved in the campaign against flogging. Ensign and 
Quartermaster John Harley of the 47th Foot described several floggings in his memoir, and 
declared: ‘that I often determined upon making my sentiments public against such an odious 
system.’110  
Junior officers who criticised the use of corporal punishment opposed its use on humanitarian 
grounds, and argued for the reform of offenders, rather than punishment. George Bell, who 
served as an ensign with the 34th Foot during the Peninsular War, was turned against corporal 
punishment after witnessing continual floggings during 1813: ‘Corporal punishment went on 
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everywhere the whole year round. Men were flogged for small offences, and for graver crimes 
flogged to death – a thousand lashes were often awarded by court-martial.’111 George Bell 
conceded that the army had: ‘some very bad characters’, but noted, ‘such punishments were 
inhuman.’112 Furthermore, these critics saw flogging as detrimental to the army, as it tended to 
brutalise offenders. George Bell suggested: ‘It does not always tend to reform a man by bullying 
and abusing him before his comrades.’113 Harley elaborated further: ‘if a soldier receive even but 
ten lashes, he never can be a good soldier afterwards. His pride is wounded, his spirit is 
humbled, his person is debased – and detests his profession, neglects his person and 
equipments, and becomes a useless member of the regiment.’114  
Critics of corporal punishment saw less punitive forms of discipline as preferable, as they 
reformed offenders, and strengthened the bonds between soldiers and officers. Although 
writing largely of his time as a regimental commander, where he abolished flogging in his 
regiment, George Bell summarised: ‘Kindness is the key to open the human heart, and with that 
key I reformed the worst offenders.’115 As a substitute for flogging, Harley argued for other 
punishments, such as: imprisonment; transferring problem soldiers to colonial regiments; or 
discharging problem soldiers from the army. Harley believed these punishments would bring: 
‘the offender to a proper sense of conduct becoming a British soldier.’116 Harley argued that the 
absence of corporal punishment would boost soldiers’ morale, and endear officers to their men:  
if [officers] were more bending and less tyrannical than I have known many of 
them, the latter [soldiers] would be more attached to their superiors, and more 
particular in attending to their duties … the soldier would have a feeling of respect 
for his officer, and the latter would be more inclined to place confidence in the 
former as a faithful adherent who looked up to him for instruction and advice, and 
considered him less as a military leader than as a father and a friend.117 
Although these accounts still emphasised the moral superiority of officers, the arguments junior 
officers levelled against flogging further highlight how shifting perceptions of common soldiers 
were making an impact on attitudes within the army. By focusing on reform, rather than 
punitive punishment or deterrence, suggests a growing appreciation of the humanity and 
quality of soldiers on the part of army officers.  
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Into Battle 
It was on the battlefield where officers’ leadership skills were put to their greatest test, even 
though battle was a relatively rare occurrence for British soldiers. Kevin Linch and Matthew 
McCormack have calculated that even a British soldier who fought for the entire Peninsular War 
would have seen combat on 355 of 2, 085 days spent on campaign.118 Understanding and trust 
were needed between officers and soldiers to ensure that men would follow their officers into 
battle in the first instance, and remain disciplined and effective once the bullets started to fly in 
the second. It was in battle, therefore, where many of the features of junior officers’ identities as 
leaders coalesced. As commanders, junior officers placed a degree of emphasis on the practical 
components of battlefield leadership, and took pride in their regiments’ ability to successfully 
manoeuvre and remain intact during battle. The tactical role of junior officers in battle was 
limited, especially in line infantry regiments which tended to operate in large, linear formations. 
This lack of agency saw junior officers place a high value on their leadership qualities as 
‘natural’ leaders. Extending from the assumption that officers were social and moral superiors 
to their men, junior officers idealised leadership in battle as leadership from the front, and 
strove to provide a model of bravery and honour for their men to follow. 
The leadership role of junior officers in battle may be broken down into the two categories of 
command, the role junior officers played in dictating events on the battlefield, and the moral 
leadership they provided to men in battle. As noted by Bruce Collins, the leadership structure of 
the British army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was centralised, with 
regiments expected to do little more than produce ‘disciplined and cohesive’ battalions that 
could operate in larger formations commanded by a general.119 This centralisation limited the 
scope that junior officers could assume as tacticians. As noted by Muir, examples of regimental 
officers displaying independent decision making during the Napoleonic Wars are rare, 
especially within line infantry regiments, where junior officers were usually limited to relaying 
orders from superior officers, ensuring movements were executed properly, and that gaps in 
the line were filled quickly.120 The growing professional standards of British officers saw junior 
officers take pride in their competence at drill. This pride extended to battlefield manoeuvres; 
however, this was usually articulated in a regimental, rather than individual, context. Describing 
his regiment’s part in the Battle of Salamanca, Grattan took pride in the 88th’s ability to 
manoeuvre during the chaos of battle: ‘He [Pakenham] told Wallace to form line from open 
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column without halting, and thus the different companies, by throwing forward their right 
shoulders, were in line without the slow manoeuvre of a deployment.’121 As a lieutenant, 
Grattan’s view of the battle was likely limited to what was occurring nearby, making it difficult 
for him to claim any individual responsibility for the 88th’s expediency in battle.  
Officers of the light infantry and cavalry had greater opportunities to exercise independent 
judgement, as they were often operating in advance of line regiments, or were engaged in 
patrols and outpost duty.122 Captain Edward Charles Cocks of the 16th Dragoons is a notable 
example here. Earmarked by Wellington as a talented officer, Cocks was regularly employed as 
an intelligence officer, and was sent to ascertain information about the movements of French 
troops in the Peninsula. This required Cocks to exercise independent judgement and tactical 
ability, a role he revelled in. In August 1810, Cocks wrote to his father:  
I am leading a life still wilder, being detached from the army with sixty or seventy 
men composed of all regiments to watch the enemy on our right … This is an 
interesting service, being very independent and giving me the means of knowing all 
that is going on. I surprised a company of sixty French yesterday… I could only 
secure a serjeant and three men and a horse… As this was the first time I had been 
engaged in an enterprise of my own planning and conducting I felt well satisfied 
with even this very moderate success.123 
Even within the cavalry, however, Cocks is an exceptional case. Few junior officers had his 
opportunities to exercise judgement in such a way, especially the most junior ensigns.  
The forms of combat during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, therefore, 
provided limited scope for officers to influence battles through displays of professional ability. 
As such, junior officers placed great value on their ability to provide a moral example of bravery 
and fortitude for their men to emulate in battle. This style of leadership also stemmed from the 
connections British officers made between gentlemanly character and professionalism. As noted 
by Christopher Duffy and Armstrong Starkey, the historical links between the aristocracy and 
eighteenth-century militaries resulted in a martial code which prioritised officers’ courage and 
self-sacrifice in battle.124 Although the aristocracy comprised only a small fraction of British 
officers during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the association between British 
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officers and gentlemanliness saw them make the connection between a gentlemanly manner 
and effective leadership. Advice literature stressed the importance of mastering fear, and 
providing an image of calm for men to follow. The Military Mentor instructed: 
In situations of a very critical nature, the soldier endeavours to read the 
countenance of his officer. If he sees him firm and composed, he becomes himself 
confident. If, on the other, he discovers any marks of apprehension in his leader, he 
is alarmed, or discouraged. Thus, whatever may excite disquietude in the soldier … 
an officer ought never to discover any emotion at it. Let his aspect on such occasions 
be calm, firm, and unmoved; let nothing disclose his secret agitation. Let his 
manners be more ordinarily forward and free; and let him assume, as much as 
possible, a sort of gaiety and cheerfulness.125 
The Regimental Companion drew explicit links between gentlemanly control and assured 
leadership. The Companion suggested to the prospective officer, that by conducting himself as: 
‘an officer and a gentleman … The influence which his deportment will have upon the non-
commissioned officers and privates of his troop will be sensibly felt, and cannot therefore be too 
much promoted.’126 
For their part, junior officers linked gentlemanly accomplishment with the self-control and 
bravery required to lead soldiers into battle. Woodberry noted: 
To be perfect in horsemanship is necessary part of a gentleman’s accomplishments. 
That a military officer should be an accomplished horseman is a position scarcely 
necessary to be stated, did not so many John Gilpins in the uniforms of Hussars so 
continually expose themselves. A man who every moment fears to be divorced from 
his saddle cannot possibly possess that undisturbed recollection, that cool and 
undeviating attention, which ought to be given to the troops under his immediate 
command.127 
Junior officers viewed their men as having an innate set of qualities, such as bravery, 
determination, and group loyalty that needed only a strong example of honour by their officers 
to be effective in battle. Blakiston and attributed British success in battle to national character: 
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Individually the British soldier is a fine specimen of the profession. He possesses the 
steadiness of the German with the spirit of the Frenchman. This must entirely 
originate in his natural character, for he has not motive to urge him to 
extraordinary acts. He has little or no prospect of promotion beyond the ranks … 
neither his emulation nor his zeal is excited by such distinctions of merit as exist in 
the French armies; nor is his sense of honour promoted by any peculiar respect to 
the profession of arms among his countryman.128 
Officer accounts iterate that the prospect of battle sharpened their men’s mind, no matter how 
disorderly they acted in quarters. In a letter home, Ensign John Mills of the Coldstream Guards 
remarked on the superiority of British troops in battle: ‘For three hundred and sixty days in the 
year, a Frenchman is a better soldier than an Englishman. Their movements compared with 
ours are as mail coaches to dung carts … But at fighting we beat them, and they know it.’129 
Junior officers extolled the value of setting a brave example, however, it was rarely other British 
officers that junior officers’ compared their conduct to. In her study of military masculinity and 
British subalterns, Kennedy highlighted how other nations, particularly the Spanish and 
Portuguese, provided an example by which British officers measured their own masculine 
identities.130 Often viewing their Spanish allies as vain and cowardly, British junior officers’ 
views on the Spanish officer corps provide an insight into the conduct they viewed as ideal. 
Browne criticised the leadership, or lack thereof, of Spanish officers during an attack on a 
French redoubt at the Nivelle in 1813:  
The drums and trumpets of the Don sounded the assault and everything was bustle 
and confusion in the Spanish ranks - the officers holloring out to their men, not to 
come on but to go on, and the men - very unwilling to shew so much disrespect to 
their officers as to take the lead, and this continuing, until the Spaniards found 
themselves at the end of their assault, further from the battery when they began 
it.131  
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These criticisms were consistent throughout the Peninsular War. Simmons assured his parents 
that the Spanish soldiers would not follow their men into battle: ‘The Spanish officers in general 
are traitors or cowards, and of course the men will not fight when their leaders set off.’132 
The extent to which junior officers’ conduct fulfilled this image of stoic bravery is not entirely 
clear. Given that the majority of new officers were in their late-teenage years when they were 
commissioned, this combination of youth and inexperience was unlikely to produce the 
steadfastness idealised by British officers. At his first experience of battle during the Walcheren 
campaign, Keep was nearly hit by a French shell. Keep reported to his mother: ‘This was my first 
affray, and Ensign Cameron who was carrying the other Colour, looked at me and laughed to see 
my face somewhat paler than usual. I was taken by surprise, but soon recovered.’133 The fear of 
being dishonoured by refusing to face battle was crucial in compelling junior officers to remain 
in the field; however, Keep’s suggestion that he responded to battle badly suggests that the 
image of stoic bravery was not always fulfilled. Experience could breed confidence under fire. As 
revealed by Yuval Noah Harari, the late-eighteenth century saw soldier-authors evaluate 
military experiences in terms of their revelatory effect on the individual, with each new 
experience bringing the combatant to a new level of self-understanding.134 Key amongst these 
was facing combat and being close to death.135 Undergoing their baptism of fire likely 
encouraged officers to face battle coolly. After his first experience of battle as a volunteer in the 
ranks, Hennell wrote to his brothers: ‘When the balls began to whiz I expected every one would 
strike me. As they increased I minded them less. I viewed calmly the town & to the whizzing of 
the balls soon became accustomed … At the bottom of the hill I was accustomed to danger & 
would have marched up to a cannon’s mouth.’136 Describing his first taste of battle at San 
Sebastian in 1813, Bridgeman wrote to his mother: ‘I do not know why this runs into my head, 
as for before I had faced the enemy I never thought of it, but somehow or other I feel a different 
being since our attack on San Sebastian, quite like an old soldier, do not laugh at me for this.’137  
The accounts of junior officers and rankers suggest that experienced officers could not only 
aspire to the ideal of leading ‘from the front’, but also modelled their conduct accordingly. The 
organisation of line infantry put the theory of ‘leading by example’ into practice, especially for 
captains. Company commanders were positioned slightly to the front and right of their company 
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in fighting formation.138 Furthermore, as revealed by Muir, regimental officers suffered a 
disproportionately high casualty rate, suggesting that officers were often found in positions of 
danger.139 At the 1811 Battle of Barossa, Blakeney rallied a small group of men after his 
regiment had suffered heavy casualties. Blakeney: ‘proposed charging a howitzer’, and lead the 
assault, unusually carrying a musket in the successful attack.140 Ranker accounts also make 
mention of officers who attempted to motivate their men through acts of gallantry. Sergeant 
William Lawrence of the 40th Foot related the bravery of a lieutenant, who quickly moved into 
position at the head of the company following their captain’s death at Waterloo:  
a cannon-shot came and took the captain's head clean off.. One of his company who 
was close by at the time, cried out, “Hullo, there goes my best friend”, which caused 
a lieutenant, who quickly stepped forward to take his place, to say to the man, 
“Never mind, I will be as good a friend to you as the captain”.141 
Displays of bravery and motivation instilled confidence in the abilities of officers and sustained 
morale and control during battle. Lawrence highlighted the impact of officers’ exhortations in 
keeping men in place at Waterloo:  
The men in their tired state were beginning to despair, but the officers cheered 
them on continually throughout the day with the cry of “Keep your ground, my 
men!” It is a mystery to me how it was accomplished, for at last so few were left that 
there were scarcely enough to form square.142 
Furthermore, brave officers were held in high regard by soldiers, tightening bonds between the 
two groups and making soldiers more effective in combat. Ranker Edward Costello of the 95th 
deeply regretted the death of his company commander, who was mortally wounded leading an 
assault during the Siege of Badajoz in 1812, and recollected the day after the assault: ‘I yet felt 
anxious to see Captain Uniacke … he was gallant, daring, and just to all whom he commanded … 
none were seen so often in the van as Uniacke; his affability and personal courage had rendered 
him the idol of the men of his company.’143 To rankers’ eyes, not all officers fulfilled the ideal of 
brave leadership. Costello and his comrades divided: ‘officers into two classes; the “come on” 
and the “go on”… To the honour of the service, the latter, with us Rifles, were exceedingly few in 
                                                          
138 G.F. Nafziger and S.J. Park, The British Military: Its System and Organisation, 1803-1815 (Cambridge, ON, 
1983), pp. 33-5. 
139 Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle, p. 190. 
140 Blakeney, A Boy in the Peninsular War, pp. 191-2.  
141 William Lawrence, The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence: A Hero of the Peninsular and Waterloo 
Campaigns, ed. George Nugent Bankes (London, 1886), pp. 210-11.  
142 Lawrence, The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence, p. 211. 
143 Edward Costello, The Adventures of a Soldier, or, the Memoirs of Edward Costello (London, 1841), p. 151 
192 
 
number.”144 It is unlikely, therefore, that all officers fulfilled the image of bravery and self-
sacrifice espoused by advice literature and officers. 
Junior officers’ attitudes towards leadership in battle, therefore, were predicated on the same 
assumption of social, cultural, and moral superiority which characterised their wider identities 
as leaders. Established aristocratic martial codes and the social gulf which existed between 
officers and rankers were important in shaping junior officers’ identities as leaders, as they 
encouraged deference on the part of rankers, and stressed the importance of bravery and 
leadership by example. Junior officers’ attitudes towards rankers; however, were also shaped by 
evolving perceptions of common soldiers during the late-eighteenth century, and by the culture 
of sensibility. Junior officers could view their men as humane objects of sympathy, encouraging 
a paternalistic style of leadership that saw officers pay attention to their men’s wellbeing and 
morale. In addition, the enlightenment values of cleanliness and order shaped junior officers’ 
role as leaders. The paternal role officers assumed over their men encouraged officers to search 
for ways to care for their men, and to question the value of corporal punishment as a 
disciplinary measure; however, paternalism as practiced by junior British army officers 
remained a ‘top-down’ form of leadership, which served to highlight the social and moral 
differences between officers and men. 
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Chapter Seven: National and Patriotic Identities 
Writing to a friend in the aftermath of the 1813 Battle of Vitoria, Lieutenant James Hope, a 
Scottish officer of the 92nd Highland Regiment, described the prelude to the battle: ‘The sun 
burst from behind the gloomy clouds, to spread his cheering rays over fields yet unstained with 
blood … over heights, where the best blood of Britain was soon to flow:- to cheer the Sons of 
Freedom, on their march to the field of honour.’1 Hope’s romantic depiction of the lead-up to 
battle likely reflects his sense of glory in taking part in one of the British army’s greatest 
successes of the Peninsular War, and was matched by his idealisation of the British soldier. This 
description encapsulates many of the characteristics of British national identity within the 
British army of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Being a part of a truly British 
army, who were united in a common cause, appears to have allowed Hope to identify with a 
‘British’ national identity. As part of one of five regiments that based their regimental identities 
on Highland culture, and whose soldiers wore kilts, Hope’s most obvious point of reference may 
have been Highland national and military identity, yet he still chose to emphasise the 
‘Britishness’ of the army at Vitoria.2 Andrew Mackillop, however, has demonstrated how 
investment in Highland national identity was only one factor in motivating eighteenth-century 
Highland military service.3 While Hope was certain of the connection between military service 
and patriotism, this connection was not self-evident for all officers throughout the French 
Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars. This chapter explores the impact of military service on 
national identity within the British army, and junior officers’ evolving relationship with the 
British nation.  
Warfare has figured prominently in historians’ studies of eighteenth-century British national 
identity. In her influential Britons, Linda Colley argued that recurring war was central to the 
construction of a coherent British national identity, by reinforcing Britons’ sense of the French 
as a national ‘other’, and allowing groups from the British periphery, such as the Scots, to 
demonstrate their loyalty through military service.4 Despite this centrality, studies of the 
relationship between military service and national identities within the British army are 
relatively recent. Stephen Conway briefly explored how the national diversity of the British 
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army during the Seven Years’ War allowed soldiers of different nations to recognise each other 
as Britons.5 For the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Catriona Kennedy has explored 
the complex web of national identities and loyalties within the British military, and 
demonstrated how this was reflected in a relatively weak sense of ‘British’ national identity.6 
Gavin Daly has also revealed how British soldiers in the Peninsular War, with the possible 
exception of Irish Catholic rankers, found a sense of national commonality by defining 
themselves against Iberian populations.7 In light of this scholarship, this chapter will explore the 
relationship between junior officers’ military service, and their national and patriotic identities. 
In contrast to the French Republican armies, British soldiers were not exposed to a systematic 
program of nationalist and ideological propaganda.8 While some regiments actively promoted 
either a British or sub-British national identity, British junior officers’ national identities were 
open to a wide range of influences. The first section of this chapter will explore how junior 
officers found points of similarity and difference with other nationalities which marked out 
their identities as members of a British and western-European cultural bloc. The second section 
examines how junior officers’ identities as men of honour encouraged a reciprocal relationship 
between individual and national honour which brought officers into a closer alignment with the 
British nation; however, one that was expressed because their expectations of recognition went 
unsatisfied. The final two sections explore how junior officers’ patriotic expression evolved 
during the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as they responded to evolving 
political circumstances. Junior officers’ shock at the threat to European society that the French 
Republic represented generated a loyalist and conservative patriotism. As the ideological 
fervour of the early-1790s dissipated, and war with France assumed the character of a war for 
national survival, junior officers in the Napoleonic period found a broader voice for their 
patriotic expression, and could come to embrace critiques of the ruling establishment that 
would have dismayed their Revolutionary-era predecessors. 
 
British and European Identities 
The ‘British’ context in which junior officers served had the effect of dissolving national 
differences between members of the British officer corps. The British army was nationally 
diverse: in 1813 the rank and file was made up of one-half English and Welsh, one-third Irish, 
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and one sixth Scottish, with many regiments being a patchwork of different nations.9 This 
diversity had been established during the eighteenth century: sixteen per cent of the rank and 
file during the Seven Years’ War coming from Scotland.10 In the officer corps, around one-
quarter of officers were Scottish, and thirty-five per cent Irish.11 As noted by Conway, this 
national diversity helped to foster a pan-British identity, while still allowing for sub-British and 
European identities to flourish.12 With its emphasis on politeness, the close confines officer 
corps was effective at collapsing national barriers, and reminding officers of their cultural 
similarities. Lieutenant Charles Kinloch, a Scottish officer in the 52nd Foot, wrote to his sister 
after he introduced a type of Scottish fiddle to his fellow officers: ‘I have brought the devil 
completely into fashion in the regiment, it is at present quite the rage in London but very few of 
the officers had ever seen it, they are all now sawing away at it as fast as they can.’13 Keep 
described the diversity of his regimental mess to his mother: ‘We have young men from the 
three Kingdoms and it forms a strange medley (not unconducive however to the pleasures of 
the service in which we are engaged.)’14 National traditions could converge with the sociability 
of the officer corps. On Saint Patrick’s Day in 813, Lieutenant George Woodberry of the 18th 
Hussars, a nominally Irish regiment, described the day’s festivities: ‘the custom in the Regiment 
on this day, is, that the English officers should treat, I asked Bolton, Burk, Deane, Chambers, 
Rowls & Pu[l]sford who did me the honour of their company. I made them quite groggy & they 
departed in peace about 12 o’clock.’15 
As noted by John Cookson, the Napoleonic Wars saw some British regiments consolidate their 
identities as ‘national’ regiments, identities which were then built on during the nineteenth 
century.16 Regiments with a strong national hue could divide opinion in the army. The 
increasing influence of Scots in the British state from the mid-eighteenth century had initially 
inspired a wave of English nationalism that criticised Scottish encroachment, and sought to 
reaffirm English rights.17 While less virulent during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 
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English officers could still display a cultural disdain for officers from the British periphery. 
Despite being offered a lieutenancy in the 91st Highlanders, Ensign Thomas Bunbury of the 3rd 
Foot declined, as: ‘The 91st being a Highland regiment, and at that time very clannish, it struck 
me that I might be subject to persecution and annoyance.’18 As noted in Chapter Four, English 
officers could identify with regiments which exhibited a strong non-English national identity, 
suggesting that overt displays of sub-British nationalism were not entirely problematic. Linda 
Colley and Robert Clyde have both demonstrated how national regiments, particularly the 
Highland regiments, within the army could also serve to highlight these nations’ service and 
sacrifice to the British nation.19 British officers made similar connections. Preparing to embark 
on the ‘Great Expedition’ to Walcheren in 1809, Keep wrote to his mother: ‘some Regiments of 
Highlanders with their martial costume I thought very elegant and when in movement or close 
column their black plumes and tartans had a very picturesque effect, and even their bagpipes 
had charm. My first introduction to these warlike North Britons inspired me with a great 
respect for them.’20 
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; however, it was Ireland’s relationship with the 
United Kingdom that presented the greatest fault line within British national identity. The Irish 
had an increasing presence in the British army and politics during the eighteenth century, with 
Ireland a crucial recruiting ground since the 1750s. Meanwhile, the absence of Catholic relief in 
the 1801 Act of Union that incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom reinforced sectarian 
divisions.21 British views of Ireland and the Irish during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
were shaped by Irish rebellion during the 1790s, with Ireland perceived as wild, unruly, and 
backward, ruled by a vulgar gentry.22 The account of Charles Crowe, an English ensign who 
joined the overwhelmingly Irish 27th Foot , or ‘Eniskillens’, highlights how English officers could 
see their Irish comrades as cultural outliers. Joining a regiment that cultivated an overtly Irish 
identity and whose officer corps was largely Irish proved chastening for Crowe. While finding 
two Irish subalterns, Pollock and Harding, to be: ‘the perfect gentleman’, and, ‘the little 
gentleman in manners and appearance’; Crowe formed less favourable opinions of the other 
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Irish officers.23 Crucial in forming this view was the belief that the Irish were eager duellists, and 
out of step with the standards of polite refinement.24 Crowe described one officer, Weir: ‘a queer 
poet, an uncouth quarrelsome fellow’; and was warned by Pollock that another officer was: ‘a 
very specious dangerous chap! He will be sworn friend with you one hour, and in the next will 
call you out to fight a duel.’25 Compounding this view was the belief that these officers belonged 
to a clique of Irish officers, as Crowe ensured that he: ‘took care to have the Scotchmen present’ 
as support when mediating a dispute between officers.26 That Crowe was able to form 
identifiable relationships with some Irish others, while drawing cultural distinctions with 
others, highlights the importance of politeness to facilitating national identification.  
Although anti-Catholicism was central to how British soldiers defined themselves in the 
Peninsula, the extent to which internal adherence to Protestantism helped foster pan-British 
allegiances is debatable.27 While Michael Snape has argued that patterns of religious observance 
in the nineteenth-century British army reflected those of civilian society; religious observance 
does not appear to have been central to junior officers’ sense of identity.28 Ensign George 
Hennell of the 43rd Foot, a devout Unitarian Protestant, described the blasphemy of his fellow 
officers to his brothers: 
I do not suppose there was ever a person in the army more quizzed than I have 
been. The officers of the army are none of them half characters. They do not content 
themselves with a little swearing & joking about serious things but they are 
generally openly profane & coolly and deliberately take the seat of the scorner. My 
Bible has been attacked in every way & the more impious the quotation the louder 
the laugh. Indeed such a pitch has it arrived that what would shock you would not 
raise a laugh here.29 
While Hennell’s adherence to a dissenting branch of Protestantism may have made him an 
isolated figure, his targeting by other officers appears more associated with his piety than his 
choice of religion. This suggests that the officer corps could be disdainful of any form of worship. 
The ambiguous role Protestantism played in the officer corps is further highlighted by the status 
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of Irish Catholic officers. Officially forbidden from holding commissions outside of Ireland, 
Catholic officers could still be found in the British army.30 Despite these impediments, as 
revealed by Catriona Kennedy, Irish Catholic officers could pursue successful careers in the 
army, and could also develop a British identity.31 Peter Jennings, a careerist Irish Catholic officer 
who served in the French army before the French Revolution, enjoyed a relatively successful 
career in the British army, and left the army as a captain in 1808. As emphasised by Kennedy, 
Jennings’ place within a tradition of professional Irish military service eased his passage into the 
British army, and allowed him to reconcile his potentially conflicting loyalties.32 Importantly, 
Jennings appeared free to practice his faith, having his daughter baptised in Brazil in 1806.33  
Historians of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars have recently begun to explore the 
relationship between military service, travel, and the construction of national identities through 
the encountering of national ‘others’.34 Gavin Daly and Kennedy have explored how British 
officers and soldiers’ experiences on campaign in Southern Europe, North Africa, and the West 
Indies reinforced their belonging to European civilisation, as they contrasted the modernity of 
western and northern Europe with the backwardness of the cultures they encountered.35 In 
addition to encounters with foreign civilians, military service brought British junior officers into 
contact with foreign officers and soldiers as allies, opponents, or, in the case of German forces, 
as fellow members of the British army. The eighteenth-century British army was influenced by 
the pan-European ‘military revolution’ of the Enlightenment and the principles of ‘limited war’. 
Although nebulous, these values placed a premium on troop organisation, and proper conduct 
of war shaped by humanity, and mutual respect between combatants, reinforced by a shared 
culture of gentlemanly civility and martial honour.36  Examining the British army during the 
American War of Independence, Stephen Conway argued that professional standards and a 
shared belief in the proper conduct of war were the key criteria for fostering respect between 
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combatants of different nations belonging to ‘military Europe’.37 Prioritising professional 
affiliation in this manner, however, divorces soldiers from the nations from which they were 
drawn, and obscures the complex relationship between militaries and nations. In his study of 
Germans in the British service during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, 
Mark Wishon has revealed how the national stereotype of Germans as boorish and dour 
converged with professional interest and mutual respect to shape interactions between British 
and German soldiers in the eighteenth-century British army.38 By observing and comparing 
different armies against the expected standards of military conduct, junior officers came to 
define themselves as part of a Western European cultural and ethnic group, which had 
implications for how officers of different nationalities associated within the British army.  
British officers who encountered non-European armies found them unrecognisable, highlighting 
how cross-military encounters provided a point of differentiation for forming pan-European 
identities. Serving in North America during the War of 1812, Lieutenant John Le Couteur of the 
109th Foot regularly wrote to his father about his lack of respect for the Native American troops 
used as auxiliaries by the British and American armies: ‘The Indians are cunning, cowardly and 
revengeful in the highest degree, brave only when their enemy is Broken or flying, and then the 
tomahawk and scalping knife are liberally made use of. I have witnessed it with horror, but an 
Indian if you face him, will never stand.’39 Describing the scalping of dead American soldiers to 
his father, Le Couteur contrasted the barbarity of the frontier with the civilisation of Britain: 
‘after they had scalped 45 and … they were dressing their scalps and some of them after picking 
of the flesh, eat it. This a fact. Let the Ladies pass their comments, and rejoice they are blessed in 
a country where such deeds were never heard of; happy little Island.’40 Comparing Britain’s 
Ottoman allies during the 1801 Egyptian campaign with European armies in his diary, 
Lieutenant Thomas Evans of the 8th Foot noted the: ‘little order or regularity in their 
movements’, and described the Ottomans as: ‘the most abominable and filthiest set of 
ragamuffins (soldiers, the very name they are a disgrace to).’41 M.E. Yapp has explored the image 
of the Ottoman Empire in early-modern and modern European culture, and has revealed how 
Europeans perceived that the secular and religious differences between the two cultures made 
the Ottomans barbaric and despotic.42 These prevailing views informed British perceptions of 
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Ottoman forces in Egypt. In particular, Evans viewed Ottoman atrocities against local Arab 
populations as indicative of their uncivilised nature: ‘the unfortunate Arabs, the proper natives 
and original possessors of the land, suffer both in their persons and property by the hands of 
these savage and merciless banditti. But an attempt to detail one half their enormities, would be 
to write a volume, suffice it to say that I often feel, and blush for our anti-Christian alliance.’43 
Reflecting the eighteenth-century belief that racial and national characteristics were in a state of 
evolution depending on exposure to different influences, British officers’ racial distinctions 
were not fixed.44 Junior officers saw the potential for degeneration, even in nations with close 
national ties to Britain. Le Couteur feared the barbarising effects of life on the American frontier, 
and wrote to his father: ‘The Americans on the Ohio and Kentucky lands, are nearly Indians, 
they use the Scalping knife and Tomahawk, and are merely a civilised Savage.’45 
There were nuances within this collective European identity, and junior officers were engaged 
in a constant process of differentiation with their European allies and enemies.46 These 
comparisons generated a sense of British exceptionalism, as British officers saw the British 
army as reflecting the humanity, quality, and rights of British citizens. As shown by Daly, the 
Portuguese army rose in British soldiers’ estimation under the influence of British honour and 
discipline.47 British officers were keen to point out the effects of tyrannical government on 
armies, effectively contrasting this with the humane military which the British constitution 
created. As shown by Larry Wolff, eighteenth-century Western Europeans viewed Eastern 
Europe as barbaric and backwards, and saw the institution of serfdom as reducing entire 
nations to the status of slaves.48 British officers were liable to see their Central and Eastern 
European allies as inhumane, owing to their living under despotic rule. Those who served 
alongside Russian forces saw this form of rule as manifesting in an arbitrary system of military 
punishment and a submissive soldiery. Observing the routine beating of Russian rankers by 
their officers during the 1814 Holland expedition, Lieutenant John Dunbar-Moodie of the 21st 
Foot was surprised to find that Russian officers were shocked at the flogging of British 
soldiers.49 For Dunbar-Moodie, what differentiated the British and Russian armies was the right 
of even private soldiers to a court-martial before subjection to corporal punishment: ‘[flogging] 
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could at least not be inflicted at the caprice of the individual. We may here observe the different 
effects produced on the character of men by a free and despotic system of Government: it was 
evidently not the nature but the degree, of punishment in our service which shocked the Russian 
prejudices.’50  
British officers’ closest affinity was with their American and French enemies. Serving in North 
America reinforced the similarities between the British and American combatants for Le 
Couteur. Le Couteur recorded the linguistic and racial similarities between the British and 
Americans after fraternising with some American officers: 
several American officers rode from Fort George to chat to me: Colonels Cutting and 
Preston, Majors Malcom, Cummings and Johnston, Captains Jones, Christie and 
Chapman. Strange indeed did it appear to me to find so many names, “familiar 
household words”, as enemies – the very names of Officers in our own army. How 
uncomfortably like a civil war it seemed when we were in good-humoured friendly 
converse.51 
Cultural similarities with Americans also drove home how close the British and American were. 
Generally impressed with the quality of society in much of North America, Le Couteur described 
an American officer in his diary as: ‘a nice looking blood in English shooting toggery.’52  
Junior officers’ attitudes towards French soldiers have implications for Linda Colley’s argument 
that the creation of a British national identity was primarily the result of Britons defining 
themselves against the French national ‘other.’53 This view has been revised by recent 
scholarship.  Stephen Conway and Robin Eagle have acknowledged the cultural interaction and 
mutual respect between France and Britain during the eighteenth century, which included 
polite cosmopolitanism and a shared Western European cultural identity.54 This mutual respect 
is evident in junior officers’ descriptions of interactions between British and French soldiers, 
but was also coloured by circumstance.55 British attitudes towards French soldiers evolved 
during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The meritocracy of the French 
Republican army shocked British officers’ sensibilities, and weakened the cultural bonds 
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between the two armies. Guarding French prisoners in November 1793, Lieutenant Thomas 
Powell of the 14th Foot recorded his low opinion of French officers raised from the ranks: ‘A 
miserable set; seemed to be picked from amongst the great Ruffians of their Prvt’s. There was 
only one Gentleman like man amongst them.’56 Of all the French officers Powell encountered, he 
reserved his greatest respect for an Irish officer in the French service, who: ‘did not seem to like 
the side he had taken, by any means, & would have deserted with us with pleasure, if his honour 
would have allow’d him.’57 The bonds of respect between British and French officers were re-
established as the ideological tension of the early-1790s dissipated. Captured by the French 
during the 1799 Holland campaign, Lieutenant Charles Steevens of the 20th Foot recalled the: 
‘humanity and attention’ of his captors and highlighted: ‘to what extremes the French frequently 
carry their politesse’; as the French displayed their civility by ensuring that British prisoners 
were well-fed; had their wounds attended to; and were kept separate from Russian prisoners.58   
Napoleon’s ascent entrenched the cultural similarities between British and French combatants. 
While Napoleonic military culture differed of the honour culture of the Old Regime, particularly 
in its focus on merit; British officers found their Napoleonic counterparts more identifiable than 
their Republican forebears.59 Antipathy for Napoleon or a desire to see France defeated did not 
diminish this respect. Reflecting on Napoleon’s 1799 defeat at the Siege of Acre, Evans recorded 
his conflicting views in his diary: 
Thus perhaps ends the career of a General who has not only been the terror of the 
World but (in one sense) the admiration of the greater part of it, and of an Army 
which has proved itself possessed of the most heroic intrepidity, fortitude and 
courage, qualities in an Army which every lover of military fame, and what’s truly 
great must admire, and allow merited, at least, a better and more deserving fate 
than their graves on the burning sands of Egyptia’s inhospitable shore.60 
The honour of the French in war was seen as indicative of the quality of French national 
character. Lieutenant James Girdlestone of the 31st Foot wrote to his sister from the Peninsula: 
‘In four or five days we may expect to meet with our noble enemy (I may say noble, for I believe 
there is no other nation in Europe besides our own that deserve that name).’61 Positive 
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interactions between British and French officers are particularly notable in accounts of the 
Peninsular War, where mutual distaste for Iberian culture reinforced cultural similarities 
between British and French enemies.62  
Central to Colley’s argument that the French constituted the dominant national ‘other’ to 
Britons during the eighteenth century, was the contrasting of the ignorant and oppressed 
French with the personally independent British. This image was prominent in anti-French 
propaganda during the French Wars.63 The portrayal of Napoleon as a tyrant may have provided 
fertile ground for such an opinion to form; however, junior officers’ sense of cultural affinity 
with French officers was resilient to these stereotypes. What emerges from junior officers’ 
accounts is the sense of a French army who were kept in ignorance by Napoleonic propaganda, 
but fully aware of this fact. The exchange of newspapers was common in British and French 
fraternisation, prompting reflections on the effects of Napoleon’s press restrictions. Writing to 
his mother from the Pyrenees in late-1813, Lieutenant William Thornton Keep noted, ‘The 
French officers on the banks of the Nive were kept in great ignorance of passing events. To 
enlighten them a little we threw over the papers containing patches of Bonaparte’s defeats. The 
French here certainly show no signs of attachment to him, and without that how unenviable 
must the condition of such potentates be.’64 Other officers portrayed the French as less passive. 
Ensign Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards noted to his mother, ‘the French officers in our 
front are very anxious for English papers, they plainly tell us, that they cannot believe their own 
papers, which they frequently send over to us.’65 The military provided a framework in which 
junior officers could reflect on the nature of national identity. The officer corps’ emphasis on 
politeness provided a culture which transcended national differences, which had the effect of 
reinforcing a sense of ‘British’ commonality. British officers also reflected on their relationship 
with other nations. Through their interactions with other militaries, British junior officers 
revealed how they saw themselves as belonging to a western-European cultural grouping.  
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Honour, Glory, and the Nation 
Honour was a core value for junior British officers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars, and was central to the everyday conduct of junior officers.66 Junior officers’ identities as 
men of honour were effective in binding them to the nation by encouraging a reciprocal 
relationship between personal and national honour. This connection was nebulous, however, 
and was marked by degrees of separation, as junior officers used their membership of pan-
military groups to mediate their connection to national honour. In Britons, Colley has 
demonstrated how the British aristocracy cultivated a public image of duty and heroic self-
sacrifice for the nation, which then influenced individual conduct by others.67 With less 
emphasis on heroism, Hannah Smith and John Cookson have also argued that British officers’ 
sense of duty to the British state strengthened during the eighteenth century.68  These ideals 
appealed to junior officers, suggesting that this culture was influential to some degree. 
Preparing to depart for the Peninsula in 1812, Keep wrote to his mother: ‘I know that your 
heart, tender as it is, must exult when you consider that I am going forth in a cause that does 
honour to the Country and profession to which I belong.’69 Lieutenant John Aitchison of the 3rd 
Foot Guards wrote in his diary in 1811: ‘I rejoice in contributing in any way my assistance to 
add to the renown of my country.’70 Investing in national honour was not entirely altruistic and 
the potential for glory provided an inducement to public service.71 The aristocratic Captain 
Edward Charles Cocks of the 16th Dragoons directly conflated personal and national honour. In a 
letter to his uncle, Cocks described soldiers as: ‘a body of men giving up many individual 
pleasures and comforts for a general national advantage, coupled certainly with the hope of 
personal fame.’72  
The elite connotations of this culture, however, made it problematic for junior officers. Although 
the desire for glory may have encouraged emulation of elite self-sacrifice, junior officers’ 
middling status in the army engendered a sense of obscurity. This sense of obscurity limited the 
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extent to which junior officers felt they could soften the dishonour of a defeat through heroic 
conduct. Through conspicuous displays of gallantry or sacrifice, senior officers could retrieve 
their honourable reputations from seemingly dire situations. General Sir John Moore’s dying 
phrase at the 1809 Battle of Corunna: ‘I hope the people of England will be satisfied. I hope my 
country will do me justice’; was highlighted by Colley as an example of the culture of elite 
heroism shaping individual conduct.73 Moore’s expedition to Spain ended in ultimate defeat. The 
British force lost over one-fifth of its men after a harrowing winter retreat; yet, Moore’s heroic 
death fostered a positive and romanticised image of him after the campaign.74 Moore’s heroism 
was not lost on those he commanded, and junior officers on the Corunna campaign applauded 
his bravery. Captain Edwin Griffith of the 15th Hussars, a veteran of the Corunna campaign, 
reflected in his journal in the aftermath of the Battle of Corunna: ‘indeed he did commit some 
errors, but he has fully expiated them by the manner in which he terminated his career and he 
will ever remain a bright pattern for emulation to all those who like him, are desirous of leading 
a life of honor and dying a death of glory.’75 Corunna veterans’ criticisms of Moore’s conduct 
suggest, however, that junior officers did not share in Moore’s repatriation. Griffith attributed 
the army’s shame to Moore: ‘he certainly forfeited to a very great degree the confidence of his 
army … Sir John subjected his army to the humiliating accusation of being actually driven into 
the sea by the French.’76  Captain Alexander Gordon, also of the 15th Hussars, was more strident 
in criticising Moore in his journal:  
It may appear invidious to reflect upon the character of an amiable and gallant 
officer, whose death in the moment of victory has cast a veil of glory over the errors 
of his judgement; but it is only an act of justice towards the brave men he 
commanded to point out the causes of the misbehaviour which, unhappily, 
tarnished their fame.77  
Junior officers’ sense of shame at the overall defeat experienced in the Corunna campaign 
suggests that status and glory were inherently linked within the British officer corps. While 
Moore was able to retrieve his honourable reputation by a conspicuous display of bravery, this 
sacrifice was notable because of his high rank. For junior officers who felt they were languishing 
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in obscurity, there was a lingering sense of dishonour surrounding the Corunna campaign, as 
their status precluded them from making a similarly noticeable display of heroism. 
Given these ambiguities, group associations were a vital conduit between personal and national 
honour.78 This connection was not entirely incidental, as some regiments actively conflated 
regimental and national honour, particularly by connecting military honour to a personal 
commitment to the monarchy. In 1794, Lieutenant William Stewart of the 28th Foot described 
his regiment’s centenary celebrations in his diary: ‘the soldiers [were] drawn out and their 
commanding officer addressed them on this occasion, chiefly setting forth their Loyalty and 
behaviour during the century that had passed and trusting they would maintain unsullied their 
character.’79 Regimental ceremonies could carry stronger patriotic overtones. Major William 
Harness, although only effective as a captain with the 80th Foot on Guernsey, recorded the 
consecration of his regiment’s colours in a 1794 letter to his wife:  
The Regiment was drawn up in a square, the Field Officers mounted with Horse 
Furniture … The Colours were in a Marquee near. The Adjutant brought the Colours 
to the Governor, the Men presented their Arms, the Governor saluted the Colours 
and presented them to Lord Paget. On his dismounting he saluted them, and 
received them most gracefully. He presented them to the Regiment, marching with 
one in each hand up the centre of the square, the Drums and fifes all beating a point 
of War and our excellent Band playing God Save the King. He gave them to the 
Ensigns and mounted. He began a most beautiful and manly speech by saying that 
the King had done him the Honor to present him with these colours; the he felt the 
Honor and duty of so sacred a Gift; that in executing his trust he knew he had but to 
present them to His Regiment, who would support them with their lives in defence 
of so gracious a Sovereign and in guarding the Honor, the laws, the religion and the 
prosperity of their country … the whole gave three chears, the Music and Drums 
struck up, the Ensigns marched with the Colours round the square, each officer 
saluting them as they past [sic].80 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the reciprocal relationship between regimental and 
individual honour was essential in binding officers to their regiments, with the bearing of the 
regimental colours prominent in this process. The consecration ceremony describe by Harness 
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suggests that this reciprocity could also extend to the nation, effectively creating a compact 
between individuals, their regiments, and British national honour.  
Investing in the honour of pan-military groups, such as the army or the navy, could also foster 
British patriotism. Victories and heroic conduct could flush junior officers with a sense of 
national and personal pride. Highlighting the overlap between military and national identities is 
the shared sense of honour with the success of the British navy. Lieutenant Charles Stewart of 
the 28th Foot recorded the fervour with which the army destined for the Low Countries 
celebrated the 1794 British naval victory on the ‘Glorious First of June’:  
here we beheld a scene equal to rouse the greatest drunkard, the Victorious British 
Fleet in its shattered state after the Glorious first of June. The Musick of each 
Battalion playing Rule Brittania, and the Heroick Crews by reiterated cheers 
animating their Brothers in War to immitate [sic] on their Element the illustrious 
example of British Valour that then lay anchored around them.81  
Conversely, defeats or reverses could sting junior officers’ honour, a response that could be 
measured against national opinion. Lieutenant William Bragge of the 3rd Dragoons wrote to his 
father during the 1812 retreat from Burgos: ‘I regret excessively having been obliged to 
recourse to this measure, which has disappointed the Expectations of England and the Hopes of 
Spain … It has likewise given our Enemies an opportunity of exulting, which I could have 
dispensed with.’82 Honour was also important in creating a sense of national belonging for 
national groups and individuals. The honour of being successful in a common cause could foster 
British unity within the army. The March 1801 landing of the British forces in Egypt included 
regiments which were associated with different British nations, such as the Welsh 23rd Foot, and 
the Highland 42nd Foot. Evans, an English officer, saw this as a bringing honour on Britain by 
virtue of the diverse nationalities who took part: ‘I mean not to particularise any corps for 
bravery, as all equally alike displayed that excellent quality, the genuine excellence of Britons.’83 
For officers on the British periphery, military honour was closely tied to their aspirations of 
Britishness. In his memoir, Blakeney, an Irish Protestant officer of the 28th Foot, recalled the 
national solidarity that emerged from the victory at the 1812 Siege of Badajoz: ‘The music 
played was the animating national Irish air, St. Patrick’s Day, when the shamrock was proudly 
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clustered with laurel; and indeed, though these two shrubs are not reckoned of the same family 
by proud collectors in the Cabinet, veteran hold them to be closely allied in the field.’84 
The relationship between military and national honour was reinforced by public opinion. Avid 
readers of British newspapers and periodicals, junior officers were well-connected to British 
events and public opinion. This connection reminded officers of the national audience for their 
actions, reinforcing the connection between military and national honour. This connection is 
well demonstrated by the public scandal that greeted the 1808 Convention of Sintra, the 
agreement that secured the initial liberation of Portugal from the French. Following his victory 
at Vimeiro on 21 August 1808, Wellington was superseded by the arrival of Sir Henry Burrard 
and Sir Hew Dalrymple, who disallowed the pursuit of the French army.85 Only nine days after 
his defeat at Vimeiro and in a precarious position, the French commander General Junot was 
able to negotiate generous terms of capitulation with the British, which formed the Convention 
of Sintra. The key terms saw the French army returned to France by the British navy, under 
arms, and carrying much of their plunder.86 Cited as an important incident in the development 
of British romantic nationalism, the convention caused a scandal and groundswell of discontent 
in Britain, where government and public alike had expected a resounding victory.87 The press 
railed against the terms given to the French, including a vitriolic pamphlet published by William 
Wordsworth, and the British government was forced into an investigation of the conduct of 
Wellington, Burrard, and Dalrymple.88  
Junior officers shared in this collective sense of exasperation and responded to the terms of the 
convention as though they had suffered a defeat. Unlike a battle, however, where good conduct 
in defeat could plausibly ensure honour was maintained, veterans of Vimeiro saw the 
convention as a betrayal of their heroic conduct. Blakeney labelled the agreement: ‘a degrading 
convention, odious to all.’89 Lieutenant George Wood of the 82nd Foot described the French army 
departing Lisbon in his memoir: 
I saw the French army embarking for France, on board the very transports that 
brought us to this country … An extraordinary sight it was; for they had their 
standards displayed in the square of Belem, with as much sangfroid as if they had 
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been the victorious army … Indeed they had some reason for considering 
themselves so, from the terms they made.90 
In contemporary accounts, junior officers’ minds quickly turned to the public response to the 
convention. Kinloch laid the blame with Burrard and Dalrymple in a letter to his mother, even 
before the news of the convention reached Britain: ‘I assure you we all wish both the 1st and 2nd 
in command out of the way, for the 3rd and 4th are liked as much as the other two are disliked. I 
don’t know what you may be in England but here we are not at all pleased with the terms, we 
think we have given them much too favourable.’91 Captain William Warre of the 23rd Dragoons, 
served as a staff officer in Portugal in 1808, and wrote to his father days after the scandal broke 
in Britain: ‘The indignation expressed in all the English Papers at the Capitulation … is scarce 
equal to what has been felt by every individual of the Army, whose glory and the gratitude of 
their countrymen (their best reward) has been so completely frittered away.’92  
The furore surrounding the Convention of Sintra ensured that it had a lasting impact on the 
psyche of the British army, even for officers who were not connected to the events of 1808. 
Already a popular tourist destination, Sintra acquired extra fascination as the place sharing the 
name of the convention, although the convention itself was signed at the Palace of Queluz, 
nearer to Lisbon. 93 Lieutenant Thomas Henry Browne of the 23rd Foot recorded a visit to the 
palace in his journal: ‘[there] is the room in which the treaty of Cintra was signed, and they shew 
you a large blot of Ink upon a table, which they affirm was dashed out of the pen of the French 
General Kellerman.’94 The convention’s fame encouraged officers to reflect on its merits. These 
reflections were far from uniform. In his memoir, Lieutenant Moyle Sherer of the 34th Foot 
labelled the convention: ‘a measure alike politic and expedient’, while Lieutenant George 
Woodberry of the 18th Hussars merely noted in his journal that the convention was ‘famous (or 
infamous).’95 In contrast, the dishonour associated with the Convention of Sintra could be 
indelible. Lieutenant George James Sullivan of the 1st Life Guards, who only joined the army in 
1811, pronounced his horror at the convention in his unpublished memoir. Sullivan saw the 
convention as a blot on British honour: 
I hope … that the convention of Cintra may be blotted out of future pages, for having 
a soldier’s feelings, I should regret that the unfortunate transaction should ever 
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flash across and wound the heart of a Briton, a Scotsman or a Son of Erin, when 
either may be sailing down the mighty Tagus, for it is here that the beautiful lands of 
Cintra bursts forth in all its beauty.96 
The varied response to the convention in the years following its signing indicates that the 
dishonour associated with it was not perpetual or all permeating. The ongoing significance of 
the convention, however, suggests that junior officers were aware of the national importance of 
the events they were involved with, reinforcing the connection between military and national 
honour.  
There are indications that the Napoleonic period altered the relationship between individual 
combatants and the nation, an issue that was inherently bound to the awarding of individual 
honours. The Napoleonic period saw European nations start to honour the contribution of 
individuals, regardless of rank, through the awarding of medals such as the 1802 French Legion 
of Honour, and the 1813 Prussian Iron Cross.97 In contrast, the British army was reluctant to 
democratise honour: it was not until the 1816 Waterloo Medal that the British army bestowed a 
generally awarded decoration for an action.98 For British officers the medals given to other 
armies were conspicuous, and even admirable. Gordon noted the awards worn by the soldiers of 
a distinguished French regiment during the 1808 retreat to Corunna: ‘We understood the Eighth 
[Dragoons] was a favourite corps; it had served in all the late campaigns, and gained great credit 
at Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, and Friedland; several of the officers wore the Cross of the 
Legion of Honour; and several of the sergeants and privates bore honorary badges.’ 99 Although 
the French army provided the most persistent example, other nations’ decorations were also 
noted. Wood compared continental armies with the British: ‘when I behold on the Continent the 
Russian, the Prussian, the Frenchman, the Spaniard, and soldiers of all nations, most of whom 
are decorated with these honourable badges, I certainly cannot help sighing at the scarcity of 
these memorable tokens of glory [in Britain].’100 As shown by Karen Hagemann, Napoleonic-era 
medals were crucial in communicating the wearer’s patriotic service to the public, and 
underscored their place within the nation.101 Memoir sources suggest that British junior officers, 
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especially those who did not receive a Waterloo medal, felt alienated from national memory as a 
result of the lack of British commendations. Wood emphasised the importance of physical 
symbols to honour culture,   
It is not the intrinsic value of these baubles that makes the soldier so covetous of 
them … [it is] the heartfelt satisfaction he would feel … showing the badge of 
emulation and distinction to his children, his family, his friends – a badge which 
would entitle him to say, “Merit, like this, my boys, has supported your King, your 
Constitution, your laws, and your freedom; gain but these, and you will for ever 
secure them.”102 
By arguing for individual decorations, junior officers envisaged a closer relationship between 
individual and national honour. Medals tied personal achievements to national honour in a 
mutually binding relationship. Universal decorations effectively reversed the elitism of honour 
culture, allowing for a greater celebration of junior officers and, possibly, common soldiers as 
national heroes.  
 
Fighting the Revolution 
The following two sections explore the expression of loyal and patriotic identities within the 
regular army, and also how these identities were affected by political and ideological 
developments in Britain and Europe throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The 
political life of the eighteenth-century British army has received little scholarly attention, 
despite army officers being prominent in politics: twenty per cent of Members of Parliament 
during the period 1790-1820 were army officers, including one in this study, Edward Charles 
Cocks.103 This scholarly oversight may stem from the view that the presence of military MPs 
represented civilian control over the military, reducing the view of soldiers and officers as 
political actors in their own right.104 While Nick Mansfield has explored the relationship 
between military service, political radicalism, and class during the early-nineteenth century; the 
majority of scholarship relating to the political views of the army has focused on its loyalty, even 
during periods of ideological and social tension.105 Despite dislike at being used as a police force, 
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the army proved reliable when called upon to quell internal disorder.106 The American War of 
Independence was a divisive period in British politics: loyalist MPs in favour of the status quo 
quarrelled with opposition Whigs who supported conciliation with American rebels, while the 
American struggle for political rights drove a popular push for parliamentary reform in 
Britain.107 Stephen Conway has revealed how the political backdrop to the American War 
divided military opinion. During this conflict, officers’ views on the conduct of the war ranged 
from conciliatory to ‘hard-line’; as some officers advocated crushing the rebellion through 
coercion.108 Despite these apparent schisms, Conway, Ira Gruber, and Armstrong Starkey, have 
all argued that political divisions had little impact on officers’ individual decisions to serve in 
the American war. Overall, few officers absented themselves from duty, and scholars have found 
little evidence of British sympathy for the American rebels.109 Hannah Smith and John Cookson 
have argued that the eighteenth-century army displayed an inclination towards national and 
public service which overrode political allegiances, perhaps explaining the muted political voice 
of the eighteenth-century army.110  
The French Revolution and subsequent war with France inspired ideological debates and 
tensions within Britain. 111  Events in France gave new impetus to radical and reformist politics 
as the parameters of the British constitution were fervently debated in radical publications, 
political societies, and clubs.112 Opposition politicians welcomed the initial stages of the 
Revolution as French steps towards British style mixed government, and argued against war 
with Revolutionary France on the grounds that the external threat to France was radicalising 
the Revolution.113 As a counter to the perceived threat of French inspired radicalism, 
conservative opinion mobilised behind the preservation of British constitutionalism and the 
Anglican Church, as popular loyalist societies formed and the government moved to repress 
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radical societies and thought throughout the 1790s.114 The response of the British army to this 
ideological and political ferment remains an under-studied aspect of the British response to the 
French Revolution. Clive Emsley revealed isolated instances of the radicalisation of rankers and 
identified a handful of officers who held pro-reform or radical sympathies during 1792, 
including three officers who were cashiered for their political beliefs.115 Emsley’s analysis, 
however, was limited to the realm of political activity and thought within Britain, and did not 
extend to opinions of soldiers engaged with French Republican armies. Far from remaining 
politically neutral, junior officer accounts from the early and mid-1790s reveal their ardent 
loyalism, as they were horrified by the perceived threat of republican ideology to European 
society. With ideological considerations at the fore, British officers saw themselves in a conflict 
with republicanism as much as with the French army, echoing the school of British ‘war 
crusaders’ identified by Emma Macleod.116 
Although primary source material for the Revolutionary period is sparse in comparison to the 
Napoleonic period, the existing sources suggest that the French republic embodied principles 
and actions that were anathema to junior officers’ view of society. This view applied to 
Revolution after its radicalisation, and contrasts with evidence the suggestion that officers were 
sympathetic to the Revolution’s early stages. Lieutenant David Powell of the 14th Light Dragoons 
saw republicanism and regicide as subverting the progress of the French state towards 
enlightened monarchy: ‘they had destroyed with their king, a mild, beneficent monarchy, 
gradually advancing to a wise & liberal reform of abuses & were now under the dominion of one 
the horridest regimes that the page of history gives an account of.’117 Inherent in junior officers’ 
criticisms was a belief in the institutions of European monarchies. Serving in the Low Countries 
in 1794, Lieutenant Charles Stewart of the 28th Foot recorded that republican ideology had 
undermined the authority of the stadtholder, William V of Orange. Stewart noting that the: 
‘pulse of the people to the allied cause … was completely hostile, there were some few instances 
expected of firm attachment to the House of Orange.’118 Junior officers viewed the spread of 
French republicanism and its values of liberty, equality, and anti-clericalism as a threat to 
European society and culture, particularly the order and stability provided by social 
hierarchies.119 Escorting French prisoners after the mid-1793 Siege of Valenciennes, Thomas 
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Powell was amazed at the discipline of the French soldiers, given their officers’ background: 
‘[they] looked very ragged & ill, but rather well disciplined, which appeared very extraordinary 
to us, as their officers were selected from the most black-guard part of their privates & one or 
two negroes amongst the officers that commanded Divisions.’120 Fighting against the slave 
revolt on Saint Domingue in 1797, Lieutenant Thomas Howard of the York Hussars was 
abhorred at the French emancipation of slavery: ‘the Negroes on the different Plantations 
through the Islands immediately shook of[f] the Yoke of Allegiance they owed to their 
masters.’121 
During the ideologically charged Revolutionary period, with debates over the nature of British 
society and constitution raging, British officers had a vested interest in maintaining the social 
status quo. This likely strengthened their anti-Revolutionary sentiments. In 1792, the British 
officer corps was a small cadre of 3, 107 officers drawn from a relatively narrow social base, and 
whose authority over the rank and file was founded on the hierarchical structure of British 
society.122 Naturally, junior officers feared the implications of egalitarianism for their own 
authority. Describing the abortive 1793 expedition in aid of French Royalists forces in western 
France, Stewart attributed the expeditions failure to the influence of republicanism on the 
Royalist army: ‘it was said there reigned in the army of the Royalist that spirit of equality so 
destructive of good order and Military Discipline; their chiefs were even afraid to … lead them to 
the coast lest should the Brittish forces not that moment be in sight they might fall victims to the 
fury of their Soldiers, as men who designed to betray them.’123 These concerns could be 
transferred to the British forces. David Powell feared that British soldiers would be seduced by 
French meritocracy: ‘considering the crisis we were at & the temper of the times it is miraculous 
how our armies could have been led on to fight against principles of so flattering & insidious a 
nature as that of the general cry Liberty & Equality.’124  
Furthermore, junior officers saw egalitarianism as a byword for violence, destruction, and 
chaos. David Powell commented that the French had: ‘under the name of a Republic … brought 
on the most frightful of anarchies: the destruction of the sacred principles of religion, or order of 
police … daringly covering their hideous misdeeds under the name of Liberty & Equality.’125 In 
Holland during 1793, Thomas Powell recorded meeting a village curate who had spent three 
weeks hiding his family from the French in a church vault: ‘Had they been seen, it was certain 
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death, as the French at that time, gave no quarter to clergy.’126 Howard believed that the sudden 
liberty given to slaves by the French Republic encouraged violent revolt. Howard described the 
slave uprising on Saint Domingue: ‘it was that the French Revolution in Europe was acted over 
again in the Colonies in Miniature: Murder, Assassination, Rape & Robbery was the order of the 
day.’127 Racial prejudice and familiarity with the cruel treatment of slaves also informed 
Howard’s reading of the slave revolt: ‘As revenge is the ruling Passion of a Negro, & as I am 
much Afraid cause sufficient existed from the inhumanity of some Whites to their Slaves, the 
whole island was immediately filled with Murder & Atrocities.’128 Although his reading of the 
revolt was shaped by his racial views and his awareness of the treatment of slaves, Howard still 
saw the sudden liberty awarded to slaves as allowing violence to erupt. Howard finally noted: 
‘in fact Language wants words to Express the Enormities committed in honor of the Rights of 
Man.’129 In addition to violence against people, British officers saw the chaos of the republic as 
damaging European culture and the values of European politeness.130 Having visited Antwerp 
Cathedral in 1794 and viewed artworks by Dutch masters, Stewart noted in his diary: 
‘Melancholy to reflect, the collection of ages were a few days after swept off by the rude hands of 
savage Barbarians and sent into the Kingdom of discord and rebellion.’131  
Criticisms of the British government and war effort, even after sustained periods of military 
underperformance, are notably absent from sources contemporary to the Revolutionary period, 
suggesting that even mild critiques of the established order were incongruent with junior 
officers’ loyalist identities. This stands in contrast to sources from the Napoleonic period, where 
officers saw critiques of the war effort as compatible with their patriotic identities. Up until the 
successful 1801 Egyptian campaign, Britain’s war with Revolutionary France was characterised 
by failure moderated only by British naval security: military expeditions to the continent met 
with disaster; the British army in the West Indies was defeated by slave insurrection and 
disease; and financially draining coalitions with European powers collapsed.132 These setbacks 
do not appear to have encouraged junior officers to offer criticisms of the war effort, an absence 
which may be attributed to the principles of conservative loyalism, which advocated support for 
the Pitt administration.133 In April 1801, Lieutenant Thomas Evans of the 8th Foot reflected in his 
diary on Pitt the Younger’s resignation and the ascent of the Addington administration. Evans 
feared this would bring peace with the French Directory: 
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The change of ministers at home has been received … with sorrow and surprise, for 
under all our country’s reverses heretofore, we had at least the consolation of 
knowing it to be governed by an able, patriotic and personally … disinterested 
[man], ‘twould in my mind, with such a man, be better to nobly struggle with the 
storms of fate, and greatly fall with a falling state, or by a noble contention against 
regicide usurpers and atheistical principles, to set our country out of the reach of 
danger, and place her in the proud attitude, to defend, and assert the general 
freedom of mankind, by leaving to the disturbers of it, as their only alternative, the 
reverting back to their former state of peace, and social order.134 
Junior officers’ antipathy to republican ideology likely made conservative loyalist discourses 
broadly appealing, however, more liberal minded officers may also have found it difficult to 
critique the war effort while appearing loyal. As emphasised by David Bindman and John 
Moores, the French Revolution was primarily interpreted in Britain through the lens of British 
politics and society, with revolutionary ideology projected onto domestic oppositional and 
reformist figures.135 This projection contributed to a habitual distrust of reformist politics, 
which. As revealed by Philip Harling, this made it near impossible for loyalists to articulate 
criticisms of the government or war effort, lest their loyalty be called into question.136 
Junior officers’ loyalism to the established social order is relatively apparent from their 
appraisals of the dangers of republican ideology, yet expressions of patriotism are harder to 
locate. It was not a certainty that junior officers would equate their loyalism with patriotism: 
patriotic language had been appropriated by a wide range of political voices during the 
eighteenth-century, including reformists and radicals.137 By the late-eighteenth century, 
however, loyalism and patriotism were coming into closer alignment. As demonstrated by 
Colley, George III strengthened the bond between the monarchy and British national identity.138 
Marilyn Morris has demonstrated how a participatory loyalist culture built up around George III 
during the Revolutionary period, encouraging the conflation of loyalism and patriotism.139 As 
demonstrated by Eric Evans, this view of patriotic loyalism also extended to loyalty to Pitt the 
Younger and his conservative government.140 From 1795 onwards, after the Jacobin terror had 
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subsided and the prospect of French invasion loomed, junior officers began to think of war in 
more patriotic terms, although these views were still coloured by anti-Republicanism.141 Evans’ 
description of Pitt as a patriotic leader, and his equation of the war with Revolutionary France 
as a patriotic endeavour: ‘to set our country out of the reach of danger’; suggests that Evans saw 
support for the government and the war as distinctly patriotic.142 Concerns over French 
territorial expansion figure more prominently in accounts from the late-1790s. Howard saw the 
emancipation of West Indian slaves as a tool for extending French colonial power: ‘thinking that 
an infinitely more secure way of maintaining the Colonies in their Interest than if they had given 
any further encouragement to the White Inhabitants … by politically bestowing so great a Gift as 
Freedom to these People, they judged they should always be able to maintain a decided 
Superiority.’143 Reflecting on the failed 1799 campaign in Holland, Evans described Britain’s 
efforts as an expedition: ‘in the cause of rational freedom … altho’ defeated by French perfidy 
and intrigue [it] will ever remain a moment of virtue, disinterestedness, and greatness of 
soul.’144 Loyalism allowed for the development of patriotic identities in seemingly unlikely 
candidates, such as Peter Jennings, the sole Irish Catholic officer in this study. As highlighted 
previously, the relationship between national and personal honour allowed Jennings to identify 
with Britain. It was Jennings’ loyalism; however, which directed him into the British service. 
Jennings highlighted his loyalty to the French monarchy during the French Revolution, 
describing Republicanism as a ‘horrible conspiracy’ which extended a ‘harmful influence’ over 
the French people.145 Jennings’ desire to combat the Revolution led him into the Irish Brigade in 
the British service, and after the Irish Brigade’s disbandment, into the 28th Foot in 1798. 
Describing his joining the 28th, Jennings conflated his desire to fight in ‘a just & lawful War’ with 
British patriotism: ‘it was not my wish … to remain an idle member of the community at a time 
particularly when the dearest interests of the Country were at stake.’146  
 
Fighting Napoleon 
The evolution in junior officers’ patriotic expression that can be detected from the late-1790s 
continued throughout the Napoleonic period. Particularly after the 1803 invasion scare, the 
‘Black Legend’ surrounding Napoleon provoked a strong emotional response regarding the 
defence of Britain as a place, as Napoleon provided junior officers with an enduring and 
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ominous figure to project their fears of French invasion onto. The broadening effect of invasion 
scares is tempered, however, by the continued use of ‘England’ as a description of their 
homeland by English officers, suggesting that ‘Britishness’ did not necessarily become the 
primary national identity for English officers. From 1803 onwards, junior officers saw 
intervention in Europe as a patriotic act, as they conflated the cause of European liberation with 
the defence of Britain. Napoleon’s image in British culture was central to this relationship, as 
junior officers perceived Napoleon as a tyrant, desirous of conquering Europe, including Britain. 
Invasion scares occurred during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period; however, the way 
they were interpreted in British culture differed. As shown by Alexandra Franklin, visual satires 
during the 1798 invasion scare projected invasion fears onto British domestic politics, using 
fear of the French to attack opposition Whigs or the Pitt administration.147 In contrast, visual 
satires produced during the invasion scare of 1803 focused on the conflict between the non-
partisan figure of ‘John Bull’, and Napoleon, encouraging the view that war with France 
transcended politics.148 To counter the potentially sympathetic view of Napoleon as a self-made 
ruler, loyalist publications portrayed Napoleon as a vain despot who sought to oppress Britain, 
and suggested that Napoleon’s alleged atrocities on his campaigns in Italy, Syria, and Egypt 
would be visited on Britain if the French invaded.149 Stuart Semmel has argued that the British 
response to Napoleon in 1803 struck a patriotic chord as loyalist discourses focused on the 
universal suffering that would occur from a French invasion, reinforcing a sense of national, if 
not social, unity.150 This image of Napoleon was particularly durable amongst junior officers. By 
exploring children’s play during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, Kathryn Gleadle has 
demonstrated how growing up during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars shaped 
the loyal and patriotic identities of adults.151 The officers in this study were overwhelmingly 
young, ensuring that many of the junior officers who fought against Napoleon had grown up 
knowing only a world where Britain and France were at war, which may have made them 
particularly susceptible to anti-Napoleonic propaganda.  
Contemporary accounts suggest that junior officers were influenced by many aspects of the 
Napoleonic ‘Black Legend’ during wartime. The extent of Napoleon’s dominion over Europe, and 
especially his conquest of Spain, confirmed the image of Napoleon as a tyrant and the belief that 
war with Napoleon was a war for European liberty. French allies until 1808, Napoleon’s 
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attempted conquest of Spain sparked a national uprising, as Madrid revolted against the French 
occupation on 2 May.152 This uprising was met with widespread enthusiasm in Britain. The 
British public and politicians of all stripes latched onto the cause of Spanish patriotism in the 
face of foreign despotism at a time of otherwise pessimism over the war effort. A British force 
dispatched to Portugal on 12 July.153 Warre, an officer with the 1808 expedition, was invigorated 
before his departure for Portugal. Warre wrote to his father: 
The Army are in the highest spirits; indeed the cause we are engaged in is the 
noblest a soldier could wish, and to support the liberties and independence of a 
country so lately our enemy. To forget all animosity and cordially join against the 
common enemy of Europe, the would-be Tyrant of the world, is worthy of the 
British name; and a soldier’s heart must be cold indeed that would not warm with 
enthusiasm in such a cause… May God assist the Right. It may be the crisis of the 
Tyrant’s power. If he fails now, it may open the eyes of Europe.154 
Although the zeal which accompanied the initial stages of the Peninsular War abated, the image 
of Napoleon as a cruel tyrant endured amongst junior officers. In a March 1814 letter to his 
sister, Captain Charles Kinloch, a Scottish officer in the 52nd Foot, expressed his fears for French 
Royalists who welcomed the British into Bordeaux: ‘It is most sincerely to be hoped that their 
good people will not at some future period suffer for their loyalty. In the event of a peace with 
Buonaparte their position will be most lamentable.’155 As Napoleon’s return from exile put paid 
to his retirement plans, a Scottish officer in the 79th Highlanders, Captain John Sinclair, lamented 
to his sister: ‘alas how soon are all my fine prospects and flattering hopes blasted, by the escape 
of that Distroyer [sic] of mankind, who has so easily again obtained possession of the Throne of 
France … also sorry am I to say that we are again to commence the war.’156  
Napoleon’s personal character, particularly his supposed vanity and hubris, was a favoured 
topic of officers, even during the French Consulate. Visiting an Egyptian village in 1801 that had 
previously been stormed by Napoleon, Evans reflected on the village’s earlier visitor:  
This is the village which Buonaparte … mentions as being so valiantly stormed by 
the Republicans. God knows how little capable of defence is this said village … but it 
being about the time of the defeat of his fleet in Aboukir Bay, Buonaparte might 
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perhaps intend his pompous account of the victorious career of the French arms 
from Alexandria to Rosetta as a kind of set off against that of the glorious Nelson.157 
In the wake of Waterloo, Lieutenant Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards speculated in a 
letter to his mother that the soldiers who captured Napoleon’s carriage: ‘found many bulletins & 
proclamations dated from his imperial palace at Brussels, so confident was he of success.’158 
Stationed in Paris in July 1815, Ensign Robert Bakewell of the 27th Foot visited various 
monuments to French victories, but especially noted Napoleon’s self-promotion: ‘the letters 
“N.B.” are placed in the most public positions … for the buildings were scarcely consider’d to be 
complete without being adorned.’159 Napoleon’s self-aggrandisement was central to how British 
officers understood the war, as they attributed the destruction of warfare to Napoleon’s 
unrelenting ambition. Keep wrote to his mother from southern France in late-1813: ‘How 
strange it appears that all these horrors should arise from the ambition of an individual, when 
he himself might his “quietus make with a bare bodkin”, an acre of ground suffice to maintain 
him, and a few feet of it to hide his remains.’160 Upon hearing of Napoleon’s return from exile in 
1815, Kinloch wrote to his mother: ‘The question of peace or war now seems to be whether the 
French nation will fight for Buonaparte. It is hardly possible to conceive that the government 
would sacrifice so many thousand lives merely for the person of one man.’161 
For officers who witnessed the effects of warfare on Europe, it was not difficult to imagine the 
same occurring in Britain. Describing a series of French atrocities against Spanish civilians in 
the Peninsula in his journal, Lieutenant George Simmons drew on anti-Napoleonic discourse to 
describe his feelings: ‘O happy England! surrounded by an element over which thy sons in their 
wooden walls triumphantly sway, and on thy happy shores the arms of that tyrant who has 
deluged Europe in blood can have no influence. May it ever be so is my earnest prayer!’162  
Visiting Copenhagen after its surrender to British forces in September 1807 following a six-day 
bombardment, Lieutenant John Christopher Harrison of the 23rd Foot wrote to his father: ‘To 
have War in your own country is a most dreadful thing. With what cheerfulness the English 
ought to pay their taxes to keep them from such a burden. I never saw such destruction.’163  This 
call to patriotism allowed for the blurring of intervention in Europe with the defence of Britain. 
                                                          
157 NAM 1995-09-101,Lieutenant Thomas Evans, diary, 19 Apr. 1801, pp. 126-7. 
158 Lieutenant Orlando Bridgeman, 21 Jun. 1815, in Bridgeman, A Young Gentleman at War, p. 178. 
159 NAM 1975-09-75, Diary of Robert Bakewell, Vol. II, p. 59. 
160 Lieutenant William Thornton Keep, 28 Dec. 1813, in Keep, In the Service of the King, p. 195. 
161 Captain Charles Kinloch, 18 Apr. 1815, in Kinloch, A Hellish Business, pp. 211-2. 
162 Lieutenant George Simmons, journal, 6 Mar. 1811, in George Simmons, A British Rifleman: Journals and 
Correspondence during the Peninsular War and the Campaign of Wellington, ed. Willoughby Verner (London, 
1986), p. 138. 
163 NAM 1980-08-56, Lieutenant John Christopher Harrison, 8 Sep. 1807. 
221 
 
Writing his diary from Copenhagen, Captain Charles Pasley of the Royal Engineers, recalled 
defending the British assault on Copenhagen to a Danish baron and his family: 
We told them that as individuals we were mere instruments, that we regretted very 
much having had hostilities with the Danes, but we believed our Government had 
sufficient & certain intelligence of the designs of France to render this violent 
measure necessary an act of necessity … we always tell them that the Fortune of 
War varies, and that we should not at all be surprised to see our enemy in 
England.164 
This is not to suggest that British officers had unwavering support for the cause of European 
liberty. Daly has revealed how the early enthusiasm for Spanish liberation dissipated during the 
Peninsular War, as British soldiers believed their efforts in Spain, especially between 1808 and 
1810, went unappreciated.165 Enthusiasm for the cause of Spanish patriotism was not necessary 
for British officers to realise the value of maintaining a European front against Napoleon. 
Lamenting Spanish infighting and the lack of support given to the British, Cocks wrote to his 
brother in late-1809: ‘But are we here for motives purely disinterested or because the interests 
of Spain and England tend towards the same centre? Certainly from the latter cause. Therefore, 
however untoward and irritating these circumstances may be, we should not be lukewarm in 
fighting and exerting ourselves for England.’166  
Emblematic of how the external threat posed by Napoleon broadened the scope of patriotism 
within the British army was the diversity of political discussion that occurred at the lowest 
levels of the officer corps. The topic of how the nation’s interests were best served became a 
matter of debate. In contrast to the Revolutionary period, where fears over republican ideology 
fostered a conservative patriotism that made junior officers reluctant to criticise the 
government, the Napoleonic period saw officers criticising governments or embracing reformist 
ideas in their hopes of improving the war effort. These developments coincided with a thawing 
of the political atmosphere in Britain from 1805.167 Then an ensign with the 48th Foot, Crowe’s 
description of a Northampton lawyer who attempted to have a fellow officer arrested as: ‘a 
violent Whig, fond of finding fault with government and everything therewith connected. A 
complaint against the military was consequently quite to his taste’; suggests that oppositional 
politics were seen by some officers as unpatriotic.168 Highlighting the breadth of thought within 
the army are rare instances of officers who were sympathetic to oppositional political views. 
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Citing the high cost or futility of war with Napoleon, opposition politicians argued for a 
withdrawal from the continent to fight a defensive war, or to sue for peace with France.169 
Ensign John Mills of the Coldstream Guards, a future Whig MP, was routinely pessimistic about 
the war in the Peninsula and the Perceval government in his letters home. Mills suggested in an 
1811 letter to his mother that Britain was best served avoiding continental intervention: ‘we 
shall be told … that in the end the French must be beat. More money must be granted to carry on 
the expense of the war and England must be drained to support it. At the end of a few years, 
people will open their eyes and see they have been humbugged.’170  
Between these two poles were officers who were critical of the way war with Napoleon was 
conducted, reflecting the emergence of loyalist critiques of the war effort in Britain from 
1805.171 Military debacles could provoke criticism of the government’s handling of the war. 
Suffering from fever during the last days of the catastrophic 1809 Walcheren campaign, Keep 
wrote to his mother in the hope that the government and Lord Chatham, the expedition’s 
commander, would face consequences for the failure: ‘I hope we shall hear the talk of a change 
of Ministry confirmed by the next arrivals, and that Lord Chatham’s trial has commenced, but 
his acquittal seems certain, and although he is much laughed at he is not blamed.’172 Having read 
the accounts of the disastrous siege of Burgos and subsequent retreat into Portugal in the 
British newspapers, Lieutenant John Aitchison of the 3rd Foot Guards wrote to his father in 
December 1812: 
I am glad however to notice that the blame is generally thrown upon the Ministry, 
not on the general and the army … The Ministry are accused of impolicy in not 
providing sufficient means of transport – the accusation is just … They are accused 
too of unnecessary delay in sending reinforcements after the battle of Salamanca – 
this is so clearly just, as I think must damn their capacity for conducting a vigorous 
(which in the end is the most economical) war – they have forfeited the confidence 
of the world by it and I only hope will receive its reward in being dismissed.173 
For Aitchison, therefore, criticising the government was not only congruent with his patriotic 
identity, but the full expression of it.  
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The space provided for criticism of the government also invited radical critiques of government 
and society, which viewed the war effort as not just being mishandled, but undermined by the 
corruption of the British elite. Peter Spence has demonstrated how a potent strand of ‘romantic 
radicalism’ had emerged in Britain by 1807.174 This political movement expressed its patriotism 
through support for the monarchy and the war against France, but saw the war effort as directly 
connected to national virtue. Radicals argued for an end to political corruption, and for military 
and parliamentary reform to invigorate the war effort.175 Military and public scandals, such as 
the Convention of Sintra and the 1809 Duke of York scandal, where it emerged that York’s 
mistress had accepted bribes to expedite promotions, strengthened the argument that the 
British elite was inherently corrupt.176 As a result of their military experiences, some junior 
officers could become sympathetic to reformist or radical ideals, ideals which were a direct 
product of junior officers’ relatively low status in the military hierarchy: officers could become 
embittered towards the influence of patronage and wealth in obtaining promotions for well-
connected officers, particularly on the part of officers who felt their merit was unrecognised. 
Complaints over aristocratic corruption of promotions could politicise junior officers, who saw 
military reform as a vehicle for criticising the establishment. This is demonstrated by the case of 
Captain Henry Foskett of the 15th Hussars. As the senior captain with the 15th in 1806, Foskett 
was blocked from having the regulated first opportunity of purchasing a vacant majority in the 
regiment by the Duke of Cumberland, the 15th’s nominal commander and the eighth son of 
George III. Foskett alleged that Cumberland had accepted bribes to ensure that officers from 
outside the regiment succeeded to the vacancies.177 After having an initial request for a report 
into Cumberland’s actions under the Articles of War blocked by Cumberland and the Duke of 
York, Foskett unsuccessfully petitioned the House of Commons, before publishing his 
complaints in the 1810 pamphlet, The Rights of the Army Vindicated. In this pamphlet, Foskett 
attacked Cumberland and York for subverting the rule of law and abusing their privileged 
position: ‘The regular channels through which he was entitled to approach the Throne, has been 
closed to him … by a gross violation of the Articles of War, and by an actual invasion of the Royal 
Prerogative.’178 Cumberland and York’s circumvention of junior officers’ legal means of redress, 
argued Foskett, made his affair one of professional and individual rights in the face of 
overbearing control by superior officers. Foskett stated that Cumberland and York had 
deprived: ‘this important and numerous class of men their only bulwark against oppression 
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from their Military superiors … At that moment the case of Captain Foskett assumed an entirely 
new character. It was no longer a case of mere individual oppression, but one in which the 
whole army had a deep interest.’179  
Officers who were critical of the elite leadership of the British army could project their 
criticisms onto a national canvas. Critical officers viewed their concerns over military efficacy 
and the rights of the military’s constituent members as converging with a wider debate over the 
rights of British citizens and national welfare. Lieutenant George James Sullivan of the 1st Life 
Guards saw the personal corruption of his regiment’s aristocratic leader, Major Camac, as 
symptomatic of a national malaise. In his unpublished memoir, Sullivan portrayed Camac as the 
epitome of aristocratic vice. In Sullivan’s account, Camac engaged in petty disputes with his 
subordinates; convened courts martial on which he gave evidence and provided judgement; 
entered into arguments with Sullivan over the affections of a maid; and incompetently led his 
regiment into the field after obtaining his rank through political connections.180 Sullivan saw 
Camac’s promotion as auguring ill for Britain: 
I blush for my Country. If Merit is to be buried in oblivion and interest to lead such 
Heroes as Major Camac to the Field –“good bye then say I Britain, thy days of Gloy 
will be but short” … Is it then proper to promote such men because they are the sons 
of Peers, and men of high rank or fortune? It is a shame to entail such disgrace upon 
a nation!!181 
For Foskett, his mistreatment at the hands of superiors raised questions about whether the 
British elite had undermined constitutional safeguards:  
his complaints were no longer confined to wrongs inflicted in the course of Military 
service, but involved a charge against a person in a high official situation, of breach 
of duty and abuse of power; - as they imputed to that person an act, not only tending 
to deprive the whole Army of the protection afforded it by law, against injustice and 
oppression, but amounting to a direct and absolute denial of justice, and thereby 
affecting the dearest rights of the subject, as explained and established by the great 
Charter of British Liberty.182 
Without protection for personal rights, Foskett suggested that the: ‘British army would be 
better qualified to fight under the banners of an ambitious tyrant … than those of A MILD AND 
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BENEFICIENT SOVERGEIN, MAGNANIMOUSLY CONTENDING FOR THE STABILITY OF HIS 
THRONE, THE SECURITY OF HIS PEOPLE, AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE CIVILIZED 
WORLD.’183  
In criticising the establishment, Foskett and Sullivan demonstrated how far notions of 
patriotism within the British officer corps had evolved during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. Their Revolutionary-era predecessor’s spooked by the threat of republicanism, would 
have found such strident criticism of the British government inconceivable. By advocating for 
specifically British rights, rather than the rights of the English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish, they also 
demonstrate the capacity of the British armed forces to consolidate an overarching British 
national identity. Through a mix of cultural recognition, sharing of honour, and war with 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, the melting-pot of the British army provided a sense of 
British commonality.  
                                                          
183 Foskett, The Rights of the Army Vindicated, p. 9. 
226 
 
Conclusion: Memory and Medals 
Napoleon’s return from his first exile in February 1815 sparked a renewed crisis, as ‘The 
Hundred Days’ threw doubt on the future state of Europe.1 Despite the strident anti-Napoleonic 
sentiments which are present in their accounts, not all junior British officers were distraught at 
the idea of fighting Napoleon again. Facing slow promotion or demobilisation in the peacetime 
army, Lieutenant George Bowles of the Coldstream Guards wrote candidly to a friend that the 
resumption of hostilities might be a boon for his stalled career: ‘Selfishly speaking I ought to 
pray for a campaign, as my only chance of promotion … but you will have so bad an opinion of 
my patriotism that I shall not venture to say what I wish for.’2 The allied victory at the Battle of 
Waterloo on 18 June 1815 was characterised by particularly intense fighting, with 50, 000 men 
dying in a single day within a compact battlefield.3 In the days that followed, junior officers who 
fought at Waterloo came to the realisation that they had been a part of a decisive and 
monumental event. The day after the battle, Bowles wrote to the same friend: 
I congratulate you heartily as I know you would me on the glorious (though dearly 
earned) laurels of yesterday; a day which will always stand proudly pre-eminent in 
the annals of the British army. A more desperate, and probably a more important, 
battle for the interest of Europe has hardly occurred even during the great events of 
the last three campaigns.4 
Officers who were not involved at the battle were similarly ecstatic at the news of the victory. 
Captain Charles Kinloch of the 52nd Foot wrote to his mother from his barracks as the news 
broke in Britain: ‘The fall of the tyrant has been as rapid as his last rise & how perfectly visible 
throughout the whole, is the hand of divine providence!’5  
Bowles and Kinloch’s initial elation soon gave way, as both served with the army of occupation 
in Paris throughout the remainder of 1815 and into 1816. The outlook for junior army officers 
in the post-war period was bleak. Keen to reduce government expenditure, the British 
demobilised 100, 000 soldiers in 1816, followed by another 32, 000 soldiers and sailors the 
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following year.6 As regiments had their second and third battalions disbanded, the junior 
officers who served in these additional battalions were placed on half-pay - still paid at the 1714 
pay rate - while those who remained faced slow promotion rates and the potential for long 
service in an overseas garrison.7 While some of the officers in this study managed to persevere 
with their careers beyond these demobilisations, half of the surviving officers in this study had 
left the army by the end of 1820. Within this context, Kinloch was not optimistic about his 
prospects. Kinloch wrote home from France in October 1815 that he and his brother, who 
served in the same regiment, would soon be without a career: ‘I think it very likely the 2nd 
Battalion will be reduced in a month or so, & my father will have the two broken soldiers back 
upon his hands.’8 After remaining with the army of occupation for the winter, Kinloch was 
eventually placed on half-pay in mid-1816. Bowles fared better than Kinloch and retired as a 
general in 1843, yet he was despondent about the state of Britain in the aftermath of war. As 
Britain was gripped by economic depression and political radicalism threatened the political 
and social status quo, Bowles expressed his concern: ‘I cannot help shuddering at what a few 
years’ peace may do in England. The rapid growth of Methodism, the encouragement of which is 
now interwoven with the Opposition system, by making the lower classes conceive themselves 
… superior to the upper, must have a decidedly bad political effect.’9  
As the nineteenth century progressed, veterans of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars reflected on the meaning of the wars in British culture in their memoirs, and took a keen 
interest in how the combatants who served in the various campaigns of the wars were 
remembered. Junior officers’ concepts of glory were grounded in memory. Being remembered 
and acknowledged for having patriotically served the nation was the standard by which glory 
was measured. As demonstrated by Catriona Kennedy, the Battle of Waterloo assumed a 
dominant position in the post-war narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, as 
artistic and literary depictions of the battle abounded.10 In the post-war decades, junior officers 
eagerly campaigned for their share of the glory surrounding Waterloo. In his revised diary, 
Lieutenant Charles Crowe of the 27th Foot, or ‘Inniskillings’, argued that histories of Waterloo 
were unfavourably balanced to a few notable regiments: ‘the little gallant band of Enniskilleners 
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is only mentioned by their desperate loss in killed and wounded; where as reading the history of 
the battle of Waterloo, a civilian is led to imagine that the Guards and hussars fought the whole 
of the hard fight!’11 Captain Jonathan Leach of the 95th Rifles felt that post-war press coverage of 
Waterloo unduly favoured Scottish regiments: ‘convincing nine-tenths of the people in England, 
and nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand in Scotland, that the Scottish regiments 
were the only people who pulled a trigger on the left of the British position throughout the 
whole.’12 
Stuart Semmel has highlighted how the story of Waterloo was communicated to the British 
people through material objects, such as museum exhibitions displaying objects from the battle, 
which allowed civilians to interact directly with the ‘memory’ of Waterloo.13 Through the 
distribution of the 1816 Waterloo medal, the first universally awarded British campaign medal, 
the Battle of Waterloo provided a physical emblem by which veterans could communicate their 
service to civilians. The Waterloo medal also created an exclusionary sense of memory, with the 
lack of a comparable decoration for other veterans proving to be a point of discontent during 
the first half of the nineteenth century, especially amongst Peninsular War veterans.14 For 
Peninsular Veterans, the Waterloo medal was emblematic of their erasure from the collective 
memory of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Captain John Blakiston wrote in his 
memoir that Peninsular veterans were: ‘ribandless and unnoticed, while his more fortunate 
fellow-soldier, who, perhaps, never saw a shot fired before or since that one occasion, struts 
about with his Waterloo medal!’15 Without recognition, junior officers were concerned that their 
service would fade from memory, particularly in light of the awarding of the Waterloo medal. 
Jonathan Leach, a captain with the 95th Rifles in the Peninsula, felt that the lack of medals for 
Peninsular veterans would see their service fade from memory: ‘if the names of Vimeira, 
Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria &c. &c. should be partially remembered, the actors in those scenes 
(with a few exceptions) will be entirely forgotten.’16 Sherer reflected that the veterans of the 
Battle of Albuera: ‘had the mortification of walking, unnoticed and undecorated, by the side of 
the more fortunate heroes of Waterloo.’17 
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13 Stuart Semmel, ‘Reading the Tangible Past: British Tourism, Collecting, and Memory after Waterloo’, 
Representations, 69 (2000), pp. 9-37. 
14 Jasper Heinzen, ‘Transnational Affinities and Invented Traditions: The Napoleonic Wars in British and 
Hanoverian Memory, 1815-1915’, English Historical Review, 127 (2012), p. 1422. 
15 John Blakiston, Twenty Years in Retirement, Vol. II (London, 1836), p. 39. 
16 Jonathan Leach, Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier (London, 1831), p. 405. 
17 Moyle Sherer, Recollections of the Peninsula (London, 1825), p. 164. 
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Medals had been awarded to officers in the Peninsula; however, these were piecemeal and 
usually awarded by regiments or to senior officers.18 Junior officers who were Peninsular War 
veterans saw these medals as reflective of a system which favoured senior officers, or well-
connected elites. William Grattan, a former lieutenant of the 88th Foot who served extensively in 
the Peninsula, campaigned for a Peninsular medal throughout the nineteenth century, collecting 
his arguments in the 1845 tract, The Duke of Wellington and the Peninsular Medal. Grattan stated 
his belief that the military system was prejudiced against junior officers, including those who 
had demonstrated incomparable bravery by leading the storming of fortresses: ‘what medals 
were given, to those officers who led forlorn hopes in the Peninsula? The question is easily 
answered. The officers who volunteered this dangerous service WERE THEN SUBALTERNS!’19 
Despite receiving a Waterloo medal, Leach argued along similar lines for his Peninsular army 
comrades. Leach cited the example of junior officers who: ‘served throughout the whole of those 
seven years, without have received a single badge. And why? Simply because they held no 
higher rank than that of captain or subaltern during the succession of campaigns, and 
consequently never commanded a battalion in a general action.’20 Eventually, despite opposition 
from Wellington, veterans of other campaigns of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
were awarded the 1848 Military General Service Medal.  
Junior officers’ scramble for post-war glory fed into an established interpretation of their 
military experiences which was defined by their status as junior officers. The sense of obscurity 
and unfulfilled aspiration which is present in veterans’ campaigns for a decoration in the mould 
of the Waterloo medal is reflective of the general sense of obscurity which characterised many 
junior officers’ writings throughout the war and which was a feature of their post-war memoirs. 
In railing against the preference given to senior or well-connected officers, junior officers 
revealed their aspirations for glory and promotion, and also their angst that these went 
unfulfilled. This was reflective of a wider identity and set of sensibilities which were the product 
of junior officers’ middling status within the army. Junior officers’ place within the military 
hierarchy was complex, and was characterised by the tension between the authority and status 
which a commission bestowed on junior officers, and the subordination they experienced at the 
hands of superior officers. These factors were not unique to this period; however, the specific 
conditions of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars likely contributed to the creation 
and consolidation of a coherent ‘junior officer’ identity in ways that were less likely in earlier 
conflicts, both inside and outside the army. Mass mobilisation vastly expanded the number of 
                                                          
18 Lesley Smurthwaite, ‘Glory is Priceless! Awards to the British Army during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars’, in The Road to Waterloo: The British Army and the Struggle against Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France, ed. Alan J. Guy (London, 1990), pp. 164-83.  
19 William Grattan, The Duke of Wellington and the Peninsular Medal (London, 1845), p. 7.  
20 Leach, Rough Sketches, p. 403.  
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junior officers serving with the British army, and consequently brought together a large body of 
individuals with a shared set of values, characteristics, and aspirations. Their identity as junior 
officers was then reinforced by their military experiences. Furthermore, the sheer length of the 
wars allowed individual officers the time to reflect on their position within the military, and on 
the relationship between their values as members of Georgian society, and the realities of 
military service. Through their writings, junior officers were important in constructing and 
consolidating this identity, as they chose to represent themselves not only as soldiers or officers, 
but specifically as junior officers. This is especially the case with regards to officers’ memoirs, 
which were written for a reading public who were eager for personal stories of war, a literary 
trend which dovetailed with, and legitimised, junior officers’ experiences of the wars.  
Often entering the army in their late-teens fired with the new found freedom their commission 
afforded them, junior officers could find the military profession to be somewhat disenchanting. 
The lack of agency inherent in their position saw junior officers see their rank as a trial they had 
to pass through before moving onto greater things via long-awaited promotion. Frustration with 
this position could engender anger at the established political and military hierarchy, including 
sympathy for radical politics. Junior officers were ambitious, with many seeking to make a 
career out of the army.  Owing to their youth, junior officers looked to the paternal care of 
regimental commanders and the fraternal bonds of their fellow junior officers as something of a 
substitute for their being uprooted from their families. Yet, despite defining themselves by their 
military careers and being embedded within a ‘regimental family’, junior officers’ identities 
were not wholly consumed by the military dimension of their lives. Families were an especially 
important civilian point of contact for junior officers. Letters flew between family members at 
home and in barracks or abroad, allowing family members to participate in family life. 
Furthermore, family and military identities regularly intertwined. Some officers entered the 
army as part of a family tradition, while others shared in their campaign experiences with their 
wives, children, or brothers.  
Nor were military men solely products of the military. Junior officers were open to a wide range 
of influences from late-Georgian society, particularly the influences of polite masculinity. Junior 
officers’ status as ‘polite gentlemen’ provided a model for male interaction between officers, 
while debates over honour were also informing how officers related to each other. Class 
distinctions between officers manifested themselves within the army, as elite regiments 
adhered to a more opulent concept of politeness than their more austere comrades in line 
regiments. As ‘polite gentlemen’, junior officers erected social and cultural distinctions between 
themselves and their men, which reinforced the military hierarchy while also encouraging 
officers to treat their men with humanity and sparking debate over the use of corporal 
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punishment in the army. In addition to the influences of gender and class, junior officers were 
also fighting in a ‘British’ army, in a war they first conceived of as an ideological struggle, which 
then evolved into a patriotic struggle for national survival. Serving within this patriotic British 
context reinforced junior officers’ sense of ‘European’ identity, while contributing to a common 
sense of ‘Britishness’ between officers drawn from across Britain and Ireland.  
Knowing more about this group can inform other aspects of the British world during the 
nineteenth century. Junior officers would help shape the British Empire. As demonstrated by 
Christine Wright, the lack of opportunities for former British officers in Britain saw them seek 
out careers in the colonies, as a steady flow of veterans, especially Peninsular War veterans, 
arrived in Australia as colonial administrators between 1820 and 1840.21 Despite noting that 
subalterns’ memoirs constituted a broadening narrative of the war, Kennedy has argued that 
subaltern’s narratives of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars did not ‘fundamentally 
question’ the social and political status quo of Britain.22  Junior officers were certainly keen to 
iterate their moral superiority to the rank and file, yet this did not preclude junior officers from 
questioning the military and political establishment, particularly when their hopes for 
promotion or recognition were frustrated. This could result in a number of officers questioning 
the system of awarding commissions and promotions by purchase, as well as reflecting 
negatively on how the British nation was governed by political elites. By campaigning for 
universal medals awarded on the basis of service and merit, rather than rank or social standing, 
former junior officers were actively arguing for a potentially subversive symbol of patriotism. 
Within this context, the role of former army officers in Britain’s post-war political landscape 
requires further research.  
That British junior officers of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars came to identify 
as junior officers as a result of their military experiences is illustrative as to the nuances which 
existed within the British military hierarchy of the late-Georgian army. Often portrayed as a 
homogenous block with a set of social and cultural sensibilities which distinguished officers 
from the rank and file, the British officer corps was instead characterised by ambiguity and 
conflicting ambitions. Junior officers certainly had more in common with their superiors than 
with the rank and file, and aspired to attain the lofty position occupied by senior officers; yet 
they also saw their lot in life to be markedly different from those who held high rank. Junior 
officers’ view of the world and themselves was firmly from the middle, a perspective which saw 
junior officers develop a collective sense of their place within the British army. 
                                                          
21 Christine Wright, Wellington’s Men in Australia: Peninsular War Veterans and the Making of Empire, c. 1820-
40 (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 12-30. 
22 Kennedy, Narratives, p. 196. 
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